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BOCKSHAMMER 


FREEDOM  OF  THE  HUMAN  WILL. 


TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  GERMAN, 


AHbBiTia^s 

BY 

A.  KAUFMAN,  Jr. 

Of  the  Theological  Seminary,  Andover. 


ANDOVER: 

PUBLISHED  BY  GOULD  AND  NEWMAN. 

1835. 


S4 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1835, 

By  Gould  and  Newman, 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  Massachusetts. 


^<r^^^ 


OF  THE 


'/-^ 


(UNIVERSITTJ 


AUTHOR'S   PREFACE. 


The  Author  of  the  present  investigation  has  either 
no  justifying  reason  to  offer  why  his  views  on  the 
Freedom  of  the  human  Will  are  here  made  known, 
after  so  much  has  been  thought  and  published  by 
others,  and  why  he  may  have  chosen  the  most  difficult 
of  all  problems  of  philosophy  as  the  object  of  his  first 
literary  effort : — or  if  he  have,  that  justification  must 
be  found  in  the  work  itself.  Hence  all  further  anx- 
iety to  justify  the  undertaking  before  the  public  in  a 
preface,  or  any  effort  to  excuse  it,  must  necessarily  be 
superfluous,  or  would  be  vain.  It  only  remains  then 
that  the  preface  attempt  to  bring  the  reader  to  an  un- 
derstanding with  respect  to  some  of  the  more  external 
circumstances  of  the  writing. 


IV  PREFACE. 

To  him  who  at  the  very  commencement  may  wish 
to  come  as  quickly  as  possible  to  a  clear  knowledge  of 
the  book,  it  may,  indeed,  seem  to  be  a  deficiency,  that 
it  is  not  definitely  announced  at  the  beginning  to  what 
scientific  system  the  author  belongs.  It  is  true  that 
by  making  such  a  declaration  the  introductory  sur- 
vey might  be  rendered  more  easy  and  clear,  there 
would  be  an  anticipation  of  the  results,  and  in  general 
an  immediate  classification  might  be  made.  But  this 
small  inconvenience  was  unavoidable  from  the  circum- 
stance that  the  Author  did  not  start  out  from  any  fin- 
ished system  either  of  another's  or  of  his  own  ;  nor 
was  it  his  design  simply  to  set  forth  results  previously 
determined  upon,  and  to  encompass  them  with  proofs. 
His  purpose  was  rather  to  search  out  results  themselves 
and  to  deduce  them  from  the  investigation.  Although 
not  now  philosophizing  for  the  first  time,  yet  the 
Author  believed  that  as  he  had  undertaken  to  consider 
the  Freedom  of  the  Will  anew,  it  was  obligatory  upon 
him  to  preserve  the  freedom  of  investigation  also  as  pure 
as  might  be.  Philosophical  Principles,  however, 
from  which  one  can  proceed  to  conclusions,  have  al- 
ways appeared  to  him  to  be  something  entirely  dif- 
ferent from  prepared  Forms  into  which  the  thoughts 
are  to  be  moulded.  Much  rather  are  these  principles 
productive,  when,  like  germs,  they  are  still  enveloped, 


PREFACE.  V 

and  from  which,  in  proportion  to  the  energy  of  their 
plastic  power,  the  growth  of  scientific  knowing  may 
develope  itself  organically. 

In  the  present  condition  of  science  the  thoughts 
and  discoveries  of  earlier  inquirers  unquestionably  be- 
long to  the  elements  and  conditions  of  this  developing 
process  ;  and  although  the  names  of  authors  and  the 
titles  of  books  are  not  here  quoted,  yet  whatever  of 
others  the  present  writing  may  have  appropriated  to 
itself,  it  does  not  for  that  reason  deny,  but  would  ex- 
pressly acknowledge. 

The  Author  found  it  necessary  to  dwell  more  cir- 
cumstantially upon  Schelling's  work  on  the  Essence 
of  human  Freedom,  inasmuch  as  a  scientific  examina- 
tion of  that  object  would  of  itself  more  than  once  lead 
to  a  consideration  of  the  work  named  ;  and  the  more 
so,  since  it  not  only  treats  fully  of  freedom  itself  and 
the  most  important  objects  kindred  with  it,  but  also 
stands  in  the  strictest  connexion  with  the  whole  of  a 
peculiar  scientific  system,  whose  influence  upon  the 
age  cannot  be  misapprehended,  and  in  reference  to 
which  to  be  ignorant,  or  to  act  as  if  ignorant,  would, 
to  say  the  least,  not  be  compatible  with  a  living  interest 
in  the  present  state  of  German  Science. 

Without  being  numbered  either  among  the  disciples 
or  the  opposers  of  Schelling's  philosophy,  the  Author 


VI  PREFACE. 

places  an  infinite  value  in  pursuing  fearlessly  his  own 
convictions.  He  believes  that  he  has  brought  consid- 
erations not  unimportant  against  some  peculiar  tenden- 
cies of  Schelling's  theory  of  Freedom ;  and  he  did 
this  openly  with  no  other  design  than  that  which  lies 
at  the  heart  of  all  the  friends  of  science,  viz.  that 
truth  might  be  promoted.  But  still  in  the  exercise 
of  an  unquestionable  right  he  feels  assured  that  duty 
has  not  been  violated,  nor  did  he  ever  lose  sight  of 
the  regard  due  to  that  scientific  man. 

Besides,  it  were  to  be  wished,  (and  the  present 
essay  may  at  least  contribute  a  share  to  occasion  it,) 
that  some  impartial  judge  skilled  in  the  system  might 
subject  the  philosophical  views  of  Schelling,  especially 
his  theory  of  Freedom  in  its  strict  connexion  with 
other  the  most  important  objects  of  religion  and  phi- 
losophy, to  a  more  thorough  and  scrutinizing  examina- 
tion, than  from  the  nature  of  the  case  could  have  been 
undertaken  by  his  friends  or  enemies  immediately 
after  the  publication  of  the  first  impression  when  all 
was  yet  excitement. 

Buttenhausen,  July  24,  1820. 

GusTAVus  Ferdinand  Bogkshammer. 


TRANSLATOR'S    PREFACE. 


As  the  Author  of  the  following  Essay,  when 
presenting  it  to  the  learned  of  Germany  where  works 
of  science  and  deep  thought  abound  much  more  than 
with  us,  did  not  think  proper  to  offer  any  other  justifi- 
cation of  his  procedure  than  what  was  to  be  found  in 
the  essay  itself,  it  is  certain  that  were  he  still  living 
he  would  feel  not  indebtedness  to  the  Translator,  if,  in 
offering  it  the  lovers  of  philosophical  discussion  in  his 
own  country,  he  should  presume  to  accompany  it  with 
a  laboured  apology.  The  Essay  must,  therefore,  be 
left  to  cary  within  itself  its  own  apology,  or  its  con- 
demnation. It  may  be  observed  in  general  terms, 
however,  that  the  points  brought  to  view  in  the  follow- 
ing pages  are  discussed  with  modesty  but  yet  with 
manliness.  The  essay  is  short  but  comprehensive,  com- 
prising all  the  most  important  objects  connected  with  the 
Will.  It  does  not  pursue  out  into  all  their  ramifications 
and  detail  the  topics  started,  but  abounds  rather  in  first 
principles.  Like  the  writings  of  Lord  Bacon  "  it  is 
full  of  the  seeds  of  things."  Professor  Tholuck  of 
Halle,  so  well  and  so  favourably  known  in  this  country 
both  as  a  scholar  and  a  Christian,  and  not  less  as  a 


VIII  PREFACE. 

deep  thinker,  pronounces  this  essay  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  and  excellent  productions  of  the  times. 

Of  the  writer  himself  but  httle  is  known.  Winer, 
in  his  Manual  of  Theological  Literature,  states  simply 
that  he  was  a  Pastor  in  the  village  of  Buttenhausen  in 
Wiirtemberg.  He  died  in  1822.  The  presumption 
is  that  at  his  death  he  was  yet  a  young  man.  In  ad- 
dition to  the  writing  here  translated,  he  wrote  another 
work  somewhat  larger,  entitled  Revelation  and  The- 
ology, which  is  quoted  with  high  approbation  in  his 
native  country.  In  religion  and  philosophy  the  Au- 
thor belonged  to  the  same  general  class  with  Schleier- 
macher,  Neander,  Olshausen,  Heinroth,  Twesten,  Tho- 
luck,  Hengstenberg,  and  others,  whose  writings  are  in 
Germany  every  day  exerting  a  more  wide-spread  and 
salutary  influence  upon  the  philosophy  and  religion  of 
that  interesting  people.  Among  these  Christian  Phi- 
losophers in  the  truest  and  best  sense,  or  Mystics  as 
they  are  sometimes  styled  by  the  opposing  Rational- 
ists, our  Author  stood  forth  as  a  philosophical  theolo- 
gian of  energy  and  thought ; — one  who  soon  attained 
the  maturity  of  his  powers  and  was  soon  gathered  to 
the  grave.  From  the  specimens  of  originality  and  depth 
which  he  furnished,  Science  had  reason  to  deplore  his 
loss. 

The  constant  aim  of  the  Translator  has  been  to 
present  the  precise  views  of  his  author;  in  no  case 
to  thrust  in  any  thoughts  of  his  own,  nor  in  any  case 
to  leave  out  any  important  thought.  In  doing  this, 
however,   original    sentences     have    oftentimes     been 


PREFACE.  IX 

divided  into  two  or  three ;  oftentimes  words  have  been 
repeated  to  keep  up  the  logical  connexion,  and  not  un- 
frequently  words  and  whole  clauses  added  to  make  the 
sense  complete.  Explanatory  phrases  have  in  some 
cases  been  added  when  the  original  was  so  concise  and 
idiomatic  as  not  to  be  intelligible  if  literally  translated  ; 
and  all  that  is  found  in  brackets  is  from  the  Translator. 
If,  in  thus  endeavouring  to  show  faithfulness  to  the 
Author,  free  use  has  sometimes  been  made  with  the 
English  language,  it  is  hoped  that  this  will  be  pardoned 
by  the  discriminating  reader.  The  language  of  Ger- 
man philosophy  has  much  more  of  vigour  and  concise- 
ness than  ours ;  it  was,  therefore,  sometimes  found 
necessary  to  adopt  words  and  phrases  not  in  ordinary 
use,  or  else  to  choose  the  more  problematical  course  of 
employing  diluting  periphrases.  To  transfuse  all  the 
freshness  of  the  original  into  a  translation  were  impos- 
sible ;  to  impart  to  it  the  same  energy,  or  to  clothe  it 
with  the  same  precision,  would  be  equally  difficult. 
But  those  who  are  incapable  of  the  pleasure  of  using 
the  original,  will,  it  is  hoped,  be  content  to  receive 
these  thoughts  in  a  form  somewhat  less  elegant  and 
precise. 

If  the  Translator  has  in  any  case  not  been  able  to 
give  an  energetic  and  perspicuous  sense,  or  to  convey 
the  precise  shade  of  his  Author's  meaning,  or  even  in 
some  cases  to  have  failed  in  apprehending  it,  he  would 
in  these  items  also  bespeak  the  favour  of  the  learned 
reader.  And  he  feels  assured  that  those  will  be  most 
ready  to  exercise  charity  who  are  best  acquainted  with 


X  PREFACE. 

the  intrinsic  difficulty  of  discoursing  with  accuracy  on 
spiritual  topics  generally,  and  the  augmentation  of  that 
difficulty  when  attempting  to  transfer  into  English,  an 
essay  on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  written  in  the  pecu- 
liar and  nervous  language  of  German  Transcendental 
Metaphysic.  He  conceives  that  his  claim  to  mildness 
is  the  better  grounded,  from  the  circumstance  that  he 
has  ventured  upon  a  comparatively  new  sphere. 
Whilst  German  Literature  in  general  is  cultivated  with 
enthusiasm,  and  their  historians  and  poets  are  translat- 
ed in  abundance,  German  Philosophy  is  but  little 
studied  ;  or  if  it  be,  no  one  is  yet  known  to  have  un- 
dertaken and  succeeded  in  translating  into  English 
any  complete  work. 

Our  language  does  not  even  furnish  a  means 
of  acquiring  a  knowledge  of  the  general  scope  and 
tendecy  of  German  Philosophy.  The  English  read- 
er may  in  his  own  language  acquaint  himself  with 
the  splendid  creations  of  Klopstock  and  Goethe,  or 
pursue  the  classic  narrations  of  Schiller  and  Niebuhr, 
whilst  Fichte,  and  ScheUing,  and  Jacobi,  and  Schleier- 
macher,  and  Schultz,  must  be  entirely  unknown  to  him 
unless  he  have  recourse  to  the  originals.  In  the  last 
century   Mr.    Nitsch^    and     Dr.    Willich,^    two    dis- 

^  A  general  and  introductory  view  of  Professor  Kant's 
principles  concerning  man,  the  world  and  the  Deity,  &c.  by 
F.  A.  Nitsch,  Lend.  1796. 

2  Elements  of  the  Critical  Philosophy,  containing  a  con- 
cise account  of  its  origin  and  tendency  ;  a  view  of  all  the 
works  published  by  its  founder,  Professor  Immanuel  Kant, 
&c.  by  A,  F.  M.  Willich,  M.  D.  Lond.  1798. 


PREFACE.  XI 

ciples  and  pupils  of  Kant,  published  in  England  a  di- 
gest of  the  leading  principles  of  their  great  Master ; 
but  these  works  are  necessarily  meagre,  having  been 
written  before  the  principles  of  the  New  Philosophy 
had  been  fully  developed  and  scrutinized.  Their  ter- 
minology, too,  has  been  in  a  great  measure  superseded 
by  the  adoption  of  a  better  nomenclature.  The  latter 
of  the  two  works  named  is  principally  occupied  with  a 
brief  historical  Introduction  to  the  rise  of  Transcen- 
dentalism, and  in  giving  a  catalogue  of  Kant's  works  to- 
gether with  an  analysis  of  their  contents.  Madame 
De  StaeFs  survey  of  German  Philosophy  is  more  rich 
and  interesting,  but  it  is  still  designed  for  the  general 
reader  alone. 

Stewart's  view  of  the  German  School  was,  with  the 
exception  of  one  of  Kant's  first  essays  written  in  Latin 
and  entitled  De  Mundi  Sensibilis  atque  Intelligibilis 
Forma  et  Principiis,  according  to  his  own  statement, 
derived  from  Second  or  third  hand.  It  is  of  course 
imperfect.  A  number  of  elaborate  articles  on  the 
Kantian  Philosophy  have  appeared  in  the  Encyclopae- 
dia Londinensis,  of  which,  taken  as  a  whole,  we  here 
forbear  to  say  any  thing.  Some  parts  are  good,  and 
may  afford  considerable  aid  to  the  student.  Tenne- 
mann's  Grundriss  has  been  translated  into  English  by 
Mr.  Johnson,  fellow  of  Wadham  College,  England  ;  this 
work  we  have  not  seen,  and  from  personal  examination 
therefore  can  neither  affirm  nor  deny  any  thing  in  re- 
gard to  its  worth.  But  judging  from  the  specimens  fur- 
nished by  the  Edinburgh  Quarterly  for  October  1832, 


XII  PREFACE. 

we  should  think  it  would  not  be  of  much  service  to  one 
who  wished  to  become  acquainted  with  the  peculiari- 
ties of  the  Critical  School.  Coleridge's  Writings  af- 
ford the  best  introduction  to  the  study  of  German  Phi- 
losophy. He  had  much  of  the  German  spirit,  and  often 
employs  German  terms.  Yet  he  was  by  no  means 
bound  to  the  Germans  ;  for  instead  of  translating  their 
works  or  retailing  their  speculations,  he  drew  his 
thoughts  from  the  depth  and  fullness  of  his  own  ex- 
haustless  mind. 

Without  making  pretensions  to  any  thing  like  an 
accurate  knowledge  of  the  history,  or  of  the  compass 
and  complement  of  German  Philosophy,  the  Translator 
would  still  hope  that  his  additions  have  thrown  some 
light  upon  certain  points  and  allusions  in  the  Essay 
which  might  otherwise  have  been  unintelligible  to  the 
mere  English  scholar.  The  appendix  and  all  the 
notes  are  from  him.  They  are  generally  intended  to 
be  illustrative ;  in  some  few  cases  they  are  confirmato- 
ry of  the  views  advanced  by  the  Author.  Many  of 
the  extracts  added  are  from  rare  works  ;  they  serve  to 
show  the  accordance  of  thought  between  thinking  men, 
and  are  conceived  to  add  interest  to  the  discussion. 

That  this  little  work  may  aid  its  reader  to  obtain  a 
more  living  insight  into  himself  and  nature  ;  that  it  may 
be  promotive  of  a  spiritual  religion  subjectively,  and  of 
christian  energy  in  action,  is  the  only  wish  of 

The  Translator. 

Andover,  Feb.  1835. 


_  LI  I 

OF  THB 

FREEDCTM  OF   THE   WILL. 


Might  it  not  be  better  to  omit  all  profound  in- 
vestigations on  the  Freedom  of  the  human  Will,  and 
adhere  simply  to  that  which  is  certain  and  indisputa- 
ble, viz.  to  conscience  and  moral  feeling,  without  be- 
ing disturbed  with  doubts  or  metaphysical  difficulties  ? 
This  question  presents  itself  at  the  threshold  of  our  in- 
quiry, and  in  so  far  as  it  concerns  practical  life  we  might 
readily  answer  it  in  the  affirmative.  To  science,  how- 
ever, this  sphere  of  investigation  must  ever  remain 
open,  because  the  direct  and  leading  aim  of  science  is 
not  action,  but  truth,  and  the  connexion  of  knowledge. 
— Happy  may  he  be  esteemed  who  has  never  heard 
of  a  free  or  an  unfree  Will ;  and  who,  faithfully  follow- 
ing his  inward  consciousness  of  right  and  wrong,  calmly 
pursues  the  right,  without  permitting  himself,  even  for 
one  moment,  to  be  perplexed  in  regard  to  the  question 
of  liberty.  When  the  time  of  action  arives  even  the 
Philosopher  forgets  his  system,  with  which  he  finds  it  so 
difficult  to  incorporate  empirical  ^  freedom  ;  and,  if  in 

1  In  English  the  word  Empiric  is  now  generally  used  to 
designate  an  ignorant  pretender  to  medical  skill.     But  in 
German  Philosophy  the  corresponding  adjective  is  employ- 
2 


14 

other  respects  a  man,  in  word  and  deed  he  pursues 
that  course,  which  without  any  subtilties  he  knows  it 

ed  with  a  very  different  significance.  It  there  means  that 
which  belongs  to  experience,  what  rests  upon  experience, 
what  is  derived  from  experience^  a  posteriori ; — Empirism, 
the  knowledge  of  experience.  As  an  equivalent  term 
experimental  is,  perhaps,  of  more  frequent  use  with  us ; 
but  empirical  is  more  philosophic,  and  by  no  means  unused  or 
unauthorized.  Empirical  freedom,  then,  is  that  freedom  of 
which  we  feel  conscious  in  all  the  actions  of  daily  life,  with- 
out inquiring  into  the  grounds  on  which  that  freedom  rests  ; 
without  inquh'ing  whether  the  Will  is  self-active  and  self- 
determinant,  or  whether  all  its  acts  take  place  in  accordance 
with  a  necessitated  and  pre-established  law ;  without  deciding 
whether  that  apparent  freedom  may  not  yet  be  but  the  grad- 
ual unfofdingjof  a  liTdderilrrechaftisBf^^-er  -whether  all  acts 
be  not  the  results  of  Divine  efficiency,  or  whether  they  may 
not  be  produced  through  objective  motives  according  to  the 
changeless  law  of  cause  and  effect.  In  philosophy  and  the 
art  of  healing,  an  Empiric  is  the  opposite  of  a  Rationalist ; 
one  who  attends  simply  to  the  notices  of  nature  instead  of 
searching  out  the  reasons  of  them.  Even  the  etymology  of 
the  word  would  indicate  this  meaning;  and  in  the  third 
century  there  existed  a  school  of  Greek  physicians  who  did 
not  refuse  to  bear  the  name  of  Empirics.  They  rejected 
the  speculations  and  subtilties  of  preceding  physicians  ;  they 
went  back  to  experience,  and  rested  entirely  upon  her  de- 
cisions.— As  Kant  has  given  currency  to  this  word  in  more 
recent  speculations,  the  meaning  which  he  attached  to  it 
may  be  seen  from  the  following  statement  of  his  views. 
"  He  presupposed  philosophy  and  mathematics  to  be,  in  re- 
gard to  their  origin,  rational  sciences,  or  sciences  of  reason. 


15 

to  be  his  duty  to  pursue.  Thus  Luther  acted  with 
efficiency  and  as  a  man  who  was  free ;  yet  in  his  spec- 
ulative moments  he  maintained  the  doctrine  of  a  ser- 
vum  arbitrium.  But  on  this  very  account  the  Meta- 
physician should  be  allowed  fearlessly  to  pursue  within 
their  legitimate  bounds,  his  inquiries  on  this  object  of 
human  knowledge ;  and  this,  too,  without  being  made 
answerable  for  the  results,  should  they,  in  the  event, 
prove  any  less  favourable  to  empirical  freedom.  Many 
a  one,  contrary  to  his  design  and  with  a  resisting  heart, 

Rational  knowledge  is  distinguished  from  empirical  by 
its  character  of  necessity  and  universality.  With  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  same  stands  or  falls  the  possibility  of  philosoph- 
ical knowledge,  which  is  of  two  kinds — synthetic  and  an- 
alytic. The  latter  rests  upon  the  first  law  of  thought  [i.  e. 
the  principle  of  contradiction] ;  but  what  is  the  principle  of 
synthetic  knowledge  a  priori  in  opposition  to  empirical,  the 
ground  of  which  is  perception  ?  The  existence  of  such 
knowledge  is  warranted  by  the  existence  of  mathematics, 
and  even  of  common  knowledge  ;  and  in  Metaphysics  the 
reflexive  effort  of  reason  is  chiefly  directed  to  its  realization. 
There  is,  therefore,  a  science  in  the  highest  degree  necessary 
and  of  the  greatest  importance,  which,  on  principles,  inquires 
into  the  possibility  of  such  knowledge  as  well  as  into  its 
grounds  and  employment."  Empirical  knowledge,  then,  is  de- 
pendent upon  perception  ;  rational  science  is  associated  with 
an  inner  Faculty  ;  and  as  the  latter  involves  unity,  necessity 
and  universality,  so  the  former  is  characterized  as  that  which 
is  fragmentary,  conditional  and  limited.  See  Tennemann's 
Grundriss  der  Gesch.  der  Phil.  §  381.  p.  467.  also  Convei-sa- 
tions-Lexikon,  art.  Empirismus.     Tr, 


16 

is,  by  the  irresistible  current  of  his  thoughts,  forced  to 
adopt  his  philosophical  theory  of  freedom  ;  and  he  is  thus 
brought  to  the  melancholy  experience  that  the  process  of 
knowledge  even  is  ofttimes  subject  to  destiny.  Con- 
templation has  its  pains  as  well  as  its  pleasures  ;  and  it 
is  therefore  no  ground  of  accusation  against  the  calm  and 
reflecting  Inquirer,  if,  by  the  strictly  interlinked  chain 
of  his  thoughts,  he  finds  himself  led  to  the  adoption  of 
views  which  seem  to  correspond  neither  to  his  own  nor 
to  the  feelings  of  others.  A  Science  too,  which,  hke  spec- 
ulative philosophy,  inquires  after  the  ultimate  grounds 
of  things  and  of  knowledge,  and  the  whole  vitality  of 
which  consists  in  acts  of  apprehension  or  cognition,  can- 
not at  the  same  time  have  in  view  another  principle 
end  separate  from  these  cognitive  acts.  Moreover  what 
is  thought  or  written  on  this  point  is  inaccessible  to  the 
multitude,  and  of  a  consequence  cannot  exert  any  evil 
influence  upon  daily  life  ;  so  that  the  fears  commonly 
entertained  in  regard  to  the  practical  tendency  of  such 
an  inquiry  are  groundless,  and  the  censuring  cavils 
sometimes  urged  against  it  are  unjust  and  out  of  place. 
He  who  is  accustomed  to  reflect,  who  is  in  the 
habit  of  inquiring  after  ultimate  grounds,  and  who  has 
come  to  the  living  consciousness  of  an  opposition  which 
when  once  awakened  must  be  satisfied — for  him  the 
question  in  reference  to  the  essential  character  of  human 
freedom,  and  how  the  same  may  be  reconciled  with 
belief  in  God,  and  with  the  assumption  of  an  eternal 
order  of  events  as  they  take  place  in  the  world,  even 
on  account  of  its  difficulty  possesses  a  high  attraction. 


17 

and  upon  the  whole  cannot  be  passed  over.     Urged  by 
his  inmost  feeling  to  attribute  to  himself  and  to  others,  now 
guilt  and  now  merit,  and  obliged  also  by  his  conscience  to 
recognize  human  action  as  free,  every  honest  Inquirer 
must  surely  wish  to  see  this  assumption  of  freedom  brought 
to  accord  with  the  remaining  requisitions  of  his  spirit, 
with  his  views  of  God  and  nature ;  or  at  least  to  see  it 
defended  against  the  difficulties  and  apparent  contradic- 
tions   which  unavoidably  force   themselves  upon  his 
consideration.      Wherever  a  spirit  of  investigation  ex- 
ists, there  the  question  in  regard  to  liberty  is  inevitable  ; 
that  is,  human  reason  in  the  progress  of  its  inquiries    x 
is   necessarily  forced  upon  it.     Every  investigation  of 
nature   points,  as  it   were  unconsciously,  to  man,  in 
whom  the  earthly  nature  attains  its  perfection  ;  but  in 
whom  there  is  at  the  same  time  found  a  higher,  an  un- 
earthly nature,  which  appears  to  be  as  much  elevated 
above  mere  organic  life  as  this  is  superior  to  blind  mo- 
tion effected  by  attraction  and  the  power  of  gravity. 
Making  Nature,  therefore,  the  starting  point,  reflection 
seeks  to  arrive  at  Intelligence  ;  the  Material   must  re- 
solve itself  into  the  Spiritual,  Necessity  must  be   lost  in 
Freedom.    A  similar  problem  presents  itself  for  solution       | 
to  the  Historian  and  the  Poet.     For  that  which  is  call-       ! 
ed  the  History  of  the  World  is  something  more  than       j 
the  fixed  course  of  fate  and  necessity,  in  that  its  great       \ 
and  truly  elevating    portion,  the  Tragic  of  History, 
consists  in  the  self-subsistent  striving  of  the  w  ill  against 
such  fixed  course; — in  the  conflict  between  Liberty 
and  Necessity.     For  which  reason  Poetry  also,  were 


18 

It  not  for  this  indestructible  co-existence  of  both  Liberty 
and  Necessity,  now  in  conflict  with  each  other  and 
now  meeting  in  perfect  concord,  would  be  deprived  of 
its  animating  principle,  and  would  necessarily  degen- 
erate into  spiritlessness  or  rather  sink  into  death.  The 
purely  spiritual  efforts  of  man,  his  converse  with  Ideas,  ^ 

^  For  half  a  century  past  the  word  idea  has  been  used 
by  English  writers  with  great  indeterminateness  and  in  such 
a  way  as  to  cause  much  confusion  of  thought.  They  speak 
of  the  idea  of  a  tree,  a  dog,  a  poem,  a  circle,  the  free  will, 
the  soul,  immortality  and  God.  I  have  an  idea  that  A  has 
no  idea  of  the  nature  of  an  idea.  The  Critical  Philosophy 
has  attempted  to  rescue  the  word  from  this  promiscuous  and 
indefinite  use,  and  to  aj)propriate  it  exclusively  to  objects  of 
Reason,  as  opposed  to  objects  of  the  Understanding,  which  are 
designated  by  the  term  Conception.  Intuition  marks  the 
immediate  object  of  the  outer  or  inner  sense,  of  understand- 
ing or  imagination.  An  Idea  is  equally  removed  from  fact, 
notion,  image  and  sensation.  Of  this  character  is  the  idea 
of  the  Perfect,  of  Eternity,  of  God,  of  Holiness,  of  Beauty,  of 
mathematical  and  moral  Truth.  To  those  who  are  not  un- 
wilhng  to  be  at  the  trouble  of  fixing  dererminately  the  mean- 
ing of  phrases,  or  of  learning  the  history  of  a  word,  the  fol- 
lowing extracts  may  not  be  unacceptable  : 

"The  word  ^Idecc,  in  its  original  sense,  as  used  by  Pindar, 
Aristophanes,  and  in  the  gospel  of  Matthew,  represented  the 
visual  abstraction  of  a  distant  object,  when  we  see  the  whole 
without  distinguishing  its  parts.  Plato  adopted  it  as  a  tech- 
nical term,  and  as  the  antithesis  to  El'd(o)M,  or  sensuous  im- 
ages ;  the  transient  and  perishable  emblems,  or  mental  words, 
of  ideas.  The  ideas  themselves  he  considered  as  mysterious 
powers,  living,  seminal,  formative,  and  exempt  from  time.  In 


19 

or  his  endeavour  to  apprehend,  by  contemplation,  the 
laws  of  that  higher  necessity  by  which  all  things  have 

this  sense  the  word  became  the  property  of  the  Platonic 
school  ;  and  it  seldom  occurs  in  Aristode,  without  some 
such  phrase  annexed  to  it,  as,  according  to  Plato,  or  as 
Plato  says.  Our  English  writers  to  the  end  of  Charles  2nd's 
reign,  or  somewhat  later,  employed  it  either  in  the  original 
sense,  or  Platonically,  or  in  a  sense  nearly  correspondent  to 
our  present  use  of  the  substantive,  Ideal,  always,  however, 
opposing  it,  more  or  less,  to  image,  whether  of  present  or 
absent  objects.  The  reader  will  not  be  displeased  with  the 
following  interesting  exemplification  from  Bishop  Jeremy 
Taylor:  *  St.  Lewis  the  king  sent  Ivo  bishop  of  Chartres  on 
an  embassy,  and  he  told,  that  he  met  a  grave  and  stately 
matron  on  the  way,  with  a  censer  of  fire  in  the  one  hand, 
and  a  vessel  of  water  in  the  other ;  on  observing  her  to  have 
a  melancholy,  religious  and  phantastic  deportment  and  look, 
he  asked  her  what  those  symbols  meant,  and  what  she  meant 
to  do  with  her  fire  and  water  ;  she  answered,  my  purpose  is 
with  the  fire  to  burn  paradise,  and  witli  my  water  to  quench 
the  flames  of  hell,  that  men  may  serve  God  purely  for  the 
love  of  God.  But  we  rarely  meet  with  such  spirits,  which 
love  virtue  so  metaphysicall}^  as  to  abstract  from  her  all  sensi- 
ble composition^  and  love  the  purity  of  the  Idea..'  Des  Cartes 
having  introduced  into  his  philosophy  the  fanciful  hypothesis 
of  material  ideas,  or  certain  configurations  of  the  brain, 
which  are  so  many  moulds  to  the  influxes  of  the  external 
world  ;  Mr.  Locke  adopted  the  term,  but  extended  the  sig^ 
nification  to  whatever  is  the  immediate  object  of  the  niind's 
attention  or  consciousness.  Mr.  Hume,  distinguishing  those 
representations  which  are  accompanied  with  a  sense  of  a 
present  object,  from  those  reproduced  by  the  mind  itself, 


20 

their  being,  could  not  proceed  one  step,  nay  could 
not  begin  to  be,  without  the  most  free  self-subsistent 
act  of  the  spirit.  Or  is  it  not  a  breaking  away  from 
those  inward  sensations  that  succeed  each  other  accord- 
ing to  natural  laws,  and  at  the  same  time  a  rising  above 
the  chain  of  external  phenomena,  which  first  brings 
man  to  himself,  and  which  marks  especially  the  con- 
dition of  the  philosophizing  mind  ?  For  him  upon 
whom  the  question  does  not  force  itself,  it  is,  perhaps, 
not  of  much  importance  to  action  (Morality)  to  de- 
cide whether  Reason,  ^  whilst  it  prescribes  laws,  may 

designated  the  former  by  impressions,  and  confined  the  word 
Idea  to  the  latter."  Biographia  Literaria,  2d  ed.  p.  64.  See 
further  Appendix  [A.]     Tr. 

1  It  is  well  known  that  in  German  Metaphysics,  as  well 
as  by  the  Old  English  writers  and  some  of  a  more  recent 
date,  a  broad  distinction  is  made  between  Reason  and  the 
Understanding.  The  latter  faculty  is  busied  with  the  things 
of  sense,  is  occupied  with  perceiving,  arranging,  classifying 
and  combining  the  varied  phenomena  of  nature,  and  is  con- 
cerned with  the  affairs  of  daily  life  ;  the  former,  from  individ- 
ual data  given,  rises  to  an  apprehension  of  the  universal,  and 
lives  in  the  infinite  and  the  eternal.  "The  faculty  of 
thought  manifests  itself  both  as  Understanding  and  as  Reason. 
By  the  understanding  we  inquire  after  and  investigate  the 
grounds,  causes  and  conditions  of  our  representations,  feel- 
ings and  desires,  and  of  those  objects  standing  in  immediate 
connexion  with  them ;  by  reason  we  inquire  after  ultimate 
grounds,  causes  and  conditions.  Reason  strives  afler  the 
comprehension  of  all  that  is  known  in  the  Unconditioned  and 
the  Absolute.     By  the  understanding  we  evolve  rules  for  the 


21 

not  on  the  other  hand  be  determined  by  reciprocal  in- 
fluences, and  whether,  therefore,  in   a  higher  sense  it 

regulation  of  our  desiring  faculty;  by  reason  we  subordinate 
these  rules  to  a  higher  Law — to  a  law  which  determines  the 
unconditioned  form,  the  highest  end  of  acting.  Through 
the  power  of  thought,  therefore,  our  knowledge  both  theo- 
retic and  practical,  is  comprehended  in  unity,  connexion 
and  in  being."  Tennemann's  Grundriss  §41.  p.  30. 

"  By  the  Understaxding,  I  mean  the  faculty  of  thinking 
and  forming  judgments  on  the  notices  furished  by  the  sense, 
according  to  certain  rules  existing  in  itself,  which  rules  con- 
stitute its  distinct  nature.  By  the  pure  Reason,  I  mean  the 
power  by  which  we  become  possessed  of  principles,  (the 
eternal  verities  of  Plato  and  Des  Cartes)  and  of  ideas,  (N.  B. 
not  images)  as  the  ideas  of  a  point,  a  line,  a  circle  of  Mathe- 
matics ;  and  of  Justice,  Holiness,  Free-Will,  &c.  in  Morals. 
Hence  in  w^orks  of  pure  Science  the  definitions  of  necessity 
precede  the  reasoning ;  in  other  works  they  more  aptly  form 
the  conclusion. 

"  To  many  of  my  readers  it  will,  I  trust,  be  some  recom- 
mendation of  these  distinctions,  that  they  are  more  than 
once  expressed,  and  every  where  supposed,  in  the  writings 
of  St.  Paul.  I  have  no  hesitation  in  undertaking  to  prove, 
that  every  Heresy  which  has  disquieted  the  Christian  Church, 
from  Tritheism  to  Socinianism,  has  originated  in,  and  sup- 
ported itself  by,  arguments  rendered  plausible  only  by  the 
confusion  of  these  faculties,  and  thus  demanding  for  the  ob- 
jects of  one,  a  sort  of  evidence  appropriated  to  those  of  anoth- 
er faculty. — These  disquisitions  have  the  misfortune  of  be- 
ing  in  ill-report,  as  dry  and  unsatisfactory ;  but  I  hope,  in 
the  course  of  the  work,  to  gain  them  a  better  character — 
and  if  elucidations  of  their  practical  importance  from  the 


22 

may  not  itself  be  unfree ;  but  nevertheless  this  view 
accords  not  with  the  demands  and  the  strong  moral 
feeling  of  an  inquiring  mind,  for  which  it  is  not  suf- 
ficient that  the  willing  man  imagines  only  that  he  per- 
forms his  own  act,  whilst  yet  with  his  inmost  self  he  is,  on 
that  supposition,  but  the  instrument  of  developing  a 
concealed    Necessity.      If    therefore    transcendental  ^ 

most  momentous  events  of  History,  can  render  them  interes- 
ting, to  give  them  that  interest  at  least.  Besides,  there  is 
surely  some  good  in  the  knowledge  of  Truth  as  Truth — 
(we  were  not  made  to  live  by  bread  alone)  and  in  the 
strengthening  of  ihe  intellect.  It  is  an  excellent  remark  of 
Scaliger,  '  Harum  indagaiio  Suhtilitalum,  etsi  non  est  utilis 
ad  machinas  farinarias  conjlciendas,  exuit  animum  tamen  in- 
sciticb  rubigine  acuitque  ad  alia.''  Scalig.  Exerc.  307.  §  3.  i. 
e.  The  investigation  of  these  subtilties,  though  it  is  of  no 
use  to  the  construction  of  machines  to  grind  corn  with,  yet 
clears  the  mind  from  the  rust  of  ignorance,  and  sharpens  it 
for  other  things."     Friend^  p.  150,  151.     Tr. 

^  As  Reason  is  distinguished  from  Understanding,  Idea  from 
Conception,  Subject  from  Object,  so  Transcendental 
stands  opposed  to  Empirical.  "  There  is  a  philosophic  (and 
inasmuch  as  it  is  actualized  by  an  effort  of  freedom,  an  ar- 
tificial) consciousness,  which  lies  beneath,  or,  (as  it  were  )  6c- 
/linrf  the  spontaneous  consciousness  natural  to  all  reflecting 
beings.  As  the  elder  Romans  distinguished  their  northern 
provinces  into  Cis- Alpine  and  Trans- Alpine,  so  may  we 
divide  all  the  objects  of  human  knowledge  into  those  on  this 
side,  and  those  on  the  other  side  of  the  spontaneous  con- 
sciousness ;  citra  et  trans  conscientiam  communem.  The 
latter  is  exclusively  the  domain  of  pure   philosoi)hy,  which 


23 

freedom  were  given  up,  it  would  be  impossible,  for 
the  critical  Inquirer  at  least,  to  be  satisfactorily  assured 
of  practical  freedom  ;  for,  (although  it  might  be  possi- 
ble for  the  spirit  to  tolerate  it)  he  could  not  peacefully 
or  indifferently  suffer  a  continual  inward  dissension,  the 
thorn  of  a  contradiction  lying  in  the  depth  of  his  per- 
sonal being.  Morever  the  well  known  expedient  to 
be  resorted  to  in  such  a  case  could  not  long  afford 
satisfaction,  that  is,  in  theoretical  philosophy,  to  permit 
the  thing  to  rest  upon  itself,  and  to  give  up  the  ques- 
tion about  freedom ;  but  on  the  contrary,  in  practical 
philosophy,  to  recognize  reason  as  prescribing  laws 
(that  is  as  free),  or,  for  the  behoof  of  action,  to  postu- 
late this  freedom.  Because,  in  order  to  be  satisfied  as 
to  the  correctness  of  such  a  view,  it  would  be  demand- 
ed that  there  should  be  two  kinds  of  reason,  one  for 
action  and  another  for  thought ;  and  so  related  too, 
that  neither  could  have  any  knowledge  of  the  other.  ^ 

Hence  it  is  that  the  human  spirit  has  continually 
repeated  the  attempt  to  solve  the  riddle  of  freedom, 
and  that  those  given  to  reflection  are  led,  as  it  were  by 
an  instinctive  impulse,  to  exercise  their  power  upon 

is,  therefore,  properly  entitled  transcendental,  in  order  to  dis- 
criminate it  at  once,  both  from  mere  reflection  and  re-pre- 
sentation on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  from  those 
flights  of  lawless  speculation,  which,  abandoned  by  all  dis- 
tinct consciousness,  because  transgressing  the  bounds  and 
purposes  of  our  intellectual  faculties,  are  justly  condemned 
as  transcendent,''^     lAt,  Biog,  p.  143.     Tr. 

^  See  Appendix  [B.] 


34 

this  dark  and  difficult  point ;  for  partly  the  very  diffi- 
culty of  the  problem  renders  it  the  more  powerfully 
attractive,  and  induces  renewed  and  continued  efforts, 
and  partly  also  the  connexion  of  this  problem  with 
other  the  noblest  and  dearest  objects  of  philosophy, 
makes  some  kind  of  answer  to  it  in  the  highest  degree 
desirable  to  those  engaged  in  speculation. 

But  the  problem  which  is  here  the  subject  of  dis- 
course appears,  like  so  many  others  presented  to  our 
consideration,  in  its  nature  to  belong  to  the  infinite ;  and 
in  this  respect  a  remarkable  analogy  reigns  between  it  and 
the  kindred  problem  of  the  practical  philosophy  which 
proposes  holiness  as  its  end.     And  although  it  is  im- 
possible for  us  at  once  to  attain  perfect  holiness,  still  it 
is  our  imperative  duty  to  be  forever  approximating 
towards  it.     As  now  in  this  case  which  concerns  our 
'practice,  the   greatness  of  the  problem  would  by  no 
means  justify  us  in  despairing  of  its  solution,  nor  ex- 
cuse any  irresolution  in   our  efforts  for  its  attainment, 
but  rather  demands,  and  imposes  upon   us  obligations 
to  use,  the  more  untiring  zeal  and  higher  efforts,  whilst 
at  the  same  time  it  inexorably  destroys  the  fond  illusion 
which  would  ever  persuade  us  that  we  have  reached 
the  goal ;  even  thus  is  it  in  respect  to  the  limits  of  our 
Jcnowlecfge  on  the  subject  now  before   us.     So  that 
there  is  no  contradiction  whatever  in  regarding  it  as 
impossible  to  give  at  once  a  full  and  satisfactory  solu- 
tion of  all  the  difficulties  pertaining  to  this   question, 
and  yet  to  venture  w^ith  delight  and  hope  to  tread  in 
the  path  that  stretches  forward  in  endless  prospect  be- 


25 

fore  us.  The  pleasure  of  speculation  and  the  happi- 
ness of  the  Inquirer  consist  to  a  great  degree  in  this, 
that  as  soon  as  one  boundary  is  attained,  immediately 
another,  from  the  darkness  of  a  still  greater  distance, 
emerges  as  it  were,  and  invites  on  to  renewed  exer- 
tions. We  admit  that  this  very  peculiarity  passes  with 
us  for  an  irrefragable  proof  of  the  indestructibility  of 
the  spirit  of  man  ;  and  in  an  especial  manner  do  we 
feel  that  the  present  life,  were  it  deprived  of  this  reflec- 
tion of  the  infinite,  would  be  to  us  worthless  and  exceed- 
ingly insipid. 

In  view  of  these  things  it  is  proper,  if  possible,  to 
contribute  somewhat  to  the  system  of  knowledge  and 
science,  which  nevertheless  always  remains  imperfect ; 
and  it  is  fit  that  every  one,  not  entirely  unversed  in  the 
things  of  philosophy,  should  be  able  to  appreciate  the 
labours  of  others,  and  also  by  his  own  labours  to  gain 
respect  for  himself. 

makes  itsdf  known  Jo ..  tke  jo^rd^  jc^Qsoioiig^esaj^ 
in  general  be  denied,  and  although  all  feel  themselves 
compelled  to  recognize  or  presuppose  man  to  be  free,  in 
so  far  as  he  acts,  yet  at  the  very  commencement  of 
this  investigation  a  not  unimportant  difficulty  presents 
itself  before  us ;  that  namely,  of  finding  a  precise  scien- 
tific expression  to  designate  this  feeling  which  manifests 
itself  in  all.  5!or  notwithstanding  that  all  feel  them- 
selves to  be  free,  still  all  do  not  therefore  know  what 
Free^dom  is  ;— and  the  progress  of  this  inquiry  depends 
not  a  little  on  the  preliminary  conception  which  we 

3 


26 

form  of  freedom.  Without  noticing  separately  and  by 
name  all  the  different  definitions  of  Liberty  which  have 
been  given,  we  remark  simply  that  two  classes  of  them 
seem  to  us  as  especially  worthy  of  attention.  Not  a 
few  make  the  essence  of  freedom  to  consist  in  the  pre- 
ponderance of  the  Intelligential  over  the  Animal,  and 
consequently  describe  it  as  the  Dominion  of  the  Spirit 
over  the  desires  and  lustful  passions.  Others,  howev- 
er, less  advantageously  indeed,  but  adhering  more 
faithfully  to  its  empirical  manifestation,  represent 
freedom  as  the  Abilityjo  jGood  and  Evil.  Those  first 
named  appear  to  describe  freedom  in  the  manner  men- 
tioned, either  to  point  out  under  what  form,  according 
to  their  view,  true  freedom  should  exhibit  itself,  as  they 
well  feel  that  human  dignity  consists  in  rising  superiour 
to  the  influence  of  sensual  gratifications ;  or  else  they 
do  it  to  avoid  the  difficulty,  in  which  the  assumption 
that  an  ability  to  evil  is  derived  from  God,  necessarily 
involves  us.  But  in  their  endeavour  to  avoid  this  dif- 
ficulty they  fall  into  another  not  less  important,  since 
on  their  supposition  it  now  becomes  impossible  to  ex- 
plain existent  evil  from  the  freedom  of  the  will,  and 
they  must  be  unavoidably  driven  either  to  the  denial 
of  evil,  that  is  of  immorahty,  in  so  far  as  it  is  imputa- 
ble to  the  creature,  or  else  to  the  denial  of  freedom, 
as  arbitrary  election  {the  faculty  of  choice,  volition). 
For  if  man  were  free  only  iipi  proportion  as  he  reigns 
over  his  lustful  passions  and  desireSjjhen  in  the  opposite 
respect  he  would  Be  proportionally  unfree ;  so  that 
were  this  definition  correct,  it  wp^^  be  proper  indeed 
toTpeak  of  the. freedom  of  good  persons,  but  not  of  the 


;  27 

freedom  of  bad  ones.  But  it  is  plain  that  this  would 
be  the  same  as  to  take  away  the  right  of  imputing  evil ; 
and  consequently  it  would  destroy  evil  itself,  as  moral 
evil,  in  so  far  at  least  as  it  has  respect  to  man.  So  on 
the  other  hand,  if  we  called  freedom  the  dominion  of 
Intelligence,  we  should  still  have  to  inquire  in  the  first 
place  after  the  freedom  of  this  freedom.  We  may  in- 
deed in  a  noble  sense  of  the  word  pronounce  that  man 
to  be  really  free  who  has  attained  the  dominion  over 
his  lusts  and  passions,  and  who  makes  goodness  the 
regulative  principle  of  his  life.  But  every  one  imme- 
diately perceives  that  the  above  expression  is  but  anoth- 
er terni  for  purity  or  holiness ;  in  regard  to  this  holi- 
ness, however,  the  question  now  first  arises,  did  man 
attain  it  by  his  own  free  election,  and  consequently  by 
a  self-determination  which  rejected  the  opposite  course 
that  might  have  been   taken  ;^  or  in  other  words,  is 

1  By  many  we  are  told  that  such  a  course  were  impossi- 
ble ;  that  every  state  in  which  we  find  ourselves,  or  every 
act  which  we  perform,  is  the  necessary  result  of  a  con- 
catenation of  antecedent  causes,  natural  or  moral,  or  both 
combined,  and  to  suppose  that  we  might  have  been  other- 
wise, or  that  we  might  have  acted  differently,  all  things  con- 
sidered, would  be  as  absurd  as  to  suppose  that  we  might 
put  our  hands  into  the  fire  without  being  burned.  "A  voli- 
tion, or  determination,  [or  act  of  Will]  when  freed  from  the 
mystery  in  which  it  has  been  too  generally  involved,  is  found 
to  be  nothing  more  than  a  desire — a  state  of  mind  which  can 
no  more  arise  without  a  cause,  than  a  sensation  or  percep- 
tion ; — and  a  state  of  mind,  which  must  infidlibly  arise,  I 
may  add,  in  the  circumstances  which  are  adapted  to  produce 


.       28     , 

that  holiness  and  dominion  of  the  spirit  his  act  or  only 
his  good  fortune  ? — After  all  that  others  have  said  on 

it,  as  the  feeling  of  fragrance,  when  the  odoriferous  particles 
of  a  rose  are  brought  into  contact  with  the  organ.  ^  *  *  * 
To  exhibit  it  as  a  matter  of  choice  with  us  whether  we  will 
submit  to  the  influence  of  motives,  when  their  moral  power 
is  discerned  by  the  mind,  is  equivalent  with  stating  that  the 
mind  chooses  whether  it  will  recieve  sensation  in  the  case 
referred  to — than  which  few  things  can  be  more  absurd." 
Payne^s  Elements,  p.  371. 

Not  so  the  profound  Author  of  the  Ecclesiastical  Polity : 
*/  Man  in  the  perfection  of  nature  being  made  according  to  the 
likeness  of  his  Maker,  resembleth  him  also  in  the  manner  of 
working ;  so  that  whatsoever  we  work  as  men,  the  same 
we  do  willingly  work  and  freely  :  neither  are  we  according 
to  the  manner  of  natural  agents  any  way  so  tied,  but  that 
it  is  in  our  power  to  leave  the  things  we  do  undone.  The 
good  which  either  is  gotten  by  doing,  or  which  consisteth 
in  the  very  doing  itself,  causeth  not  action,  unless  apprehend- 
ing it  as  good  we  so  like  and  desire  it.  That  we  do  unto 
any  such  end,  the  same  we  choose  and  prefer  before  the 
leaving  of  it  undone.  Choice  there  is  not,  unless  the  thing 
we  take  be  so  in  our  power,  that  we  might  have  refused  and 
left  it.  If  fire  consumeth  the  stubble,  it  chooseth  not  so  to 
do,  because  the  nature  thereof  is  such  that  it  can  do  no  other. 
To  choose,  is  to  will  one  thing  before  another ;  and  to  will, 
is  to  bend  our  souls  to  the  having  or  doing  of  that  which 
they  see  to  be  good.  Goodness  is  seen  with  the  eye  of  the 
understanding,  and  the  light  of  that  eye  is  Reason.  So  that 
two  principal  fountains'there  are  of  human  action,  Knowledge 
and  Will;  which  Will,  in  things  tending  towards  any  end, 
is  termed  choice."     Hooker,  Bk.  I.      Tr. 


this  point,  especially  after  what  has  been  remarked  in 
reference  to  it  by  Schelling  in  his  work  entitled  "  Phi- 
losophical INQ,UIRIES  RESPECTING  THE  ESSENCE    OF 

HUMAN  Freedom,"  '  we  presume  that  nothing  more 
need  be  added  in  order  to  show  that  freedom,  in  and  of 
itself,  is  something  else  than  the  dominion  of  Intel- 
ligence ;  and  that  evil  cannot  be  made  to  consist  in  the 
mere  feebleness  of  the  intelligential  principle,  much 
less  in  the  want  of  freedom. 

In  one  point,  however,  there  is  an  agreement  be- 
tween that  definition  of  freedom  which  has  already 
been  considered,  and  that  other  given  by  Schelling. 
The  agreement  consists  in  this,  that  both  definitions 
primarily  have  respect  to  the  use  of  freedom  ;  the  first 
expresses  the  manner  in  which  freedom  should  be 
used,  whilst  the  last  named  Inquirer  had  in  mind  the 
principal  manifestations  of  empirical  freedom,  as  they 
stand  opposed  to  each  other.  But  in  regard  to  both 
of  these  views  it  may  justly  be  asked,  whether,  if  free- 
dom were  defined  according  to  its  exercises  only,  the 
Idea  itself  would  not  be  ravished  from  our  sight,  and 
merely  separate  empirical  phenomena  substituted 
instead  of  it?  No  doubt  the  word  freedom  in  its 
primary  and  literal  sense  expresses  a  negative  concep- 
tion, namely,  the  absence  of  all  force  or  compulsion  ; 
and  this  universal  and  essential  characteristic  of  freedom 
must  be  found  connected  with  all  free  actions  under 
whatever  variety  of  outward  circumstances  they  may 

1  Philosophische    Untersuchungen    Uber   das  Wesen   der 

menschlichen  Freyheit. 

3# 


30 

be  performed.  On  the  contrary,  those  empirical  phe- 
nometia,  which  in  the  above  named  definitions  have  been 
adduced  as  marks  of  freedom,  are  not  to  be  met  with 
in  every  manifestation  of  free  vdll :  whilst,  therefore, 
they  belong  to  the  history  of  freedom,  they  are  not  such 
essential  and  immutable  criteria  as  to  be  of  any  service 
in  forming  a  scientific  definition  of  it  considered  in 
itself.  That  only  which  cannot  be  absent  from  any  free 
will,  whatever  may  be  its  other  condition  and  relations, 
that  alone  is  really  essential  to  the  nature  of  freedom, 
and  that  alone  may  be  used  for  its  definition.  As  the 
dominion  of  the  InteUigential  over  the  Animal,  freedom 
is  too  narrowly  defined,  because  by  this  definition  all 
the  wicked  would  be  excluded  from  the  class  of  the 
free.  That  definition  which  declares  freedom  to  be 
an  Abihty  to  good  or  Evil,  also  appears  unsuitable  and 
erroneous;  for  this  representation  leaves  it  entirely 
undecided  whether  the  Good  and  the  Evil  result  from 
election  and  self-determination,  or  whether  they  are  the 
products  of  Divine  appointment  and  necessity  ; — so  that 
here  is  missing  that  very  attribute  without  which  free- 
dom cannot  at  all  be  conceived  of.  Besides,  the  ori- 
ginal and  archetypal  freedom,  that  is,  the  freedom  of 
God,  lies  entirely  without  the  bounds  of  this  definition, 
since  an  ability  to  evil  taken  in  its  real  and  Hteral  sense, 
cannot  at  all  belong  to  Him.  Even  to  the  higher  un- 
fallen  spirits  an  ability  to  evil  could  only  be  figuratively 
ascribed,  and  in  a  sense  very  limited.  But  since  the 
word  can  by  no  means  be  used  in  its  literal  sense  with 
respect  to  God,  nor  be  so  taken  as  when  we  speak  of 


31 

an  ability  to  fly  or  of  an  ability  to  think,  and  under- 
stand by  the  expression  a  natural  power  or  constitution 
from  which  thought  and  flying  proceed  according  to 
established  laws ;  so  it  is  clear  that  in  this  sense  human 
freedom  is  also  incorrectly  defined  to  be  an  Ability  to 
Good  and  Evil.  Such  a  conception  of  freedom  were 
rather  a  kind  of  fixed  tendency  to  both  Good  and  Evil 
as  already  comprehended  in  it ;  but  it  would  effectually 
exclude  all  real  liberty.  Good  as  well  as  evil,  as  such, 
does  not  lie  in  freedom  itself;  opposed  to  each  other,  both 
arise  as  the  consequence  of  a  determinate  freedom, 
that  is,  of  the  freedom  of  man.  From  its  false  use, 
(of  which  hereafter,)  springs  evil,  which,  consequently, 
is  not  to  be  sought  in  the  ability  itself,  much  less  in 
the  pure  Idea.  Hence  the  predicates  Good,  morally 
Good,  are  never  applied  to  the  free  Will ;  they  first 
arise  from  a  determined  mode  of  its  use.  Freedom 
must  indeed  in  itself  always  be  regarded  as  a  Good, 
since  it  is  the  necessary  condition  of  man's  higher  nature, 
of  his  spiritual  personality.  In  the  higher  domain  of 
spiritual  being,  however,  the  activity  of  the  Will  is  by 
no  means  restricted  to  an  election  between  good  and 
evil ;  and  hence  that  definition  which  limits  the  Will's 
freedom  to  this  one  point  does  but  imperfectly  enumerate 
its  modes  of  action.  The  power  of  the  will  exhibits 
itself  in  such  original  activities  of  Mind  as  have  no  ref- 
erence whatever  to  morality  or  immorality  ;  nay,  which 
operate  for  themselves  before  all  moral  law,  and  entirely 
independent  of  it.  This  is  the  case  with  the  act  of 
pure  self-consciousness,  and  generally  with  that  ten- 


32 

dency  which  the  spirit  takes  in  its  higher  scientific  ex- 
ertions. In  tMs  pure  WilHng,  that  is,  in  the  original 
energy  of  the  spirit  acting  from  itself,  nothing  is  con- 
tained which  in  any,  even  the  most  remote  sense,  can 
as  yet  be  called  evil.  Were  this  the  case,  then  indeed 
evil  would  be  associated  in  our  very  conception  of  free- 
dom ;  but  this  again  would  immediately  destroy  the 
conception  itself,  and  evil  would  have  to  be  explained 
as  a  product  of  nature,  that  is,  as  necessary.  If  by  the 
term  ability  be  meant  a  power  real  and  actual,  then  an 
ability  to  good,  as  such,  must  be  already  good,  and  an 
ability  to  evil,  as  such,  must  already  be  evil ;  whence 
it  would  follow  that  there  is  no  freedom  at  all,  but  the 
necessity  to  become  not  one  of  the  two,  good  or  evil,  but 
both  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  manner.  There 
is  always  a  certain  indeterminateness,  or  rather  an  ac- 
tual double  sense  in  the  expression,  that  freedom  is  an 
ability  to  good  and  to  evil.  For  if  by'^the  phrase  nothing 
more  is  intended  to  be  affirmed  than  that  by  means  of 
freedom  man  has  in  his  power  the  possibility  not  of 
moral  good  only  but  of  moral  evil  also  ;  this  is  indeed 
an  incontestible  analytic  truth,  yet  is  it  in  no  sense  a 
definition  of  the  free  will,  but  only  a  consequence  de- 
veloped from  our  conception  of  freedom.  But  if  by 
the  expression  it  be  understood  that  an  ability,  or  (ac- 
cording to  the  examples  above  used,)  a  natural  constitu- 
tion and  adaptedness  to  evil  as  well  as  to  good,  con- 
stitutes the  essential  characteristic  of  freedom  ;  then  in- 
deed evil  must  spring  from  freedom  itself,  not  in  the 
way  of  an  accompaniment,  (as,  under  given  circum- 


33 

stances,  sickness  from  health,)  but  always  and  necessa- 
rily. Against  such  a  view  what  has  hitherto  been  said 
seems  valid,  and  in  general  it  may  be  urged  against  it, 
that  this  definition  of  liberty  involves  not  only  the 
impossibility  of  its  derivation  from  the  Will  of  a  personal 
God,  but  also  the  necessity  of  evil. 

Negatively  expressed.  Freedom  is  to  be  regarded 
as  the  absence  of  all  force  or  compulsion  ;  positively, 
as  Conscious  Self-determination,  in  which  there  is  given 
a  spiritual  Personality  or  Self-subsistence.  The  Will  is 
a  Conscious  Energy,  the  fountain  of  actions  which  spring 
from  the  union  of  powers  towards  objects  and  designs. 
It  is  originally  both  the  mover  and  th^  connecting  bond 
of  powers,  whereby  arises  a  spiritual  and  personal  life  ; 
hence  one  may  correctly  characterize  the  Spirit  as  as- 
cending Will.  Immediately  and  simultaneously  with 
the  I,  exists  also  the  will ;  and  conversely,  where  there 
is  no  Will  there  is  no  Personality,  because  where  this  is 
wanting,  rude  power  may  operate,  passion  and  instinct 
may  reign,  but  no  conscious  energy  regulating  itself 
with  self-subsistent  determination  and  design.  An  un- 
consious  will  were  a  contradiction  destructive  of  itself. 
All  that  could  be  intended  by  it  would  be  to  mark  a 
blind  appetency,  and  it  might  be  compared  to  the  force 
and  impulse  of  the  excited  elements. 

It  were  strange,  and  would  betray  but  little  know- 
ledge of  that  self-subsistent  power  which  lies  in  the 
spirit,  if  the  state  of  desiring  and  the  act  of  willing  w^ere 
confounded  with  each  other,  or  if  both  were  used  as 
words  of  synonymous  import.     Desire  is  the  very  op- 


34 

posite  of  the  will,  inasmuch  as  the  two  reciprocally 
strive  to  limit  each  other,  yea  rather  to  destroy  each 
other.  Appetite,  as  hunger  or  thirst,  involuntarily 
springing  up  from  the  deep  ground  of  mere  feeling  and 
from  a  sensible  need,  has  its  sole  attraction  towards 
self,  an  seeks  to  satisfy  itself,  and  in  its  ascendency  in- 
dicates an  absence  or  rather  a  passiveness  of  the  Will 
and  of  Intelligence.  Hence  the  desirous  man  (or  man 
in  a  state  of  desire,)  is  not  only  something  very  different 
from  the  willing  man,  but  the  direct  contrary  of  him.  ^ 

^  And  yet  two  writers  on  the  Philosophy  of  Mind,  most 
popular  with  us,  strenuously  maintain  the  sameness  of  will 
and  desire.  "  The  determination  of  the  mind  never  is,  and 
never  can  be,  to  do  what,  in  the  particular  circumstances 
of  the  moment,  we  do  not  desire  to  do." — "What  is  termed 
will,  is  a  desire  following  directly  another  desire  ;  but  it  has 
this  circumstance  in  common  with  many  other  desires, 
which  rise  one  from  the  other,  and  are  not  considered  as 
involving  on  that  account  any  peculiar  quality.  The  in- 
dolent sensualist,  for  example,  who  knows  the  extent  of  com- 
mand over  the  various  objects  of  luxurious  accommodation 
which  wealth  confers,  may  have  wishes  as  various  as  the 
luxuries  of  which  he  thinks  ;  and  the  desire  of  any  one  of  these 
may  be  instantly  followed  by  the  desire  of  that  which  he  knows 
to  be  necessary  for  the  gratification  of  it, — as  instantly,  as, 
when  the  very  delicacy  which  his  appetite  lias  sought  is 
placed  before  him,  his  will  to  extend  his  arm  to  it  seems  it- 
self, in  its  quick  subsequence,  to  be  almost  a  part  of  the 
earlier  desire  of  enjoying  what  is  within  his  reach,  so  as  to 
require  only  the  rapid  intermediate  effort."  Brown  on 
Cause  and  Effect,  p.  38,  39. 


35 

Whilst  in  desire  there  is  necessarily  commingled  a  feel- 

.  ing  of  dependence,  the  will  is  accompanied  with  the 

feeling  of  independence.      This  last  state,  however, 

"  On  various  accounts  certain  actions,  i.  e.  certain  motions 
of  some  of  the  bodily  members,  may  be  regarded  in  the 
light  of  a  good,  and  so  become  objects  of  desire.     But  as 
the  actual  motions  follow  instantly,  by  Divine  appointment, 
our  desires  to  perform  them,  these  desires  perish,  of  course, 
in  the  moment  of  their  birth.     It  is  to  desires  of  this  kind 
that  we  give  the  name  of  Volitions ;  but  they  are  not  spe- 
cifically different  from  our  permanent  desires — all  of  which, 
but  for  the  circumstance  of  their  permanence,  would  be 
denominated  Volitions."     "  There  is,  then,  no  radical  differ- 
ence between  will  and  desire."     Payne's  Elements^   p.  365, 
370.     Thus  no  distinction  is  here  recognized  between  the 
Will,  volitions  and  desires.     Indeed  writers  generally,  who 
in  their  leading  characteristics  belong  to  this  school  of  phi- 
losophy, do  not  seem  to  admit  any  radical  distinction  in  fact, 
(although  they  do  in  words,)  between  acts  of  the  will  and 
desires,  inasmuch  as  they  represent  all  appetites,  sensations, 
propensities,  desires,  hopes,  fears,  all  apprehension  of  spir- 
itual truth,  the  loftiest  efforts  of  thought  and  imagination, 
Holiness  and  Free  Will,  as  being  but  different  states  oftht 
same  indivisible  essence,  mind.     Without  entering  into  the 
discussion,  we  would  simply  ask.  Have  brutes  a  Will  ?     Are 
they  Persons  ?     Can  we  call  them  beings,  though  lower  in 
degree  and  varying  in  their  specific  characters,  yet  the  same 
in  kind,  with  the  Divine  Being,  angels  and  men  ?     But  have 
they  not   desires  of    various  kinds?     If   now  these  latter 
differ    not    essentially  from   acts   of   will,   how   shall    we 
account    for    it  that  brutes    are    without  moral    character 
and  irresponsible,  as  all  admit  that  they  are  ?     And  whence 
originate  guilt  and  remorse  in  man  ?    See  Appendix  [C]  Tr. 


36 

can  exist  only  under  the  condition  of  the  self-subsistent 
determination  of  a  spiritual  power  concentred,  under 
the  condition  of  a  conscious  energy  and  action  springing 
absolutely  from  itself;  consequently  the  power  of  the 
will  is  more  centrifugal  than  centripetal,  yet  at  the  same 
time  that  it  has  a  tendency  to  place  itself  in  opposition 
to  that  which  is  not  self,  it  also  evinces  a  striving  to  sub- 
ject this  last  to  self,  and  thus  to  manifest  itself  to  the 
same  as  an  energic  or  creative  power. 

Desires  and  passions  in  and  of  themselves  consid- 
ered, and  aside  from  their  possible  derangement  are,  as 
well  as  every  other  power  and  activity,  of  inestimable 
wortli  in  their  proper  place ;  but  being  blind,  and  con- 
sequently always  subordinate  powers,  they  have,  as  is 
proper,  no  determining  voice  in  the  counsels  of  the  Spir- 
it, and  should  therefore  never  be  released  from  the  guard- 
ianship and  guidance  of  the  Understanding  and  the  Will. 
The  derangement  of  this  proper  relation  (w^hich,  from  the 
nature  of  free  man,  we  shall  hereafter  endeavour  to 
explain,)  is  sin  ;  and  evil  lies  not  in  any  one  of  these 
individual  powers  considered  in  and  of  itself,  but  in  the 
perversion  of  their  order,  in  the  false  co-operation  and 
interlinking  of  powers  that  have  departed  from  and 
deranged  their  original  relation.  For  the  activity  of 
the  Life  is  not  destroyed  by  means  of  evil,  but  the  in- 
dividual Factors  only  come  to  bear  a  different  relation  to 
the  Centre.  Inactivity  or  the  non-use  of  the  will  and 
of  reason  is,  in  strictness,  never  without  guilt ;  and  it 
is  this  inactivity  of  the  will  which  marks  every  degree 
of  evil,  from  sinful  weakness  and  inefficiency  of  con- 


37 

duct,  to  the  most  abandoned  wickedness.  An  entire 
perversion  follows  when  the  will  itself  and  the  abused 
reason,  deluded  by  the  desires  and  passions  as  by  false 
friends,  rise  in  league  with  these  in  rebellion  against 
the  law,  and  with  them  make  now  but  one  hostile  host. 
The  will  then  becomes  an  energetic  will  to  evil,  nay,  it 
becomes  wickedness  itself.  As  the  triumph,  so  also 
the  fruitfulness  of  Evil,  shows  itself  in  this,  that  the 
powers  by  which  it  is  actuated  were  originally  the  same 
as  those  which  operate  in  the  Good.  Hence  the  eternal 
hostility  between  the  two,  and  the  continual  longing 
after  derangement  and  subversion  which  cleaves  to  per- 
fected immorality,  because  that  a  system  of  wickedness 
and  lies  can  only  be  constructed  from  the  wreck  of  truth, 
and  reared  upon  the  ruins  of  virtue.  By  this  means, 
that  is,  through  the  original  homogeneousness  of  these 
powers,  persons  of  the  very  greatest  wickedness  are 
oftentimes  enabled  to  show  forth  capabilities  (e.  g.  of 
courage,  of  perseverance,  of  presence  of  mind,)  which 
in  themselves  considered  are  of  very  high  worth,  but 
in  their  present  relations  become  most  pernicious. 
From  the  above  representation  moreover  it  becomes 
intelligible  how  the  wicked  can  make  themselves  ap- 
pear externally  virtuous,  and  how  the  hypocrite  by 
his  deceitful  arts  can  assume  the  specious  garb  of  piety. 
For,  evil  also,  inasmuch  as  it  is  but  perverted  good,  is 
susceptible  of  a  refined  cultivation,  and  hence  it  does  by 
no  means  always  appear  in  the  gross  outbreakings  of 
desires  and  lustful  passions,  (from  which,  perhaps,  some 
one  might  wish  that  he  were  on  the  very  summit  of 

4 


38 

human  sinfulness,)  but  rather  the  will  which  has  become 
depraved,  and  the  debased  reason,  in  league  with  white- 
washed passions,  generate  that  hypocritical  prudence,  that 
false,  that  ofttimes  astonishing  worldly  wisdom,  which 
can  only  be  characterized  as  deceitful  cunning  and  cool 
premeditating  wickedness.  To  wish  to  derive  a  phe- 
nomenon of  this  kind  from  the  lusts  and  desires  them- 
selves, were  unsatisfactory.  Desire  wills  neither  the 
Good  nor  the  Evil,  and  that,  simply,  because  it  wills 
not  at  all.  The  human  will  too,  as  such,  is  not,  per  se, 
essentially  evil, — it  does  not  originally  will  what  is  wrong; 
and  perfected  immorality  has  never  yet  at  once  broke 
forth  from  any  human  soul.  But  in  our  view,  which 
we  shall  endeavour  to  develope  more  fully  in  the  pro- 
gress of  this  essay,  evil  arises  gradually  through  the 
seduction  of  lust,  (obedience  to  which  constitutes  the 
first  guilt,  but  yet  a  guilt  which  might  be  altogether 
avoided) ;  and  thus  it  increases  in  the  course  of  a  contin- 
ually augmenting  and  wicked  derangement  of  powers, 
until  it  arrives  at  a  certain  state  of  self-subsistence.  A 
case  analogous  to  it  is  presented  to  us  in  the  human 
organization.  When  the  fluids  are  diverted  from  their 
proper  channels  they  give  rise  to  an  after-growth,  a  pro- 
duct hostile  to  life  and  yet  deriving  its  sustenance  from 
life.  A  neglected  mind  therefore,  especially  where  it 
has  very  early  been  guilty  of  crime,  may  proceed  to  such 
a  high  point  of  evil  that  sinfulness  will  acquire  the  as- 
cendency, and  for  a  time  prove  too  powerful  for  every  op- 
posing obstacle.  In  this  condition,  although  the  better 
voice  may  call  aloud  from  its  depth  and  command  to 


39 

return,  sudden  reformation  is  impossible — ^impossible,  at 
least,  before  the  self-consuming  madness  of  evil  has 
run  through  its  course  ;  as  is  not  unfrequently  the  case 
with  certain  diseases,  which  no  human  skill  can  arrest 
until  they  have  arrived  at  a  certain  crisis.  Without 
doubt  it  is  a  remarkable  peculiarity — a  peculiarity  fre- 
quently observed  in  Evil, — that  notwithstanding  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  individual  powers  operative  in  it,  notwith- 
standing the  apparent  self-subsistence  by  means  of  which 
this  Life  that  has  moved  out  of  its  proper  orbit  seeks  to 
form  for  itself  an  independent  and  secure  middle-point, 
(as  a  substitute  for  the  true  centrum  which  has  been  lost,) 
still  there  always  remains  an  inward  contradiction,  a 
contradiction  that  cannot  be  removed  ;  there  is  still 
an  indestructible  feeling  of  disunion,  a  continual  long- 
ing after  something  not  had.  And  thus  it  is  that  such  a 
life  betrays  itself  as  somewhat  false  and  unsubstantial ; 
it  can  afford  nothing  which  is  healthful  and  per- 
manent, but  seems  rather  to  resemble  spectral  forms 
and  apparitions.  This  is  the  reason  why  that  in  in- 
dividuals who  have  given  themselves  up  to  the  prac- 
tice of  wickedness  there  is  observed  an  internal  faint- 
heartedness and  insecurity  at  the  very  time  when  one 
would  least  expect  it ;  their  condition  is  like  to  that  of 
one  under  whose  feet  the  solid  earth  begins  to  trem- 
ble and  to  move.  The  abused  reason  can  no  longer 
keep  in  league  those  powers  that  have  conspired  to 
pursue  a  life  of  falsehood  ;  and  the  feeling  of  dissever- 
ance from  the  Ground  of  all  Life  ends  in  corroding 
remorse,  or  cowardly  irresolution  and  despair.  Were 
there   an  original  ground  of  evil  as  such,  in  which  it 


40 

might  have  its  firm  root  so  far  as  its  developement  ap- 
pears, then  in  its  manifestations  it  would  exhibit  a  natural 
and  healthy  growth,  a  life  inwardly  true,  peaceful  and 
permanent.  But  if  this  were  the  case  it  would  be  difficult 
to  explain  why  all  better  persons  feel  such  a  horror  on 
witnessing  the  gross  outbreakings  of  evil ;  and  still 
more  difficult  would  it  be  to  account  for  that  internal  dis- 
sension which  exists  in  the  breast  of  every  wicked  man, 
for  the  arts  of  hypocrisy  and  self-deception,  and  for  the 
self-corroding  agony  of  ren?orse  and  despair.  After  all 
that  has  been  said,  it  only  remains  as  a  further  preliminary 
step  to  consider  evil  as  a  degeneracy,  as  a  monstrous- 
birth  ;  and,  since,  in  so  far  as  its  essential  being  is  concern- 
ed, it  has  no  fixed  ground  in  an  original  nature,  to  consid- 
er it  as  something  unsubstantial,  and  to  explain  its  tem- 
poral phenomenon  from  that  determination  which  the 
free  will  of  a  finite  being  is  able  to  make.  As  has 
already  been  observed,  however,  this  will  is  not  to  be 
regarded  as  an  ability  to  evil  derived  from  God,  nor 
must  it  by  any  means  be  supposed  that  the  will  origi- 
nally, as  such,  is  evil ;  for  by  making  such  a  supposi- 
tion we  should  be  driven  to  the  necessity  of  assuming 
a  primary  Ground  of  evil,  and  indeed  of  considering 
the  Great  First  of  all  as  being  himself  also  evil.  Besides, 
on  such  a  view  it  were  perfectly  inconceivable  how  a 
Will,  in  its  very  essence  infected  with  evil,  could  ever  be 
transformed  into  a  good  Will,  without  an  utter  destruction 
of  its  essential  being.  Hence  we  are  unavoidably  led 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  ultimate  ground  of  evil  lies 
in  something  different  from  nature,  and  which  is  itself 


41 

originally  not  evil,  namely,  in  the  human  will, — from 
which  we  maintain  that  it  is  free. 

This  assertion  is  doubtless  worthy  of  particular 
attention.  For  although  it  is  daily  assumed  that  the 
will  is  free,  still  on  closer  examination,  and  on  a  com- 
parison of  this  with  other  acknowledged  truths,  it  creates 
abundant  difficulty.  So  that  we  deem  it  necessary  in 
the  first  place  to  offer  a  vindication  of  this  assumption 
which  in  many  respects  appears  so  strange,  or  at  least 
to  point  out  in  what  this  supposed  freedom  consists. 

If  one  considers  the   phenomena  i  of  the  sensible 

^  As  the  words  essence,  nature,  phenomena,  and  phe- 
nomenal, are  employed  in  this  essay  in  a  manner  differing 
somewhat  from  their  ordinary  use,  it  may  not  be  improper 
to  subjoin  an  explanation.  "Having  resolved  all  external 
and  internal  Intuitions  into  Sensations,  we  may  with  equal 
propriety  apply  the  name  of  Phenomena,  or  appearances, 
to  them  ;  and  say  of  Nature,  or  the  external  world,  that  it  is 
only  a  collection  o£  Phenomena y  or  appearances,  which  strike 
our  senses  and  exist  in  the  mind  alone ;  hence  also  the  ttoo 
general  varieties,  Time  and  Space,  can  exist  no  where  but 
in  the  mind.  We  must  not  however  suppose  that  this  in 
any  manner  leads  to  Idealism  ;  for  it  is  most  certain  that  in 
all  this  procedure  the  mind  is  Passive,  and  is  acted  upon 
by  something  different  from  itself,  and  which  it  does  not 
create  ;  namely,  that  which  produces  Sensation  :  and,  from 
the  happy  discovery  that  Time  and  Space  really  are  the  two 
Receptivities  of  the  Sensitive  Faculty,  we  are  enabled  to 
say  that  this  something  is  out  of  THme  and  Space,  and  may 
be  called  the  Noumenon,  or  Cause  of  the  Phenomena,  or 
the  thing  in  itself  independent  of  the  mind.  Thus,  while 
4# 


42 

world  as  such,  they  appear  to  form  one  unbroken  chain, 
each  of  whose  individual  links  constitutes  the  necessary 
condition  of  each  succeeding  one.  It  is  an  immeasur- 
able system  of  causes  and  effects  strictly  connected 
with  each  other ;  a  consecutive  series  which  seems  to 
unwind,  as  it  were,  in  one  long  line  of  inseparable 
dependencies.  The  Freedom  of  the  Will  is  :  That  it  is 
not  subjected  to  this  law  ; — that  every  moment,  by  an 

the  same  causes  produce  the  same  effects^  Nature  will  be  as 
permanent  and  unchanged  as  it  is  at  present,  and  the  ex- 
ternal world  completely  secured."  Thomas  Wirgman^  Encyc. 
Lond.  Art  Philosophy,  p.  128. 

"  The  word  nature  has  been  used  in  two  senses,  viz. 
actively  and  passively ;  energetic  (=  forma  formans,)  and 
material  (=  forma  formata).  In  the  first  it  signifies  the  in- 
ward principle  of  whatever  is  requisite  for  the  reality  of  a 
thing,  as  existent :  while  the  essence  or  essential  prop- 
erty, signifies  the  inner  principle  of  all  that  appertains 
to  the  possibility  of  a  thing.  Hence,  in  accurate  lan- 
guage we  say  the  essence  of  a  mathematical  circle  or 
geometrical  figure,  not  the  nature  ;  because  in  the  con- 
ception of  forms  purely  geometrical  there  is  no  expres- 
sion or  implication  of  their  real  existence.  In  the  second, 
or  material  sense  of  the  word  Nature,  we  mean  by  it  the 
sum  total  of  all  things,  as  far  as  they  are  objects  of  our  senses, 
and  consequently  of  possible  experience — the  aggregate  of 
Phenomena,  whether  existing  for  our  outer  senses,  or  for 
our  inner  sense.  The  doctrine  concerning  nature  would 
therefore  (the  word  Physiology  being  both  ambiguous  in 
itself,  and  already  otherwise  appropriated)  be  more  properly 
entitled  Phenomenology,  distinguished  into  its  two  grand 
divisions,  Somatology  and  Psychology."   Friend,  p.  410.  Tr. 


43 

inward  self-determination,  without  being  conditioned  by 
any  thing  extraneous  or  antecedent  to  itself,  it  is  able  to 
begin  a  new  ideal  series  of  spiritual  effects,  and  can 
also  arbitrarily  connect  itself  as  a  forming  power  with 
the  course  of  things  as  they  take  place  before  us.  By 
these  outward  events,  however,  it  is  in  no  way  deter- 
mined, but  on  the  contrary  this  active  imprinting  of 
itself  is  accompanied  by  corresponding  effects  upon 
nature ;  or  in  other  words,  these  things  by  which 
the  will  is  not  determined,  may  on  the  contrary  be  de- 
termined by  the  Will.  ^    Without  doubt  in  the  spirit  and 

^  We  find,  however,  that  some  writers  on  the  Will  do 
not  accord  with  this  representation.  "  Necessity,  as  applied 
to  the  operation  of  moral  causes,  appears  simply  to  corres- 
pond with  the  uniformity  which  we  observe  in  the  operation 
of  physical  causes.  We  calculate  that  a  man  of  a  certain 
character  will  act  in  a  particular  manner  in  particular  cir- 
cumstances, or  that  he  will  be  acted  upon  in  a  certain  man- 
ner by  particular  truths  and  motives,  when  they  are  present- 
ed to  him, — by  a  principle  of  uniformity  similar  to  that  with 
which  we  expect  an  acid  to  act  in  a  particular  manner  upon 
an  alkali^  Jibercromhie  on  tJie  Intellectual  Powers,  Pt.  Ill, 
ch.  IV. 

"  I  assert  that  nothing  ever  comes  to  pass  without  a 
cause.  What  is  self-existent  must  be  from  eternity,  and 
must  be  unchangeable  :  but  as  to  all  things  that  begin  to  be, 
they  are  not  self-existent,  and  therefore  must  have  some 
foundation  of  their  existence  without  themselves."  [Con- 
sequently, every  act  of  the  Will  which  begins  to  be,  or  every 
Will  in  whatever  condition  or  relations  it  may  be,  must, 
provided  it  was  not  so  from  eternity,  have  some  cause,  out 
OF  ITSELF,  why  it  is  as  it  is  and  not  otherwise.    Or  in  other 


44 

the  heart  of  man — a  tribunal  whose  decisions  we  should 
know  and  reverence,  even  long  before  we  approach 
nature,  so  foreign  to  us,  to  inquire  about  the  significance 
of  her  synnbolic  language  and  mysterious  hieroglyphics 
— there  lies  a  defence  of  the  bold  assumption  that  the 
Will  is  independent  of  and  contradistinguished  from 
nature.  In  what  immediately  follows  we  shall  attempt 
to  vindicate,  or  at  least  to  point  out  freedom  in  the 
soul  of  man.  But  to  derive  a  proof  of  this  from  the 
necessary  laws  of  nature,  or  to  set  forth  a  deduction  of 
,v^y  I  freedom  drawn  from  natural  causes,  is  neither  attempt- 
[  ed,  nor  is  it  deemed  possible  ;  yet  by  pursuing  this 
course  we  do  by  no  means  exclude  the  effort  to  bring 
human  freedom  into  an  accordance  with  the  Idea  of  God 
and  with  nature,  but  rather  retain  it  as  a  farther  pro- 
blem to  be  solved. 

words,  the  Will  is  hot  the  Originator  of  its  own  acts.]  Ed- 
wards^ Inquiry  on  the  Will,  Pt.  II.  Sec.  III.  On  this  reason- 
ing Dugald  Stewart  thus  remarks:  ^'  The  foregoing  argument 
goes  to  prove,  that  all  human  actions  are  as  necessarily  pro- 
duced by  motives,  as  the  going  of  a  clock  is  necessarily  pro- 
duced by  the  weights,  and  that  no  human  action  could  have 
been  otherwise  than  it  really  was.  Nay,  it  applies  also  in  full 
force  to  the  Deity,  and  indeed  to  all  intelligent  beings  what- 
ever ;  for  it  is  not  founded  on  any  thing  pecidiar  to  the  hu- 
man mind,  but  on  the  impossibilily  of  free  agency ;  and,  of 
consequence,  it  leads  to  this  general  conclusion,  that  no 
eveiU  in  the  universe  could  have  happened  otherwise  than  it 
did."  And,  if  logically  carried  out,  he  might  have  added 
the  words  of  Spinoza:  ^*Res  nullo  alio  modo,  neque  alio 
ordine  a  Deo  pioduci  potuerunt,  quam  productse  sunt."     Tr. 


5t    LlBli^^^:; 

OF  THE  ^ 

From  the  considemtieft-o£  natiWStoqjSijr ,  and"  ^Y  ^\^ 
means  of  impressions  recieyed  from  witlwa^^^4&  im^^^ 
possible  that  man  could  ever  have  been  led  to  aEnovv- 
ledge  of  the  Freedom  of  the  Will.  This  is  no  notion 
which  was  made,  or  which  originated  from  abstraction  ; 
because  from  the  so  called  universal  laws  of  nature, 
governed  by  necessity,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  derive 
its  very  antithesis — a  Law  of  Freedom.  Freedom 
is  an  Idea,  it  is  original  to  the  human  soul,  and  so  I 
inwoven  with  it,  that  it  is  no  less  impossible  for  the  i 
mind  arbitrarily  to  divest  itself  of  this  Idea  than  it  is  ar- 
bitrarily to  create  it.  In  speaking  thus,  however,  we 
do  not  pretend  to  assert  that  each  particular  man, 
though  he  possesses  this  Idea  existing  in  the  germ,  has 
so  developed  it  as  to  have  made  it  an  object  of  clear 
and  distinct  consciousness.  For  there  are  also  other 
Ideas  in  many  individuals,  whose  souls  seldom  or  rarely 
hold  converse  with  themselves,  which  are  either  per- 
fectly misapprehended,  or  only  float  before  the  mental 
vision  as  obscure  representations.  But  no  one  will  there- 
fore entirely  deny  to  human  nature  the  Faculty  of 
Ideas ;  for  this  would  be  the  same  as  to  say  that  for 
the  spirit  there  is  nothing  unconditioned  or  infinite,  and 
that  all  the  representations  possible  for  the  soul  of  man 
are  comprehended  in  the  conceptions  of  the  under- 
standing  and  sensible  intuitions.  After  being  suffi« 
ciently  wearied  with  perceiving,  arranging  and  combin- 
ing the  endless  series  of  outward  phenomena,  the 
spirit  at  last  unavoidably  meets  with  such  presentations 
as  cannot  be  reckoned  under  the  same  category  with 


46 

those  phenomena,  nor  ranged  in  the  same  series  with 
them.  And  it  is  particularly  worthy  of  remark,  that 
this  very  power  of  forming  representations  which  lie 
above  the  range  of  experience  and  the  conceptions  of 
understanding  is  that  which,  as  the  most  noble  and 
worthy,  not  only  elicits  the  highest  interest,  but  it  is 
that  alone  which  gives  humanity  to  Man.  Still,  how- 
ever much  it  may  be  elevated,  it  is  this  faculty  which 
does  in  an  especial  manner  regulate  the  course  of  life ; 
for  Ideas,  as  if  they  were  heavenly  powers  that  might 
be  felt  though  but  indistinctly  apprehended,  oftentimes 
exercise  a  more  than  earthly  power  and  dominion  even 
over  those  who  are  but  little  cultivated.  As  is  the  case 
with  so  many  other  ideas,  that  of  God  for  instance,  so 
is  it  especially  with  the  idea  of  freedom,  that  it  causes 
itself  to  be  felt  by  that  higher  obtrusiveness,  and  per- 
vades the  mind  with  an  indestructible  though  uncom- 
prehended  activity.  The  chief  problem  of  philosophy 
is  to  search  into  these  higher  movements  of  life  pecu- 
liar to  the  Spirit,  and  to  make  ideas  objects  of  distinct 
consciousness.  For  such  inquiries  he  is  best  fitted 
who  has  accustomed  himself  to  consider  the  soul  in  its 
immediate  relation  to  itself — a  relation  by  which  it  is  it- 
self distinguished  from  that  which  ends  in  it  or  passes  by 
it ; — to  consider  it  as  that  which  constitutes  the  abid- 
ing principle,  the  subject,  as  it  were,  of  all  its  changes 
and  conditions ;  that  which  at  the  same  time  contains 
the  primary  standard  of  all  phenomena — a  standard 
not  given,  but  existing  anterior  to  everything  that  is 
given.    With  special  reference  to  the  idea  of  freedom  it 


47 

could  not  be  correctly  said,  that  it  first  originates  as  the 
result  of  varied  reflections  upon  the  phenomena  of  the 
inner  and  outward   world.     For  although  it  is  certain 
that  continued  thought  upon  the  visible  world  conducts 
back  to  a  First  and  Free  Original,  who  belongs  not  to 
the  class  of  the  Phenomenal  ;  and  although  it  is  farther 
certain  that  meditation  upon  our  internal  moral  nature 
can  ultimately  find  rest  only  in  the  idea  of  moral  free- 
dom ;  yet  from  all  this  it  does  not  follow  that  this  idea  is 
first  simply  formed  in  the  progress  of  those  reflections, 
and  that  it  is   therefore  to  be  regarded   as  but  a  mere 
expedient  invented  to  aid  us  in  the  better  understand- 
ing of  both  worlds.     Indeed  this  idea  could  scarcely 
be  applied  to  the  purposes  named,  did  it  not  exist  prior 
to  and  independent  of  every  purpose ;   for  even  the 
application  of  it  supposes  its  pre-existence  i.  e.  presup- 
poses that  it  is  impossible  for  the  human  spirit  to  rest 
peacefully  in  an  endless   regress  of  blindly  operative 
causes  and  consequences  ;  or,  which  is  the  same  thing, 
that  it  is  not  possible  for  it  to  exclude  from  itself  the 
idea  of  freedom.     In  the  first  original  action,  in  the  act 
of  self-conscionsness,  is  this  idea  already  present ;  for 
even  here  the  soul  feels  itself  to  be  an   energy  acting 
from  itself,  and  finds  the  act  of "  Willing"  to  be  so 
essential  to  its  being,  that  when  critically  scrutinized 
no  other  predicate  whatever  can  be  applied  to  it,  and 
it  is  impossible   for  the  soul  even  to  think  of  itself  as 
710^  Willing.     The  existence  of  the  idea  then,  already 
gives  assurance  for  the  existence  also  of  a  sphere  of 
gjctiop  lying  above  the  unbroken  visible  chain  of  phe- 


48      • 

nomena,  whose  changes  are  effected  according  to  ne- 
cessary laws.  Hence  the  conflict  which  man  must 
carry  on  against  necessity,  and  the  pain  consequent 
upon  its  power,  are  apparent ;  for  both  are  conceivable 
only  on  the  supposition  that  the  essence  of  the  soul  ori- 
ginally possesses  freedom  as  its  own  proper  endowment. 
It  is  very  certain  that  the  brute  animal  does  not  thus  feel 
the  constraint  of  necessity,  to  which  it  nevertheless 
yields  passive  obedience ;  it  does  not  feel  the  want 
of  freedom  for  the  very  reason  that  by  nature  it  is  un- 
free,  just  as  a  person  born  blind  has  no  conception  of 
darkness  because  he  never  lost  that  of  light  ^.  In  or- 
der that  he  might  be  able  to  form  to  himself  a  represen- 

^  By  some,  however,  liberty  is  ascribed  to  brutes.  "  The 
liberty  of  brutes  is  as  perfect  in  its  sphere,  as  that  of  men  or 
angels.  As  they  roam  in  forests  and  mountain  wildernesses, 
or  swim  in  the  depths  of  the  ocean,  or  fly  and  gaily  sing  in 
the  radiant  fields  of  the  summer's  sky,  they  are  free ;  they 
rejoice  in  their  freedom  ;  and  prize  it  as  one  of  heaven's 
best  gifts."  Upharn's  Essay  on  the  Will,  §  148,  p.  231.  An.l 
by  others  to  rivers.  Hobbes  says,  "  The  water  is  said  to 
descend /reeZ?/,  or  to  have  liberty  to  descend  by  the  channel 
of  the  river,  because  there  is  no  impediment  that  way;  but 
not  across,  because  the  banks  are  impediments.  And  though 
water  cannot  ascend,  yet  men  never  say  it  wants  the  liberty 
to  ascend,  but  the  faculty  or  power ^  because  the  impediment 
is  in  the  nature  of  the  water  and  intrinsical."  Hobbes  was 
a  celebrated  advocate  for  necessity,  or  rather  for  a  liberty 
which  was  nothing  better  than  necessity.  His  definition  of 
liberty  was :  The  absence  of  all  impediments  to  action  that  are 
not  contained  in  the  nature  and  intrinsical  quality  of  the  agent. 


49 

tation  of  the  deep  night  in  which  he  Hves,  he  must  pre- 
viously have  enjoyed  the  intuition  of  light.  He  who  has 
never  tasted  liberty  will  also  feel  no  desire  to  exercise  it ; 
nor  does  any  pain  arise  relative  to  its  hindrance  or 
interruption.     He  only  who  is  originally  free  can  feel 

It  was  in  this  sense  that  he  spoke  of  a  river  as  being  free  ;  in 
its  own  sphere  it  is  free.  In  his  Philosophical  Writings  Schel- 
ling  says  essentially  the  same  thing  :  "  Frei  ist,  was  nur  den 
Gesetzen  seines  eignen  Wesens  gemass  handelt."  "  That  is 
free  which  only  acts  conformably  to  the  laws  of  its  own  be- 
ing." In  remarking  upon  this  definition  Tholuck  observes 
that  it  is  entirely  accordant  with  the  one  given  by  Spinoza, 
and  that  it  expresses  the  same  as  what  we  mean  when  we 
speak  of  any  thing's  being  necessitated  or  nnfree.  He  goes  on 
to  remark  of  Neeb,  whom  he  highly  commends,  that  the  con- 
ception of  freedom  recognized  by  him,  was,  in  a  higher 
sense,  not  materially  different  from  that  of  Schelling  and 
Spinoza,  since  he  ascribed  to  man  in  his  original  condition, 
and  to  all  holy  spirits,  such  a  relation  to  God,  as  that  by  their 
union  with  Him  they  could  not  act  otherwise  than  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  their  being.  This  relation,  he  proceeds,  we 
call;;free,  as,  w  hen  speaking*  analogically,  every  developement 
of  nature,  the  organization  of  w^hich  suffers  no  interruption 
from  without,  is  denominated  free.  Still,  however,  there  is 
only  an  external  likeness  between  this  definition  and  that  of 
Spinoza.  For  we  maintain  that  man  stands  in  this  condi- 
tion of  Divine  Freedom  by  a  continuous  act  of  free  self- 
determination,  which  cannot  be  conceded  bj  pantheists, 
inasmuch  as  they  assert  that  even  in  this  self-determination 
the  actor  is  God.  See  Lehre  von  der  Sunde,  4te  aufl.  s,  189, 
190.     Tr, 

5 


50 

the  constraint  of  necessity ;  as  original  warmth  is  de- 
manded to  the  end  that  the  sensation  of  cold  may  be  felt. 
The  power  of  the  Will  is  the  warm  stream  of  light 
that  flows  through  opposing  nature,  and  by  which  the 
rigidity  and  fixedness  that  pervade  it  are  first  made 
known.  But  should  any  one  say  that  freedom  is  still 
simply  an  Idea,  in  opposition  to  that  w^hich  is  living 
and  actual,  it  would  be  because  he  had  entirely  misap- 
prehended the  nature  of  an  idea,  which  through  its 
Ideality  loses  nothing  of  its  Reality,  but  for  this  very 
reason,  as  has  already  been  shewn,  manifests  itself  by 
exercising  an  active  influence  in  life.  Freedom  is 
not  to  be  considered  as  a  mere  creature  of  thought, 
nor  as  a  distant  good  yet  to  be  hoped  for,  nor  as  some- 
thing long  since  lost,  but  as  an  original,  present,  exist- 
ing Power.  The  will  acting  from  itself  is  so  intimately 
connected  with  the  essence  of  spiritual  being,  that  the 
former  cannot  be  taken  away  without  the  destruction 
of  the  latter.  Without  the  most  free  act  of  the  spirit, 
as  has  already  been  intimated,  man  could  never  have 
said  to  himself  "  F'  ;  nor  would  he  ever  be  able  to  say  it. 
It  is  only  as  the  soul  arbitrarily,  (for  in  the  so  called  course 
of  nature  there  is  no  ground  for  this  interruption,)  breaks 
off  the  series  of  passing  sensations  in  which  it  rather  loses 
than  finds  itself,  and  by  a  reflex  act  turns  in  upon  itself, 
that  it  distinguishes  itself  from  things,  and  from  the  im- 
pressions produced  by  them  or  arising  inwardly.  Thus 
only  is  it  that  the  soul  finds  itself,  not  by  a  seeking,  but 
by  virtue  of  its  own  free  act  dependent  upon  no  out- 
ward anterior  condition.     Even  the  very  first  act  of 


51 

self-consciousness  is  a  pure  ^If-determination,  so  that 
freedom  is  a  matter  of  fact  which  stands  or  falls  with 
the  being  of  I.     Ev^ery  analysis  of  self-consciousness 
conducts  back  to  a  point  where  the  chain,  (represented 
as  endless,)  of    connexion  between  bhndly  operative 
causes  and  effects,  does  by  no  means  reach  ;  and  where, 
in  a  manner  entirely  different  from  the  so  called  laws 
of  nature,  a  much  higher  life,  even  the  life  of  the  spirit, 
re-creates  itself  endlessly,  and   in  this  repetitive  act 
beholds  or  knows  its  own  self.     So  little  place  is  here 
found  for  that   necessary  and  inseparable  consecutive 
series  of  phenomena  interlinking  with  each  other,  that 
rather  in  so  far  only  as  that  series  is  removed  can  self- 
consciousness  enter ;  and  conversely,  this  decreases  in 
precisely  the  same    proportion  as    that  appears  pre- 
dominant.    The  fact,  moreover,  that  the  soul  always 
remains  conscious  of  its  own  identity,  as  the  tide  of 
things  rolls  onward,  and   amid   the  ceaseless  change 
of  outward  phenomena  and  inward  states,  can  only  be 
explained   on  the  supposition  that  it  finds  within  itself 
somewhat  which  does  not  belong  to  these  phenomena, 
somewhat  which  is  not  subject  to  their  laws.  The  charac- 
teristic of  these  laws  is  a  ceaseless  progression  from  the 
condition  to  the  thing  conditioned,  whilst  yet  for  the  con- 
sciousness of  identity  there  is  demanded  something  per- 
manent and  enduring— something  that  can  oppose  itself 
to  the  rapid  current  instead  of  floating  down  passively  with 
the  stream,  and  which,  from  its  lofty  height,  can  securely 
contemplate  the  changing  scenes  beneath.     The  state, 
finally,  of  the  philosophizing  mind,  is  possible  only  on 


52 

condition  that  the  soul  has  power  arbitrarily  to  withdraw 
from  the  consequential  series  of  external  or  internal  phe- 
nomena comprehended  in  the  law  of  constant  propulsion, 
and  that  in  the  midst  of  change  and  fluctuation  it  can 
always  turn  back  to  the  Permanent  as  the  ground  of 
the  Phenomenal,  and  can  elevate  itself  to  the  One 
and  the  Ultimate  ;  this  never  occurs,  however,  in  a 
progressive  series,  and  can  be  conceived  of  only  by  con- 
ceding to  the  soul  its  own  free  determination.  Other- 
wise the  spirit,  by  speculation,  could  never  be  made  par- 
ticipant of  a  higher  knowledge  ;  but,  if  subject  to  the 
same  law  of  causality  with  the  phenomena  of  nature,  it 
would  always,  buried  as  It  were  in  the  dark  perception  of 
the  apparent,  be  borne  along  together  with  the  ceaseless 
current  of  other  things.  For  the  spirit,  then,  there  would 
be  progression  only  without  beginning ;  always  time  a- 
lone  without  eternity.  Once  inserted  as  a  link  in  the  iron 
chain,  there  could  be  for  it  no  dehverance.  Nothing 
but  the  free  spirit  can  deliver  itself;  and  this  alone 
has  power  not  only  to  distinguish  itself  from  things, 
but  also,  (for  the  actuahzing  of  which  no  course  of 
nature  is  sufficient,)  to  go  back  to  the  laws  of  its  own 
agency,  and  to  the  ultimate  grounds  of  its  existence. 
So  the  will  then  is  the  true  redeemer  for  man  ;  and  it 
also  constitutes  the  necessary  condition  of  his  higher 
cognitive  faculty,  since  it  is  utterly  inconceivable  how 
truth  and  science  could  be  accessible  to  us  without 
the  Will.  For  although  there  is  frequently  found  an 
impulsive  kind  of  knowing  not  directed  by  the  free 
will,  and  which,  nearly  in  the  manner  of  brute  animals, 


53 

as  an  instinctive  curiosity  seeks  to  satisfy  itself  with, 
and  impress  itself  upon,  numberless  individual  objects  ; 
yet  there  is  also  a  higher  scientific  insight,  which  ap- 
prehends universal  laws  and  takes  its  direction  accord- 
ing to  ultimate  grounds  i.     Still  nothing  but  the  deter- 

^  ^'  In  consequence  of  being  endowed  with  Reason,  man 
strives  after  a  systematic  completion  of  his  knowledge,  and 
consequently   aims  to  raise  himself  to  a  science  of  the  ul- 
timate grounds  and  laws  of  Nature  and  ^'reedom,  as  well  as 
of  their  reciprocal  relations  to  each   other.     He  is  at   first 
urged  to  this  by  a  blind  feeling  of  need,  without  forming 
any  worthy  conceptions  of  the  problem   thus  proposed  by 
Reason,  without   knowing  in  what  way,  by  what  means, 
or  to  what  extent,  the  end  is  to  be  attained.     By  degrees,  as 
the  self-consciousness  of  reason  is  gradually  developed,  his 
eftbrts  become  more  determinate  in   their  aim  and  more 
reflective  in  their  character.     This  reflective  eflbrt   is  de- 
nominated the  act  of  philosophizing." — **  The  human  spirit 
proceeds  from  dark  undeveloped  consciousness  to  clear  ap- 
prehension, from    imagination  to  thought,  from  belief  to 
knowledge,  from  the  individual  to  the  universal,  and  thus 
accompanied  by  an  obscure  feeling  of  truth,  of  agreement, 
of  harmony  and  conformity  to  law,  it  seeks  for  the  Certain 
and  the  Necessary,  to  which  all  the  convictions  that  interest 
it  must  attach   themselves,  and  by  means  of  which  it  may 
give  an  account  of  them.     It  philosophizes,  first  for  itself, 
and  then  generally  for  the  thinking  reason.     In  accordance 
with  the  natural  progress  of  cultivation  the  philosophizing 
act  is  first  occupied  with  external  and  gross  objects  which 
strongly  excite  attention,  and  afterwards  proceeds  gradually 
to  the  more  refined,  the  more  concealed,  the  inward  and 
the  simple.     We  find  this  progressive  course  more  or  less 
5* 


54 

mining  power  of  an  energetic  will  can  cause  this  direc- 
tion ;  for  which  reason  also  there  is  a  much  more  in- 
timate and  essential  connexion  between  spiritlessness 
and  inefficiency  of  will  than  is  usually  supposed.  Even 
in  the  productions  of  the  Artist  and  the  Poet  it  is  im- 
possible not  to  perceive  that  independence  which  we 
have  hitherto  affirmed  the  spirit  to  possess  over  the 
mechanism  of  causes  and  effects  necessarily  conjoined. 
For  although  the  faculty  of  song  and  the  creative  pow- 
er of  art  are  vouchsafed  by  Divine  favour,  and  are  to 
be  regarded  as  gifts  from  above — and  although  the 
poet  and  the  artist,  therefore,  in  the  hour  of  inspiration, 
neither  can  nor  will  strive  against  a  higher  influence, 

among  all  nations  and  in  various  modifications.  But  a  marked 
difference  is  seen  in  this,  that  in  but  few  the  thinking  subject 
proceeds  to  scientific  acts  of  philosophizing.  Whence  arises 
this  difference  ?  Tennemann's  Grundr.  §  2,  p.  2.  lb.  §  53.  p.  35, 
"  Man  doth  not  seem  to  rest  satisfied,  either  with  fruition 
of  that  wherewith  his  life  is  preserved,  or  with  performance 
of  such  actions  as  advance  him  most  deservedly  in  estima- 
tion ;  but  doth  further  covet,  yea,  oftentimes  manifestly  pur- 
sue, with  great  sedulity  and  earnestness,  that  which  can- 
not stand  him  in  any  stead  for  vital  use  ;  that  which  ex- 
ceedeth  the  reach  of  sense,  yea  somewhat  above  the  capacity 
of  Reason,  somewhat  Divine  and  Heavenly,  vv'hich  with  hid- 
den exultation  it  rather  surmiseth  than  conceiveth  ;  some- 
what it  seeketh,  and  what  that  is  directly  it  knoweth  not ; 
yet  very  intentive  desire  thereof  doth  so  incite  it,  that  all 
other  known  delights  and  pleasures  are  laid  aside,  they  give 
place  to  the  search  of  this  but  only  suspected  desire."  Hook- 
er.    Tr. 


55 

still  the  most  free  accord  of  the  mind  with  that  higher 
influence  is  not  to  be  misapprehended.  And  it  is 
equally  certain,  also,  that  without  self-independence 
and  freedom  of  spirit,  no  true  work  of  art  could  ever 
be  produced.  As  the  idea  of  beauty  is  evidently  some- 
what of  the  inward  being,  so  also  the  creation  of  a  par- 
ticular work  of  beauty,  or  a  criticism  pronounced  upon 
it,  is  plainly  a  determining  act  proceeding  from  itself. 
Here  dependence  upon  the  laws  of  the  visible  world 
is  so  definitely  rejected,  that  an  ideal  form  of  phenom- 
ena, conditioned  by  no  law  of  nature,  is  rather  self-ac- 
tively  called  forth,  and  placed  in  opposition  to  the  or- 
dinary course  of  things. 

Art  is  so  far  removed  from  being  a  mere  represen- 
tation or  lifeless  imitation  of  that  which  is  exhibited  in 
the  phenomena  of  nature,  that  it  rather  strives  to  pre- 
sent those  unseen  forms  of  which  external  nature  is 
but  the  correlative  manifestation — it  seeks  to  body 
forth  the  archetypal  nature  or  ideas.  Consequently 
the  Poet  and  the  Artist  endeavour  to  represent  anoth- 
er nature,  the  counterpart  of  that  which  is  visible  ;  and 
in  their  productions  exhibit  themselves  as  absolutely- 
free,  that  is,  as  creative.  But  independence  of  the 
outward  nature  is  also  shown  in  criticisms  pronounced 
upon  works  of  art ; — in  determining  what  in  them  is 
beautiful,  or  what  is  otherwise.  The  standard  of  judg- 
ment in  such  cases  is  not  derived  from  nature,  (w^hich 
contains  rather  copied  representations  than  the  un-i 
sketched  originals,)  but  is  taken  directly  from  the  Idea, 
which  the  poet  and  the  artist,  empowered  by  their  ideal 


56 

nature,  self-subsistently  apply.  Since  now,  according 
to  what  has  hitherto  been  said,  the  free  will  constitutes 
the  fundamental  condition  as  well  of  true  Science  as 
of  Poetry  and  Art,  so  does  it  hold  the  same  relation 
also  to  true  moral  Action. 

True  action  is  without  doubt  that  which  is  connect- 
ed   with  the    consciousness  of  one's  own  individual 
agency.     It  may  be  asked.  How  can  such  a  conscious- 
ness   arise? — Not    from    the    feeling    that    something 
nearly  concerns  us,  even  though  our  whole  being  were 
seized  with  it ;  for  then  indeed   we  might  speak  of  a 
sensation,  or  of  an  impression,  or  of  a  Divine  ordinance, 
but  not  of  an  election,  or  of  a  resolve.     Neither  could 
this  consciousness  ever  have  arisen  if  any  thing  were 
developed  from  the  depth  of  our  appropriate  personality 
according  to  the  dark  laws  of  nature  ;  as  is  the  case, 
for  example,  in  an  inexplicable  shuddering,  or  a  magi- 
cal inclination,  or  any  other  involuntary  tendency.     In 
every  feeling  of  this  kind  something  has  indeed  hap- 
pened  to  us,  but  nothing  has  been  done  by  us ;  and 
all  events  of  this  description,  as  well  as  those  wliich  a 
destiny  independent  of  our  own  agency  brings  upon 
our  outward  life,  we  name  occurrences^  but  not  acts. 
The  consciousness  of  true   action  can  arise  from  the 
Willing  Spirit  alone ;    and,  indeed,  in  that  case  only, 
when  knowing  from  itself  and  self-determined,  it  decides 
upon  the  end  aimed  at.      Nothing  but  the  free  will 
can  make   that  wdiich  takes  place  in  reference  to  us 
our  own  act ;  wherefore,  also,  the  tme  cause  lies  in  our- 
selves alone — it  lies  in  that  which  each  one  calls  him- 


57 

self.  This  power  in  man  is  that  which  is  self-knowing 
and  self-active.  Hence  many  things  may  very  nearly 
concern  us,  but  nothing  more  nearly  than  our  own 
act ;  but  with  the  consciousness  of  such  an  act  is  also 
connected  the  consciousness  of  freedom. 

In  every  individual  act,  consequently  in  all  true 
action,  the  question  in  regard  to  its  moral  worth  cannot 
be  avoided.  How  comes  it  that  man  is  able  to  apply, 
nay  is  obliged  to  apply,  such  a  criterion  of  judgment 
not  derived  from  tlie  phenomenal  world,  to  all  human 
actions  ? 

The  fact  itself  is  undeniable.  It  is  a  necessity 
deeply  impressed  upon  the  human  soul  to  estimate  its 
own,  and  the  acts  of  others,  not  merely  according  to 
their  external  appearance,  but  to  examine  and  decide 
upon  them  according  to  their  moral  worth. ^       This 

^  Although  the  conscious  feeling  which  dwells  in  the 
breast  of  every  one  must  lead  him  to  acknowledge  the  truth 
of  these  remarks,  yet  there  have  not  been  wanting  those, 
who,  through  perverted  speculations,  have  attempted  to 
sweep  them  all  away.  Arabia  has  produced  a  sect  of  fana- 
tics who  maintain  that  with  every  holy  being  God  created  its 
dark  counterpart,  and  with  every  Divine  one  a  devil,  to  the 
end  that  the  latter  might  be  instrumental  in  developing  to 
the  world  the  former ;  so  that  when  Abraham  arose,  Nimroil 
appeared  with  him,  at  the  time  of  Moses  there  was  a  Pha- 
raoh, and  during  the  Saviour's  manifestation  upon  the  earth  a 
black  Judas  was  found  at  his  side.  The  dark  moral  shade,  say 
they,  is  no  less  excellent  than  the  light  which  it  serves  to 
place  in  more  prominent  contrast.  Nor  have  such  viewg 
been  confined  to  the  opium-eating  East.     Some  of  the  cold- 


^58 

distinction  between  the  action  as  it  appears,  and  the  in- 
ward act  of  the  spirit,  cannot  be  regarded  as  an  inven- 

erand  less  refining  spirits  of  Europe  have  evolved  senti- 
ments of  a  similar  kind.  We  are  told  by  Diderot  that  all 
is  necessity,  that  there  is  no  difference  between  the  holy  and 
the  profane,  that  the  doer  of  good  is  lucky,  not  virtuous. 
Bonnet,  the  celebrated  disciple  of  Leibnitz,  says  (as  translat- 
ed by  Stewart):  "The  same  chain  embraces  the  physical 
and  moral  worlds,  binds  the  past  to  the  present,  the  present 
to  the  future,  the  future  to  eternity.  That  wisdom  which 
has  ordained  the  existence  of  this  chain  has  doubtless  will- 
ed that  of  every  link  of  which  it  is  composed.  A  Caligula 
is  one  of  those  links,  and  this  is  a  link  of  iron.  A  Marcus 
AuRELius  is  another  link,  and  this  link  is  of  gold.  Both  aro 
necessary  parts  of  one  whole,  which  could  not  but  exist 
Shall  God  then  be  angry  at  the  sight  of  the  iron  link? 
What  absurdity  !  God  esteems  this  link  at  its  proper  value  : 
He  sees  it  in  its  cause,  and  he  approves  this  cause,  for  it  is 
good.  God  beholds  moral  monsters  as  he  beholds  physical 
monsters.  Happy  is  the  link  of  gold  !  Still  more  happy  if 
he  know  that  he  is  only  fortunate,  Heureux  le  chainon  d' 
or !  plus  heureux  encore,  s'il  salt  qu'il  n'est  qu'  heureux,^'' 
It  may  not  be  uninteresting  to  notice  the  shew  of  mathe- 
matical demonstration  which  Thomas  Belsham  gives  to  this 
view.  He  argues  thus:  "According  to  the  hypothesis  of 
free  will,  the  essence  of  virtue  and  vice  consists  in  liberty  ; 
for  example,  benevolence  without  liberty  is  no  virtue : 
mahgnity  without  liberty  is  no  vice.  Both  are  equally  in, a 
neutral  state.  Add  a  portion  of  liberty  to  both,  benevolence 
instantly  becomes  an  eminent  virtue,  and  malignity  an  odious 
vice.  That  is,  if  to  equals  you  add  equals,  the  whole 
WILL  BE   unequal  ;  than   which  nothing  can  be  more  ab- 


59 

tion  of  certain  sages  and  lawgivers,  since  it  involves  a 
universal  moral  necessity  felt  even  by  the  most  simple 
and  unsophisticated.  This  distinction  has  been  recog- 
nized too,  although  in  different  degrees  of  perfection 
and  clearness,  yet  in  essence,  among  nations  of  ancient 
and  modern  times  differing  most  widely  in  other  res- 
pects ;  and  among  whom  there  also  reigns  the  greatest 
dissimilitude  in  manners,  religion,  and  laws.  That  a 
higher  degree  of  mental  cultivation  is  requisite  to  make 
the  distinction  spoken  of  become  an  object  of  more 
clear  consciousness,  is  not  intended  to  be  denied ;  but 
on  the  contrary  it  is  altogether  appropriate  to  the 
nature  of  the  case  that  it  should  be  so.  In  every  in- 
stance the  conception  of  guilt  and  of  innocence,  of  merit 
or  the  desert  punishment,  is  found  to  attach  to  the 
wide  spread  and  indestructible  pecuharities  of  human 
nature.  But  this  conception  is  not  any  inference  or 
conclusion,  it  is  directly  in  the  will  that  it  originates, 
which  will  an  inward  voice  bids  us  ascribe  to  man  ;  and 
only  where  an  election  was  possible  do  we  speak  of 
merit  or  ill  desert.  In  addition  to  this,  it  is  a  remarka- 
ble fact  that  consciousness  is  universally  felt  to  be  the 
necessary  condition  of  the  imputation  of  a  moral  char- 
acter; so  that  the  moral  worth  or  turpitude  of  an 
act  is  not  made  to  depend  upon  any  outward  manifesta- 
tion whatever,  but  upon  the  inmost  life  of  the  spirit, 
and  is  immediately  conjoined  with  the  original  activity 

Burd."  Elements  of  Philos,  of  Hum,  Mind,  p.  258.  Such 
reasoning  needs  no  refutation  ;  such  statements  need  no 
comment,     Tr. 


60 

of  the  I.  As  true  peace  and  self-regard  depend  less 
upon  our  external  relations  and  outward  actings  than 
upon  that  which  we  have  inwardly  willed,  so  is  it 
always  in  deciding  upon  the  moral  worth  of  another — 
the  ultimate  and  highest  ground  of  decision  is  derived 
from  the  will  of  the  man.  The  accordance  of  this 
will  with  a  law,  which  does  indeed  command  with 
necessity,  but  yet  without  involving  a  necessity  of  na- 
ture— a  law  which  in  itself  is  of  universal,  indisputable 
validity,  but  which  may  nevertheless  every  moment 
be  violated — this  accordance  is  it  that  gives  worthiness 
to  character,  and  constitutes  the  very  essence  of  mo- 
rality. Without  placing  an  inward  and  intolerable 
contradiction  in  the  beino-  of  man — without  o-ivins:  the 
lie  to  conscience,  in  the  certainty  of  which  no  one 
doubts — it  cannot  be  assumed  that  what  we  are  not 
only  accustomed,  but  what  we  are  even  bound  to  as- 
cribe to  ourselves  and  others,  is  not  yet  in  and  of  itself 
the  ground  of  imputing  moral  character ;  or  in  other 
words,  unless  that  be  done,  the  conviction  in  regard  to 
the  Will's  freedom  cannot  be  surrendered.  To  give 
up  this  were  at  once  to  contradict  the  holiest  feelings, 
to  resolve  the  noblest  ideas,  as  virtue,  morality,  and  de- 
sert, into  mere  idle  conceits.  In  which  case  also  every 
condemning  sentence  either  actually  pronounced  a- 
gainst  man,  or  threatened  in  future,  would,  as  resting 
upon  a  false  principle,  necessarily  of  itself  fall  away. 
Thus  is  it  at  once  obvious  how  important,  even  on 
account  of  its  consequences  for  the  dignity  and  well 
being  of  man,  it  becomes  to  determine  the  question  in 


61 

reference  to  freedom  or  non-freedom.  Yet  it  is  by- 
no  means  exclusively  on  account  of  the  consequences 
which  might  result  from  particular  views  on  these 
points,  that  it  is  improper  to  pass  them  by  without 
consideration  in  a  scientific  inquiry.  Evil  consequences 
could  themselves  neyer  become  universal,  because  it 
would  be  impossible  for  an  un perverted  man  to  act 
upon  the  assumptions  from  which  they  must  necessarily 
spring.  For  in  this  whole  domain  we  meet  with  an 
original  obligation,  antecedent  to  all  calculation  of  con- 
sequences— with  a  command  neither  made,  nor  dis- 
covered, but  which  existed  already  coeval  with  con- 
sciousness— a  command  that  does  not  receive  its  bind- 
ing force  from  any  foreign  conditions,  but  which  -im- 
poses its  injunctions  unconditionally.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary to  appeal  to  such  a  command,  as  the  principle  of 
all  moral  actions,  according  to  the  mode  of  expression 
used  in  the  system  of  any  one  philosopher ;  independ- 
ent of  every  particular  system  there  speaks  in  all  a 
Law,  which  if  not  in  form,  yet  in  essence,  is  One. 
Every  one  knows  that  he  should  act  conformably  to 
the  requisitions  of  his  conscience.  Every  one  must  not 
only  approve  of  righteousness  and  trueness  for  himself 
alone,  but  must  also  wish  that  both  might  be  universally 
regarded.  Through  this  command  originally  existent, 
each  one  possesses,  as  it  were,  a  delineated  archetype, 
every  departure  from  which  manifests  itself  by  a  feel- 
ing of  disquietude,  by  a  voice  of  reproach  which  calls 
him  to  return.  But  an  obligation  which  not  only  does 
not  require  a  peaceful  surrender  to  the  course  of  out- 
6 


62 

ward  events,  but  on  the  contrary  frequently  demands 
the  most  determined  opposition  against  them — which 
not  only  forbids  an  individual  to  permit  himself  to  be 
determined  exclusively  by  the  feeling  of  gratification, 
or  the  probability  of  momentary  advantage,  but  on  the 
other  hand  demands  that  each  one  should  bring  every 
thing  else  as  a  sacrifice  to  the  Idea,  without  giving  him- 
self the  trouble  perplexedly  to  calculate  how  this  idea  may 
possibly  exhibit  itself  in  the  world  of  sense — an  obliga- 
tion of  this  kind  is  either  independent  of  sense,  or  it  points 
to  a  power  of  the  idea,  and  consequently  to  an  ability 
or  energy  of  the  will  to  determine  itself  according  to 
the  moral  Ideal,  however  dissimilar  the  course  of  out- 
ward events  may  be.  To  derive  the  origin  of  this  law 
itself  from  experience  were  contradictory,  because  ex- 
perience can  make  known  an  existence  only,  but  not 
an  obligation,  and  because  there  is  at  the  same  time 
presented  in  that  law  a  perfect  Archetype,  to  which  no 
given  experience  corresponds,  and  to  which,  therefore, 
it  is  obligatory  upon  man  to  approximate  in  endless 
progression.  It  is  consequently  anterior  to  all  experi- 
ence and  independent  of  it ;  a  principle  of  activity  in 
the  soul  itself,  a  power  in  the  possession  of  which  the 
soul  enacts  its  own  laws,  and  is  therefore  free.  It  will 
not  be  objected  that  there  is  perhaps  still  in  the  spirit, 
so  far  forth  as  it  is  itself  a  law,  only  a  concealed  me- 
chanism at  work,  and  that  the  soul  in  acting  gradually 
developes  an  inward  predetermined  series,  which  in  ap- 
pearance simply  are  manifestations  of  will,  but  which 
in  fact  are  but  the  unfolding  of  a  necessity  not  yet  ob^ 


63  /f 

served — and  that  accordingly  the  soul  blindly  obeys, 
not  indeed  an  external,  but  an  internal  law  of  causality, 
similar  to  a  time-piece,  which  carries  within  itself  the 
principle  of  its  own  motion,  and  so  far  is  negatively 
free,  but  at  the  ground  is  still  a  machine  and  therefore 
unfree.  Such  an  assumption  and  comparison  would 
be  in  direct  contrast  to  our  conception  of  a  moral 
law,  that  is,  of  a  command  which  possesses  uncon- 
ditional validity,  yet  without  involving  any  compulsive 
force.  In  what  has  heretofore  been  said,  moreover, 
there  are  contained  decisive  grounds  against  that  pre- 
tended concealed  mechanism  of  the  spirit,  as,  (to  adduce 
no  other  points,)  that  morality  and  the  imputation  of 
guilt  could  not  in  any  manner  consist  with  such  me- 
chanical creatures.  And  finally,  it  is  an  important  ob- 
jection against  the  comparison  used,  and  one  which  is 
readily  seen,  that  it  extends  only  to  the  most  unimportant 
part.  Without  appealing  to  the  fact  that  a  machine, 
in  consequence  of  the  external  aids  which  it  requires, 
and  on  account  of  the  constant  possibility  of  countless 
interruptions  from  without,  is  incorrectly  described  as  a 
kind  of  thing  possessing  autonomy  ;  yet  self-conscious- 
ness generally,  and  moral  consciousness  in  particular,  as 
the  direct  characteristic  of  spirit,  is  entirely  overlooked 
in  that  comparison.  But  as  self-consciousness  cannot 
in  general  be  called  in  question,  so  in  like  manner  that 
which  is  the  distinguishing  fact  of  self-consciousness 
cannot  by  any  one  be  reasonably  denied.  Now  the 
"I  am  "  is  the  first  and  most  distinctive  fact  of  con- 
sciousness, which  evidently  could  never  have  origina- 


64 

ted  without  the  most  free  act ;  and  it  has  been  shown 
that  by  means  of  it  a  higher  world,  the  world  of  know- 
ledge and  of  truth,  is  opened  up  before  the  spirit.  So 
likewise  the  other  distinguishing  facts  of  consciousness 
as  well  as  the  first,  though  only  rendered  possible  by 
the  first,  are  these  two  :  /'  I  ought,"  and  ^^  I  am  guilty 
or  innocent ;"  respecting  which  it  has  not  less  satisfac- 
torily been  show^n  that  their  origin  is  only  conceivable 
on  the  condition  of  a  free  Will. 

But  since  a  machine  never  acts  from  its  own  design 
nor  for  its  own  ends,  but  rather,  conformably  to  our 
very  conception  of  it,  presupposes  an  intelligent  cause, 
a  framer,  according  to  whose  design  and  for  whose  ends 
it  must  blindly  move  ;  so,  the  necessary  mechanism  of 
the  human  spirit  being  once  assumed,  just  propose  the 
question,  What  must  you  think  not  only  of  yourselves 
and  your  own  dignity,  but  what  must  you  think  of  the 
most  perfect  Spirit  of  God,  the  Author  of  this  pretend- 
ed time-piece  ?  On  such  a  supposition  man  were  with* 
out  doubt  no  longer  the  image  of  God,  but  the  direct 
contrary,  a  being  the  most  dissimilar  to  Him  ;  and  the 
remaining  creation,  what  would  it  be,  if  upon  its  lofti- 
est summit  it  ended  in  a  machine  ?  And  how  much 
degraded  from  its  greatness  and  grandeur,  nay  how  in- 
significant must  it  appear,  if,  in  its  productions,  it  never 
rose  to  a  self-subsistent  being — a  being  acting  from  it- 
self? Even  to  the  Creator  no  glory  could  accrue 
from  such  a  creation  ;  it  would  but  detract  from  his 
excellency.  And  could  this  view  be  established,  what 
a  strange  phenomenon  were  man,  who,  in  consequence 


65 

of  a  deception  imposed  upon  him  by  his  Maker,  would 
suffer  remorse  through  the  illusion  of  conscience,  and 
would  vainly  dream  of  freedom  !  i     On  such  a  suppo- 

^  In  perusing  the  various  metaphysical  systems  of  philo- 
sophers, it  is  curious  and  instructive  to  trace  the  train  of  log- 
ical consequences  which  often  flow  from  some  one  false  as- 
sumption, to  contemplate  the  superstructure   of  errour  fre- 
quently reared  upon  some  erroneous  principle,  to  examine  in- 
to the  evil  that  has  resulted  from  the  vain  attempt  to  bring 
down  all  the  higher  forms  of  spiritual  truth  to  a  level  with  our 
Sensitive  Faculty,  to  observe  the  effect  of  Reason,  although 
thrust  out  of  its  legitimate  sphere  by  the  intrusion  of  the 
Understanding,  to  give  oneness  and  comprehension  and  con- 
sistency to  all  knowledge,  and  finally,  to  watch  the  conflict 
between  consciousness  and  conscience  on  the  one  hand,  and 
perverted  speculation  on  the  other.      One  of  the   leading 
principles  of  the  Leibnitzian  Philosophy  was  the  doctrine  of 
Optimism  : — That  is,  out  of  the  infinite  number  of  possible 
worlds  God  selected  that  which  his  wisdom  perceived  to  be 
best,  a  world  where  the  most  realities  might  find  existence  and 
harmony.     To  such  a  world   his  power  gave  actual  exis- 
tence ;  such  is  the  present  world.     Hence,  viewed  in  all  its 
relations  and   dependencies,  every  thing  that  exists  is  the 
best  that  it  could  be ;  nothing  could  be  better,  even  though 
it  may  in  itself  be  imperfect.     Consequently,  nothing  could 
be  otherwise  than  as  it  is,  and  therefore  every  thing  is  neces- 
sitated to  be  as  it  is  ;  there  is  no  room  left  for  Free  Will. 
All  auctions  and  events  are  pre-conformed  to  each  other  ;   all 
things  take  place  agreeably  to    the  Divine   determination. 
The  outward  world  is  a  physical   machine,  the  mind  is  a 
spiritual  machine  ;  their  movements  are  both  harmonious  and 
reciprocal.      God  is  the  efficient  agent  in  each.     The  same 
6* 


66 

sltion  existence  itself  would  become  worthless,  and  the 
hope  of  a  future  life  repulsive  ;  because  the  only  ad- 
mode  of  representation  was  subsequently  adopted  by  the 
dogmatic  Wollf. 

Lord  Karnes,  whilst  he  firmly  believed  that  we  are  ne- 
cessitated in  all  our  actions,  yet  openly  acknowledged  that 
this  doctrine  is  in  direct  opposition  to  the  universal  and  na- 
tural feelings  of  mankind  ;  nay,  he  even  went  so  far  as  to  ad- 
mit that  the  business  and  intercourse  of  life  could  not  be 
transacted  unless  each  one  possessed  the  assurance  that  he 
was  free.  In  order  to  reconcile  his  speculative  views  with 
his  empirical  convictions,  and  to  solve  the  riddle  of  freedom, 
he  had  recourse  to  the  strange  supposition  that  our  sense 
of  liberty  is  false  and  deceitful,  yet  necessary ;  we  are  so 
made,  that  by  virtue  of  our  very  constitution  we  are  led  to 
imagine  ourselves  free,  whilst  yet,  when  philosophically 
scrutinized,  we  are  mere  machines,  and  act  only  in  so  far  as 
we  are  acted  upon.  Dr.  Hartley,  as  well  as  his  successor 
and  admirer  Dr.  Priestley,  admits  that  it  was  against  the 
strongest  convictions  of  his  own  mind  that  he  adopted  his 
views  of  philosophical  necessity,  and  surrendered  his  belief 
in  freedom.  Other  writers,  who  were,  no  doubt,  not  unac- 
quainted with  the  agony  and  bitterness  of  Remorse,  concede 
that  a  belief  in  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  the  ground- work 
and  necessary  condition  of  this  feeling ;  but  at  the  same 
time  they  declare  that  the  feeling  itself  is  altogether  falla- 
cious, that  it  is  superseded  by  the  "  glorious  doctrine"  of  ne- 
cessity, and  that  it  should  never  be  admitted  into  a  system  of 
moral  discipline.  Others,  again,  would  persuade  us  that  a 
belief  in  a  fixed  necessity  is  the  most  soothing  and  cheer- 
ing view  that  can  be  taken  of  the  world,  and  particularly  of 
human  nature.     It  fills  us  with  self-satisfaction  on  contem- 


67 

vantage  which  futurity  could  at  best  promise,  would  be 
a  more  clear  insight  into  the  machinery  of  an  inexora- 
ble necessity  no  longer  to  be  concealed — and  thus  we 
should  be  brought  to  witness  the  destruction  of  an  illu- 
sion, which,  whilst  it  remains,  is  yet  consoling.  But 
who  does  not  see  that  views  of  this  kind,  even  whilst 
they  are  in  the  process  of  thought,  do,  as  it  were,  de- 
stroy themselves,  and  dissolve  into  nothing  ?  Besides, 
by  the  denial  of  freedom  it  could  not  once  be  proved 
that  moral  evil,  for  the  present  life  at  least,  does  at  all 
cease  actually  to  exist.  It  would  seem,  indeed,  that  with 
the  removal  of  the  free  will,  evil  also  would  be  taken 
out  of  the  way ;  but  in  strictness  it  would  only  remove 
the  ground  of  imputing  moral  character,  or  the  right  of 
charging  the  creature  with  guilt.  Existing  wicked- 
ness and  immorality  themselves,  however,  could  not, 
without  an  entire,  nay  an  impossible  confusion  and 
perversion  of  all  conceptions,  be  accounted  as  any 
thing  else  than  real  evil,  so  that  that  denial  would  not 
remove  them  ;  and  so  long  as  there  were  yet  conceded  - 
One  free  Will,  an  Original  Will,  the  ground  of  all  evil 
would  have  to  be  sought  in  that  alone.  On  the  supposition 
of  that  spiritual  mechanism  which  He  alone  could  have 
formed  and  can  regulate,  to  the  Creator  would  have  to 
be  ascribed  not  only  the  permission  of  evil,  and  a  cer- 

plating  our  own  characters,  and  reconciles  us  entirely  to  all 
our  fellow  beings,  however  vile  and  abandoned  they  may  be, 
because,  forsooth,  all  their  actions  are  performed  agreeably  to 
the  appointment  of  God,  and  to  be  offended  with  them  there- 
fore would  be  open  rebellion  against  Him  !     Tr. 


68 

tain  mere  co-operation  with  the  sinner,  in  so  far  as  all 
power  is  derived  from  Him ;  but  He  would  have  to  be 
regarded  as  the  direct  and  only  cause  of  evil — of  that 
which  still  always  remains  evil.  But  it  were  superflu- 
ous to  dwell  more  circumstantially  on  this  painful  view 
of  the  subject,  or  to  consider  more  particularly  the  con- 
tradictoriness  of  those  thoughts  to  which  the  denial  of 
freedom  necessarily  gives  rise. 

Our  only  design  has  thus  far  been  to  point  out 
freedom  as  it  exists  in  the  being  of  man's  spirit  itself, 
and  to  show  that  it  is  so  intimately  interwoven  with  his 
internal  economy,  that  there  is  no  possibility  of  its 
removal  without  the  destruction  of  all  that  is  peculiar 
to  spirit  and  to  morality.  It  were  a  very  different 
problem  : — To  derive  freedom  from  its  first  grounds, 
and  to  show  how  it  must  necessarily  arise  according  to 
immutable  laws  of  nature.  Many  reasons  might  be 
adduced  to  prove  that  an  investigation  instituted  with 
such  a  design  would  necessarily  fail  of  attaining  its  end  ; 
yet  from  such  investigation  no  evil  could  result  against 
freedom  itself,  for  it  should  at  the  same  time  become  the 
aim  of  the  inquirer  to  show,  that  neither  in  the  being 
of  God,  nor  in  the  laws  of  nature,  is  there  any  thing  to 
be  met  with  that  could  oblige  us  to  surrender  it.  To 
show  this  is  indeed  the  most  difficialt,  as  well  as  the 
most  attractive  part  of  the  investigation,  which  now 
leads  us  naturally  to  consider  the  Freedom  of  the  hu- 
man Will  in  relation  to  God  and  to  Nature  :  and  to  es- 
tablish the  actualness  of  the  free  will's  existence  in  op- 


69 

posftion  to  those  mighty  forces,  of  which  yet  all,  upon 
their  ultimate  height,  appear  as  but  One  Force  only. 
The  shortest  and  surest  way  to  do  this  seems  to  be 
to  derive,  a  priori,  from  universal  principles,  not  only 
the  'possibility  of  a  free,  self-operative,  particular  will, 
but  also  from  the  very  same  principles  to  demonstrate 
that  such  will  is  actually  in  being,  and  to  elucidate  the 
manner  of  its  co-existence  with  an  actual  world.  If  by 
those  principles  were  understood  such  laws  as  the 
mathematics  point  out  in  nature,  or  if  that  derivation 
were  conceived  to  be  a  construction  of  freedom  resting 
upon  those  laws,  or  an  exhibition  of  the  mode  of  its  or- 
igin according  to  them ;  then  w^ould  freedom  be  trans- 
formed into  a  product  of  nature,  and  the  laws  of  its 
movements  could  be  as  easily  demonstrated  as  are  those 
of  the  planets,  whose  most  important  phenomena  ne- 
cessarily result  from  the  universal  laws  of  gravity  and 
attraction.  But  since  without  a  violent  and  abrupt  sal- 
tus,  (leap,  abrupt  transition,)  nothing  could  ever  origi- 
nate from  such  premises  except  that  which  was  kindred 
with  them — a  necessary  product  of  nature — so  it  were 
contradictory  to  apply  such  a  method  of  derivation,  or 
proof,  to  that  which  is  not  necessitated.  From  laws 
that  involve  within  themselves  the  character  of  physi- 
cal compulsion,  it  is  not  possible  to  derive  such  an  ac- 
tivity, whose  distinguishing  trait  consists  in  this  very 
point,  That  it  is  not  subject  to  that  compulsion.  To 
will,  is  evidently  to  act ;  and  to  derive  this  acting  from 
yet  other  grounds  lying  out  of  the  will,  would  be  to 


70 

destroy  that  of  which  we  speak  i.  e.  the  Willing.  Free- 
dom, in  regard  to  its  fountain  and  its  appropriate  sphere 
of  action,  lies  in  an  entirely  different  domain,  and  with- 
out the  bounds  of  a  series  of  things  mechanically  de- 
veloped. It  must  be  regarded  as  springing  forth  di- 
rectly from  the  Supersensuous,  as  a  power  shining  in 
upon  the  Spacious  and  the  Necessary,  without  yet  be- 
coming subject  to  their  laws  ;  even  as  light  pervades 
and  illuminates  space  without  filling  it,  or  without  being 
comprehended  by  it.  The  ultimate  and  sufficient 
ground  of  human  freedom  can  be  found  in  God  alone  ; 
and  although  many  questions  in  respect  to  the  kind  and 
mode  of  its  origination  from  God,  and  of  its  entrance 
upon  a  state  of  actual  existence,  must  ever  remain  un- 
answered, yet  it  does  not  seem  to  fall  without  the  lim- 
its of  human  science  to  point  out  its  fountain  even  in 
the  Divine  Being.  The  Godhead  is  by  no  means  so  un- 
approachable by  the  spirit  that  the  idea  of  the  Most 
High  must  be  conceived  of  only  as  the  utmost  bound, 
but  not  as  the  object  also  of  speculation.  Surely  the 
idea  of  this  Being  contains  in  it  something  real,  essen- 
tial, and  is  not  throughout  of  a  merely  negative  nature. 
The  sole  ground,  rather,  of  that  deep  and  thrilling  in- 
terest which  every  profound  inquiry  awakens  within  us, 
lies  in  the  possibility,  always  presupposed,  that  some- 
thing may  be  know^n  of  the  All  Perfect.  Human  na- 
ture's highest  attribute,  or  spiritual  personality,  of  itself 
conducts  every  reflecting  mind  to  the  Most  High,  to  the 
SuperAmrndLii ;  and   we  cannot  imagine  how  spirit  and 


71 


freedom  could  ever  have  been  imparted  to  man,  except 
through  the  will  of  an  originally  free  and  most  perfect 
Spirit.^ 

From  a  still  deeper  depth,  and, — in  reference  to 
the  personality  of  God — from  a  still  ulterior  ground, 
Schelling  attempts  to  derive  the  origin  of  human  free- 
dom and  the  possibility  of  sin,  in  his  remarkable  trea- 
tise entitled  "  Philosophical  inquiries  respect- 
ing THE  NATURE  OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM  AND  THE 
OBJECTS     INTIMATELY     CONNECTED     WITH    IT,"  ^        It 

would  be  inappropriate  to  censure  an  undertaking  of 
this  kind,  both  on  account  of  its  difficulty,  and  because 
it  Hes  without  the  sphere  of  ordinary  efforts  ;  on  these 
accounts  it  should  rather  excite  the  attention  of  all 
who  have  at  heart  the  promotion  of  true  science. 
Strange  indeed  is  the  view  which  in  that  work  is  taken 
of  the  highest  Being;  especially  in  that  respect,  where 
for  science  even,  men  have  been  accustomed  to  rest 
satisfied  with  an  empty  or  undefined  conception.  The 
old  objection  against  an  impersonal  God,  in  its  indefi- 
niteness  and  universality  ever  incorrect,  can  in  no  case 
be  promotive  of  true  science  ;  yet  from  it  first  origina- 
ted the  idea—an  idea  highly  beneficial  to  the  cause  of 
science — tliat  the  all- perfect  Being  is  to  be  regarded 
as  a  unity  of  hving  qualities,  and  not  as  a  pure  unity  of 
conception.      As  the  thoughts  of  God,  (an  essential 

1  See  Appendix  [D.] 

2  Philosophische  Untersuchungen  iiber  das  Wesen  der 
menschlichen  Freyheit  imd  die  damit  zusammanhangenden 
Gegenst'ande,  vou  F.  W.  J.  Schelling. 


72 

part  of  whose  perfection  is,  that  thought  originates  be- 
ing, and  that  an  act  of  will  results  in  the  effect  will- 
ed,) cannot  possibly  be  a  play  of  empty  notions 
through  which  nothing  living  is  produced,  but  must 
rather  be  regarded  as  plastic  or  creative ;  so  the  attri- 
butes of  God  are  not  mere  notional  conceptions,  but 
living  qualities,  or  real,  yea  the  most  real,  active  powers. 
Those  who  have  inclosed  themselves  in  the  conception 
of  a  pure  oneness,  as  in  a  blank  circle,  would  do  well 
to  look  around  to  see  what  they  can  find  in  it,  and 
how  they  may  get  out  of  it  again.  In  this  simple 
One,  according  to  the  very  conception  of  it,  there  can 
be  no  distinction  ;  but  where  there  is  no  possibility  of 
distinction,  there  neither  intelligence,  nor  will,  nor 
love  can  be  found.  For  One  has  in  itself  nothing 
which  it  can  will,  or  towards  which  it  may  exercise  af- 
fection ;  it  becomes  necessary,  therefore,  that  this  One 
should,  as  it  were,  double  itself  by  the  production  of  a 
kindred  counterpart.  This  last,  however,  presupposes 
an  original  twoness,  a  duality  of  the  Knower  and  the 
Known,  of  the  Lover  and  the  Loved  ;  and  thus  only 
does  it  become  possible  that  the  eternal  Seer  may  be- 
hold and  become  conscious  of  himself,  and  that  a 
proper  personality  of  God  can  arise.  On  no  other 
supposition,  moreover,  than  as  a  movement  of  distin- 
guishable powers  is  in  this  way  placed  in  the  life  of 
God,  is  any  outward  revelation  of  the  Divine  Being,  or 
any  farther  series  of  possible  generations  conceivable. 

Hence  also  every  more  profound  philosophy,  even 
from  the  earliest  times,  found  its  only  secure  resting 


73 

place  in  the  very  ancient  doctrine  of  Tri-unity  ;  ^  a 
doctrine  which  distinguishes  from  the  eternal  Ground 
the  two-fold  manifestations  of  the  same,  the  one  an  in- 

^  Great  evil  has  undoubtedly  been  done  to  the  cause  of 
truth  by  the  manner  in  which  its  doctrines  have  sometimes 
been  enforced.  Many  instructors  of  philosophy,  especially 
of  religious  philosophy,  (and  strictly  speaking  indeed  there  is 
none  other,)  have  attempted  to  urge  upon  their  pupils  or 
hearers  certain  doctrines  as  the  mere  arbitrary  appointments 
of  God,  without  attempting  to  give  any  explanation,  or  with- 
out pretending  to  account  for  their  views  on  any  rational 
ground.  Thus  the  requisitions  of  the  Sabbath  have  often 
been  urged  simply  on  the  authority  of  the  Divine  command, 
as  if  the  Divine  law  were  arbitrary,  without  noticing  the 
grounds  of  such  an  appointment  which  are  found  in  the 
wants  of  human  nature  and  of  the  animal  creation  in  general. 
(For  the  Christian  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  Bible  consti- 
tutes the  ultimate  tribunal  of  appeal ;  but  the  requisitions  of 
the  Bible  are  gi-ounded  in  the  highest  reason,  even  in  the  Rea- 
son of  God.)  The  doctrine  of  the  atonement  is  often  held 
forth  with  no  other  claims  to  notice  or  acceptance.  But  it  is 
certain  That  unless  the  hearer  has  been  brought  to  feel  in  the 
wants  of  his  own  being  the  necessity  of  an  atonement,  he 
will  always  think  that  his  teacher  has  misapprehended  the 
instructions  of  the  Divine  oracles.  In  a  particular  manner 
the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity— the  sublimest  and  most  mysteri- 
ous of  all  doctrines-^is  frequently  exhibited  in  such  a  way 
as  to  leave  the  impression  upon  the  hearer  or  reader  that  it  is 
one  of  outward  revelation  simply,  that  there  is  no  ground  for 
it  in  the  essence  of  the  Divine  Being,  nor  any  reason  for  its 
belief  to  be  found  in  the  wants  of  humanity  ;  that  it  not  only 
far  transcends  the  comprehension  of  finite  minds,  but  that  it 

7 


74 

ward,  the  other  an  outward  manifestation.  Yet  this 
doctrine  does  not  imply  an  actual  plurality  in  the  Di- 
vine Essence,  but  rather  fixedly  retains  the  idea  of 
Unity  undestroyed.  But  without  supposing  an  orig- 
inal threefold  distinction  in  the  One  Divine  being, 
even  for  science  this  barren  oneness  becomes  inopera- 
tive and  dead ;  and  we  might  in  vain  seek  for  that 
which  it  must  forever  want,  viz. — a  first  moving  princi- 
ple, a  primum  movens.  In  a  manner  somewhat  simi-  . 
lar,  although  adopting  neither  the  same  words  nor  the 
same  mode  of  exhibition,  Schelling  long  since  repre- 
sented a  threefold  distinction  in  God  ;  but  more  partic- 
ularly in  his  treatise  on  human  freedom  he  has  made 
an  appropriate  scientific  application  of  this  idea.  Ac- 
cording to  his  view,  the  eternal  One,  (the  Ground  origi- 
nant,  called  also  the  unoriginated  Ground,)  divides  in 
two  Originals,  both  equally  eternal ;  or  there  is  in  Him 
a  twoness,  (duality,)  to  the  end  that  life  and  personal- 
ity might  be  possible.  By  means  of  that  twoness 
eternally  proceeding  from  the  unoriginated  Ground, 
arises  Love,  which  conjoins  the  one  of  those  eternal 
Originals,  the  Ideal,  (the  existent,)  with  the  other,  the 

is  even  above  the  apprehension  of  reason  and  directly  oppo- 
sed to  it.  History  teaches  that  the  awakened  Inquirer  can- 
not long  rest  satisfied  with  such  instructions.  Reason  is  ever 
striving  to  give  harmony  and  unity  to  all  its  knowledge. 
History  teaches  too,  that  this  sublime  truth  does  not  lie  en- 
tirely whhout  the  sphere  of  human  thought,  or  of  practical 
speculation,  if  such  an  expression  may  be  allowed,  (spiritual 
body).     See  in  Appendix  [E.]     Tr. 


75 

Ground  of  existence.  Essentially,  the  distinction  is 
here  made  only  that  both  may  become  One  ;  the  sep- 
aration, in  order  that  Love  may  unite  those  who  are 
separated.  Yet  this  connecting  Love,  according  to 
the  representation  of  the  above  named  treatise,  is  rath- 
er an' originated  Becoming  than  an  original  Being  ;^ 
and  the  free,  independent,  permanent  Ground  does  not 
lose  its  distinctive  characteristic  by  ascending  into  the 
purely  ideal,  not  even  in  the  untroubled  clearness  of  a 
perfected,  inwardly  formed  counterpart.  An  appro- 
priate or  individual  life  is  rather  ascribed  to  this 
Ground,  and  also  a  distinct  agency,  which,  not  only  to 
aid  our  apprehensions  nor  in  the  order  of  thought  sim- 
ply, but  in  fact  and  in  the  order  of  time,  is  antecedent 
to  the  agency  of  the  Spirit  and  of  the  Love.  The 
procession  of  things  from  this  Ground,  which  is  the  na- 
ture in  God,  and  the  agency  of  the  Ground  generally, 
is  the  chief  object  of  discourse  in  that  oft-named  trea- 
tise ;  and  thus  being  a  philosophy  of  the  Ground,  it  is 
characterized  as  a  philosophy  of  nature.^     The  sepa- 

^  The  idea  of  a  secondary  being  without  beginning,  (an- 
fangslosen  Werdens,  an'  originated  Becoming  in  opposition 
to  an  unoriginated  Being,  [eternal  generation]),  a  derivation 
in  essence  but  not  in  the  order  of  time,  was  somewhat  too 
refined,  was  somewhat  incomprehensible,  nay  it  appeared 
even  contradictory  to  Arius,  who  had  but  little  of  the  specu- 
lative or  intuitive.  We  here  see  how  little  Origen's  subjective 
form  of  intuition  was  adapted  to  the  spirit  of  Arius.  Neand. 
Algm.  Kircheng.  II.  B.  II  Abt.  s.  771.     Tr. 

2  Not  having  the   work  of  Schelling,  a  short  analysis  of 


76 

rate  existence  of  things,  their  distinctiveness  from  God, 
is  explained  in  this  manner,  viz.,  they  derive  their  ori- 

which  is  here  given,  I  fear  lest  I  may  have  misapprehended 
some  of  the  author's  terms,  and  I  hardly  feel  v^arranted  to  of- 
fer any  farther  explanations,  lest  I  should  misrepresent. 
Guided  by  Tennemann  and  Tholuck,  however,  I  w^ill  venture 
to  subjoin  a  few  occasional  statements  'which  may  serve  to 
throw  some  light  on  those  peculiar  points  in  the  philosophy 
of  Schelling  which  are  brought  to  view  in  this  work. 

Fichte  attempted  to  deduce  all  things  from  the  I  in  a 
progressive  method.  But  with  him  it  was  altogether  an  ar- 
bitrary assumption  that  the  Subjective  produced  the  Objec- 
tive, and  not  the  latter  the  former.  This  order  might  be 
transposed,  and  we  might  as  well  proceed  from  nature  to  • 
the  I.  Especially  if  we  give  ourselves  up  to  wild  specula- 
tion without  critical  and  fixed  rules,  one  method  is  just  as 
admissible  as  the  other.  Schelling  therefore  differed  from 
Fichte.  He  supposed  there  were  two  sciences  which  were 
the  representatives  or  counterparts  of  each  other; — the  one  he 
denominated  Transcendental  Philosophy,  the  other  J^atural 
Philosophy^  or  the  philosophy  of  nature.  Out  of  the  I  springs 
the  former,  and  from  the  same  it  derives  the  objective,  the 
multiform,  the  necessary  ==:Natu re ;  the  latter  derives  its  origin 
from  Nature,  and  from  it  deduces  the  I,  the  Free,  the  Simple. 
The  tendency  of  these  two  sciences  is  to  make  both  the  powers 
of  nature  and  the  powers  of  the  soul,  considered  as  identical,  re- 
flect mutual  light  upon  each  other.  The  fundamental  principle 
lying  at  the  basis  of  both  is  this  ;  that  the  laws  of  nature  may 
be  immediately  apprehended  in  consciousness  as  the  laws  of 
consciousness  also,  and  conversely,  the  laws  of  consciousness 
may  also  be  pointed  out  in  objective  nature  as  laws  of  na- 
ture.    Yet  the  first  in  its  constructive  form  can  never  ex- 


77 

gin  from  a  Ground  distinguished  from  God,  but  which, 
conformably  to   what  has    heretofore   been  said,    and 

haust  the  multitudinous,  nor  can  the  last  ever  attain  to  the 
absolutely  simple.  It  is  not  possible  to  conceive  how  multi- 
plicity could  spring  from  unity,  and  how  again  from  this 
multiplicity  should  spring  a  unity  which  at  the  same  time 
involves  within  itself  both  multiplicity  and  unity.  Both  of 
these  lose  themselves  in  the  infinite,  which  is  common  to 
both.  There  must  therefore  be  a  higher,  a  connecting  phi- 
losophy, from  which  these  two  sister  sciences  spring.  Schel- 
ling  supposed  that  the  essence  of  Knowing  consisted  in  the 
original  oneness  of  the  knowing  subject  and  the  object 
known;  the  absolute  Ideal  and  the  absolute  Real.  From 
thence  he  deduced  his  system  of  the  absolute  identity  of  the 
subjective  and  the  objective;  or  the  indifference  of  the  dif- 
ferenced, wherein  consists  the  essence  of  the  Absolute= 
God.  He  did  not  rest  satisfied  with  thus  representing 
God  as  the  Absolute,  the  Centre  from  which  all  things  radi- 
ate and  towards  which  all  things  converge  ;  but  he  plunged 
still  deeper  into  this  mysterious  depth  and  attempted  to  shew 
how  the  personaHty  of  God  arose.  He  placed  in  the  Divine 
Being  a  dark  uncreated  Ground  and  also  a  brightened  Form 
of  the  same.  A  third  principle  or  power  united  these  to- 
gether.  The  first  he  named  the  perverted  God,  (umgekehr- 
ten  Gott,)  the  Enemy  of  every  creature ;  and  as  the  bright  God 
was  developed  from  the  dark  original  Ground  by  means  of 
the  evolution  of  the  dark  God  in  the  world,  so  God  himself 
derived  his  existence  from  Satan.  (We  must  suppose,  how- 
ever, that  these  statements  are  not  to  be  taken  literally,  but 
that  they  are  mere  symbolic  representations.)  Thus  God  is 
not  free  and  independent.  He  is  subjected  to  the  still  higher 
conditions  of  his  own  being ;  his  manifestation  was  necessary, 
7* 


78 ' 

since  no  absolute  dualism  can  here  find  a  place,  still 
belongs  to  God,  and  is  designated  as  that  which  is  in 
God,  but  is  not  God  himself.  Absolutely  considered, 
God  is  then  first  realized  only  as  he  beholds  himself  in 
an  image  formed  through  a  reflex  presentation.  But 
it  is  easy  to  perceive  that  neither  this  self-knowledge 
of  God,  nor  the  formation  of  things  would  be  possible, 
without  an  Understanding  to  arrange  and  classify, 
through  which  distinction  and  form  might  be  effected 
among  the  dark  agitations  of  original  powers  excited 
and  pervaded  by  obscure  appetencies.  From  these 
powers  thus  distinguished  and  arranged,  or  thus 
brought  into  order,  originates  body  ;  but  the  living 
bond  of  union  between  these  powers,  distinguished  in- 
deed but  not  entirely  disparted  from  each  other — that 
bond  w^hich  springs  from  the  depth  of  the  Ground — 
is  called  soul.  Without  that  living  bond  the  distinc- 
tion would  not  be  creative  ;  it  would  rather  be  a  rend- 
ing in  sunder,  yea  a  deadening  of  these  powers. 
Hence  every  being  in  nature  is  to  be  regarded  as  ani- 
mated by  a  soul ;  ^    and  the  more  perfectly  so  in  pro- 

and  even  in  the  order  of  time  Intelligence  sprang  from  Non- 
intelligence,  from  the  nature  in  God,  the  Chaos.  This  being 
the  character  of  the  Absolute  and  of  the  Ground,  both  subject 
to  the  law  of  an  inexorable  necessity,  it  follows  that  every 
thing  that  springs  from  them,  nature,  the  will,  sin,  and  every 
thing  else,  is  involved  in  the  same  law,  and  therefore  his  phi- 
losophy may  justly  be  characterized  as  the  philosophy  of 
nature ;  all  things  are  the  products  of  necessity.  See  Appen- 
dix, [F.]     Tr. 

^  Beseelt,  soulified,  if  we  may  be  allowed  to  coin  a  word 


79 

portion  as  the  powers  contained  in  it  are  more  defi- 
nitely and  clearly  distinguished.  Every  thing  is  root- 
ed in  a  double  principle ;  first  in  the  Ground,  bywhich 
it  is  distinguished  fi'om  God,  and  secondly,  also,  in  the 
understanding  of  God.  Upon  the  first  rests  the  indi- 
vidual will  of  the  creature  ;  which,  however,  in  a  lower 
degree  of  formation  appears  as  a  blind  instinct  only. 
The  highest  degree  is  characterized  thus;  that  in  a 
being  even  the  deepest  point  of  original  darkness — the 
darkness  derived  from  the  Ground — is  entirely  bright- 
ened into  light,  by  means  of  progressive  distinguishings 
arid  a  more  perfect  transformation  of  its  powers.  Of 
all  beings  known  to  us,  man  alone  is  elevated  to  this 
summit.  Through  his  derivation  from  the  Ground,  he 
possesses,  in  reference  to  God,  an  independent  princi- 
ple in  himself;  but  it  is  only  with  the  transformation 
of  that  principle  into  light,  which  in  its  connexion  with 
the  Ground  remains  dark,  that  spirit  at  the  same  time 
springs  up  in  him  :  so  that  the  soul  of  man  is  the  hving 
identity  of  both  principles,  the  dark  and  the  light.  Or 
in  other  words,  when  that  principle  originating  from 
the  Ground — the  principle  of  individual  being  whereby 
man  is  distinguished  from  God — is  elevated  to  an  har- 
monious union  with  the  ideal  principle,  there  is  in  man 
— a  spirit.  Even  as  in  God  also  there  is  spirit,  when  all 
the  depths  of  the  Real  lying  in  the  Ground  are  illumi- 

for  the  exigency.  The  author  does  not  mean  to  affirm  that 
every  object  in  nature  is  endowed  with  a  separate  individ- 
ual soul,  but  that  all  creation  is  pervaded  by  a  living  Power, 
the   Law  of  Life.     Tr. 


nated  by  the  Ideal  in  him,  from  which  illumination 
there  arises  a  resolved  harmony  of  both  principles  in 
the  most  perfect  accordance — that  identity,  namely, 
which  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  absolute  sameness, 
nor  yet  with  entire  inseparableness.  That  this  peace- 
ful union  is  indissoluble  in  God — that  these  principles  in 
perfect  harmony,  each  one  in  its  proper  place  and 
manner,  characterize  the  whole  Divine  Being — and 
that  in  the  eternity  of  God  there  is  no  strife  or  disso- 
nance— this  belongs  to  his  perfection.  Were  the  case 
precisely  the  same  in  regard  to  man,  that  is,  were  this 
bond  of  both  principles  in  him  also  so  inseparable  as 
that  the  individual  will  could  never  aspire  upward  from 
its  tranquil  Ground,  but  always  remained  in  peaceful 
accord  and,  subordination  to  the  other  principle,  the 
universal  will ;  then  there  would  be  no  distinction  be- 
tween God  and  man — God  would  not  be  manifested 
as  spirit,  man  would  be  as  God.  The  union  of  these 
principles  must,  therefore,  be  separable  in  man,  and 
this  constitutes — in  the  words  of  the  work  so  frequent- 
ly referred  to  already — the  possibility  of  good  and 
evil. 

It  may  well  somewhat  surprise  us  that  the  freedom 
of  the  human  will,  sought  for  and  expected,  is  not  here 
to  be  found,  but  on  the  contrary  we  are  presented  with 
the  possibihty  of  good  and  evil ;  for  these  two  concep- 
tions are  by  no  means  of  precisely  the  same  import. 
In  reference  to  good  and  evil  we  must  rather  inquire 
in  the  first  place  whether  they  are  the  actual  consequence 
of  human  freedom  of  Will,  or  whether  they  arose  through 


81 

Divine  appointment  and  pre-determination,  or  finally, 
whether  they  must  be  regarded  merely  as  the  natural  off- 
spring of  an  involuntary  excitation  of  forces,  which  took 
place  already  in  the  first  creation?  The  possibility  of  good 
and  of  evil  does  not  at  all  necessarily  involve  the  possi- 
bility of  such  beings  who  with  conscious  self-determi- 
nation act  from  themselves,  and  from  whose  free  elec- 
tion the  moral  good  and  the  moral  evil  of  human  ac- 
tions must  originate,  if  so  be  that  moral  freedom  gen- 
erally belongs  to  man. — But  in  fact  it  is  not  the  double 
possibility  of  good  and  of  evil  which  can  be  legitimate- 
ly deduced  from  the  premises  assumed  in  this  w^ork,  or 
from  the  separability  of  principles  ;  but  rather,  all  those 
positions  being  conceded,  there  would  result  from  them 
directly  the  'possibility  of  evil  only.  For  good  is  al- 
ready originally  there,  and  its  possibility  rests,  accord- 
ing to  the  representations  made,  upon  entirely  different 
grounds  than  upon  the  possible  disseverance  of  princi- 
ples ;  the  essence  of  good  is  namely — the  uninterrupt- 
ed harmony  of  the  powers.  Not  the  possibility  of  good, 
but  the  possibility  of  evil  only,  depends,  as  we  are  led  to 
conclude  by  following  consecutively  the  whole  course 
of  reasoning  in  that  work,  upon  the  circumstance  that 
disharmony  may  enter  into  man.  And  this  also  ap- 
pears really  to  be  the  true  sense  of  Schelling  in  his 
treatise,  for  the  nearer  and  more  direct  inquiry  express- 
ly proposes  as  the  problem  to  be  solved,  the  possibility 
of  evil  only,  and  seeks  to  make  this  intelligible.  But 
the  inquiry  proceeding  in  this  manner,  recedes  farther 
and  farther  from  the  original  end  proposed ;  and  it  is 


82 

no  longer  the  freedom  of  the  will,  but  evil  only  which 
is  sought  after.  And,  in  consequence  of  a  train  of 
thought  once  entered  upon,  this  evil  seems  to  be  repre- 
sented as  some  offspring  of  original  nature, — as  a  natu- 
ral product.  We  believe,  too,  that  this  character  of 
evil,  and  the  whole  view  of  the  subject  as  exhibited  in 
the  speculations  of  Schelling,  must  be  the  necessary  re- 
sult, so  soon  as  such  an  importance,  nay  we  might  say 
such  a  preponderating  power,  is  once  attributed  to  the 
Ground.  From  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  Ground 
independent  of  God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  Spirit  and  con- 
scious Will — and  that  out  of  this  ground  individual  be- 
ing has  originated — may  be  derived  the  possibility  of 
evil  indeed,  (and  scarcely  even  this!)  but  not  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  free  wdll.  For,  according  to  this  view,  in- 
dividual being,  although  independent  of  God  in  so  far 
as  he  exists,  yet  becomes  the  more  dependent  upon 
him  so  far  forth  as  he  is  the  Ground  of  existence ;  it  is 
therefore  independent  of  the  Spirit,  but  dependent 
upon  the  Nature.  Hence  it  is  not  to  any  individual 
man,  but  to  the  Ground  only  that  a  certain  indepen- 
dence of  God,  a  relative  self  subsistence,  can  be  as-  ' 
cribed.  The  self-subsistence  of  each  individual  will, 
w^hich  can  hardly  with  satisfaction  be  explained  as  the 
correlative  image  of  the  Divine  Conscious  will,  must, 
as  it  would  seem  on  the  view  just  given,  be  the  corres- 
pondent of,  or  become  subordinate  to  the  unfree  and 
dark  Ground.  For  this  Ground,  operating  as  a  blind 
power,  is  able  to  produce  nothing  but  necessary  conse- 
fjuents,  in  all  the  gradations  of  its  products,  however  far 


83 

removed.  If,  then,  the  derivation  of  man's  free  will 
from  God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  a  spirit  and  exists  with 
consciousness,  has  its  great  and  undeniable  difficulties  ; 
yet  the  derivation  is  encumbered  with  difficulties  in- 
finitely greater,  when  the  fountain  of  freedom  is  sought 
for  in  something  ulterior  to  the  consciousness  and  the 
personality  of  God.  Yet  the  most  important  question 
— and  one  which  it  is  our  conviction  must  be  decided 
in  the  negative — is,  whether  there  can  be  supposed  to 
exist  in  God,  independent  of  his  spirit  and  personality, 
a  root  of  any  hfe,  and  an  actual  distinct  agency  of  the 
Ground  ?  There  must  indeed  without  doubt  be  in  him 
a  distinction  of  qualities,  (in  order  that  there  may  be 
life  and  manifestation);  but  also,  (to  the  end  that  he 
may  have  unity  and  perfection,)  there  must  be  an  in- 
separableness  of  powers,  together  with  a  peaceful  co- 
union  and  harmonious  co-operation  of  those  powers  in 
Eternity  which  always  remain  the  same — which  ex- 
cludes every  succession  and  variation  of  time.  As  in 
infinite  space — that  silent  shadow  of  eternity  falling  in 
upon  creation — there  is  neither  above  nor  beneath,  so 
also  in  the  eternity  of  God  there  is  neither  before  nor 
after. 

Thus  also  in  the  Tri-unity  perfected  in  itself,  that 
which  we  call  first  is  also  the  last,  and  conversely,  the 
last  is  first ;  consequently,  there  is  in  it  no  quality  that 
is  anterior  to  others.  It  is  also  impossible  that  there 
should  be  in  God  any  thing  prior  to  the  Divine  will, 
and  independent  of  it ;  and  least  of  all  could  it  be  so 
in  the  order  of  time.     God  is  in  no  sense  before  or  ul- 


84 

terior  to  his  will ;  and  this  Schelling  has  expressed  most 
definitely  in  the  following  sentence  :  ^'  There  is  in 
strict  accuracy  no  other  Being  whatever  than  the  Will- 
ing ; — the  Willing  is  the  primary  Being."  Since,  now, 
we  here  recognize  the  peculiarity  of  this  philosophy 
expressed  in  a  noticeable  manner  ;  and  inasmuch  as 
we  quote  below  a  passage  entire,  which  is  very  deci- 
sive on  the  question  now  under  consideration,  ( — viz. 
whether  the  Ground  can  furnish  a  root  independent  of 
the  personality  of  God  ?) — "  It  is  no  contradiction  to 
assert,  that  in  the  circle  from  which  all  things  are,  that 
by  which  the  One  is  produced,  is  itself  in  turn  again 
produced  from  it" — we  deem  it  necessary  only  to  add, 
that  in  the  singular  application  of  these  speculative 
views  in  the  writing  now  before  us,  in  order  to  aid  us 
in  discovering  the  desired  root  of  evil,  the  idea  of  uni- 
ty is  frequently  lost  sight  of.  Hence  in  this  work  we 
find  defended  the  position  of  a  distinct  agency  of  the 
Ground  /o?'  a  longer  time ;  hence  an  excitation  of  evil 
happening  already  in  the  first  creation,  and  evident  in- 
dications of  it  in  nature  antecedent  to  human  freedom  ; 
hence  universal  evil  developed  as  a  principle,  which, 
throughout  the  universe  lying  in  hostile  opposition  to 
the  good,  broke  forth  from  the  Creation ;  and  hence, 
finally,  the  necessity  of  sin. 

The  cause  of   this  scientific    phenomenon  seems 

evidently  to  lie  in  the  preponderance  yielded  to  nature, 

in  a  strong  tendency  towards  the   Real,   and  in  the 

i    aversion,  which   in  end  of  itself  is  proper,  that  is  felt 

to  mere  notional  conceptions.     Hence    even  in  this 


■/ 


^«  ■ 


JU-J.   tct^ 


85 

inquiry  into  things  purely  spiritual,  a  philosophy  of 
nature,  favored  by  prepossession,  becomes  predom- 
inant. With  an  increasing  love  for  nature,  the  ideal 
principle  must  frequently  be  driven  back  into  its  in- 
ward recesses,  or  become  entirely  latent.  By  plac- 
ing in  God  the  operation  of  a  nature,  it  results  as~a 
necessary  consequence  that  God  himself,  as  it  were 
organically,  is  developed  before  our  eyes  from  deep 
darkness  until  he  attains  to  the  bloom  of  a  personal 
life  ;  and,  if  the  expression  may  be  tolerated,  he  al- 
most appears  to  be  the  subject  of  growth.  And  as 
the  plant,  which  in  its  roots  is  subjected  to  darkness 
and  constraint,  but  in  its  blossoms  struggles  forth  into 
light  and  liberty — thus  exhibiting  a  most  touching 
emblem  of  silent,  longing  sorrow — so  on  the  supposi- 
tion of  a  nature  in  God,  the  Divine  Being  could  never 
perfectly  liberate  himself  from  necessity  and  darkness  ; 
nor  could  he  remove  from  himself  a  slight,  though 
always  vanquished,  sensation,  (pressure,  impression, 
Andrang,)  of  melancholy  and  sadness.  With  such  a 
fixed  destiny  pervading  all  things,  the  investigation 
must  necessarily  end  in  the  assumption  of  a  freedom, 
which,  in  opposition  to  God  and  nature,  cannot  be  main- 
tained where  it  is  most  needed,  viz, — in  action.  So 
in  this  work  of  Schelling,  notwithstanding  the  oppos- 
ing moral  seriousness  that  reigns  throughout  the  whole, 
and  contrary  to  the  expectation  awakened  at  the  com- 
mencement, empirical  freedom  is  entirely  given  up,  and 
all  that  is  left  to  man  is  One  free  act,  anterior  to  all 
consciousness  ;  and  this  act,  the  possibility  of  whjch  is 
8 


86 


not   grounded  in   the  first  principles,  does  forever  iin-^ 
changeably  determine  all  his  acting.     This  is  a  theory 
of  freedom,  which,    although  undesirable,  can  by  no 
means  be  said  to  be  unheard  of;  for,  to  name  no  other 
examples,  Leibnitz  and  Kant,  (as  theorists,)  long  since 
came  to  much  the  same  result,  though  in  different  ways. 
For  although  that  intelligible  act  is  not  found  in  the 
system  of  Leibnitz,  yet  in  his  predetermined  harmony, 
(by  which,  indeed,  still  less  is  conceded  to  liberty  than 
in  the  theory  of  Schelling,)  there  is  already  involved 
the  determination  of  all  actions  by  an  unavoidable  ne- 
cessity ;  since  by  it  must  be  explained  the  harmonious 
connexion  between  soul  and  body.     It  is  true  that  in 
his  view  the  soul  does  indeed  act  from  itself;  but  yet  it 
acts  only  in  conformity  with  those  necessary  laws  which 
yv<^|:/V  have  been  implanted  in  it  ever  since  creation — and  this 
\       is  necessary,  to  preserve  the   harmony  between   the 
\     creation  and  the   Creator.     Could  the   will  but  once 
depart  from  the  path  strictly  marked  out  before  it,  one 
such  departure  would  immediately  destroy   the   pre- 
determined   harmony.      It  was    Leibnitz's    views  of 
nature,  and  the  strict  subjection  to  its  laws  extended 
by  him  even  over  the  realm  of  spirits,  which  in  a 
manner  compelled  him  to  assume  that  predetermina- 
'    tion.     To  him  the  creation  appeared  so  impenetrable 
and  so  compactly  constructed,  that  it  could  never  afford 
an  entrance  to  the  light  of  the  free  spirit ;  since  the 
course  of  life  for  each  individual  was  already  determin- 
ed from  eternity,  and  had  been  brought  into  strict  and 
preestablished  harmony  with  the  movements  of   the 


87 

whole  machine.  He  believed  empirical  freedom  to  be 
so  irreconcileable  with  the  order  of  nature  and  the 
Divine  government  of  the  world,  that  rather  than 
surrender  the  latter  t)e  preferred  to  bind  the  former 
to  an  unchanging  and  unchangeable  law  of  predeter-  j 
mination.  But,  in  what  is  said  of  monads,  viz.  that  they 
are  not  to  be  regarded  as  material,  but  as  powers  of 
presentation,  there  is  contained  the  germ  of  a  more 
living  view  of  the  world,  and  the  prophecy  of  our 
future  deliverance  from  a  strict  adherence  to  nature.^ 

^  Leibnitz  was  one  of  the  first  philosophers  who  was  led  to 
a  more  spiritual  apprehension  of  the  material  world,  and  of  the 
laws  by  which  it  is  governed.  Preceding  writers  had  been 
in  the  habit  of  regarding  the  Creator  and  the  creation  as  to- 
tally and  diametrically  opposed  to  each  other  in  their  charac- 
,  teristic  qualities.  The  latter,  or  the  material  of  which  it  was 
formed,  was  regarded  as  hard,  rigid,  unyielding,  filled  with 
evil  properties ;  and  by  many  it  was  regarded  as  the  source 
of  all  evil.  Hence  Aristotle  believed  that  the  world  in  its 
present  form  was  eternal,  and  Plato  taught  that  matter  was 
co-eternal  with  God.  Hence  the  atomic  theory  of  Epicurus, 
who  in  words  indeed  acknowledged  the  existence  of  a  Grod, 
but  his  God  had  so  little  intercourse  or  sympathy  with  this 
creation,  that  he  rather  enclosed  himself  in  the  depths  of  his 
own  Eternity,  and  left  the  universe  to  take  care  of  itself. 

Epicurus  held  that  an  infinite  number  of  hard  atoms 
floating  about  in  the  vast  inane,  were  by  their  inward  mo- 
tion gradually  brought  together,  and  by  degrees  arranged 
themselves  in  their  present  forms.  Hence  also  the  vortices 
of  Descartes,  who  thought  that  on  the  principles  and  laws  of 
mechanics  simply  he  could  account  for  all  the  phenomena  of 


it^^ 


88 

It  is  acknowledged  by  those  who  have  been  in  a  con- 
dition to  observe  impartially  the  phenomena  in  the  do- 
creation  without  having  recourse  to  the  hypothesis  of  a 
Framer  or  Creator.  Even  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  the  cotemporary 
of  Leibnitz,  believed  that  all  the  forms  of  the  bodily  world 
were  ultimately  constituted  of  the  same  specific  material,  and 
that  the  essence  of  this  material  consisted  in  particles  infinite- 
ly small.  He  held  that  these  particles  were  hard,  impenetra- 
ble, and  totally  dissimilar  to'  spirit ;  he  was  therefore,  in  all 
essential  respects,  an  atomist.  He  seemed  inclined  to  be- 
lieve that  even  the  Law  of  gravitation  consisted  in  a  countless 
number  of  these  invisible  atoms — or  in  other  words,  that  a 
subtile  ethereal  matter  pervaded  the  universe,  by  virtue  of 
which  the  vast  spheres  that  roll  through  infinity  were  attract- 
ed towards  each  other.  But  if  his  own  principle  that  mat- 
ter is  infinitely  divisible  be  correct,  must  it  not  ultimately  be  re- 
solved into  something  else  than  atoms  ? 

Leibnitz  rejected  entirely  the  atomic  theory  and  introdu- 
ced his  own  theory  of  monads.  In  the  system  of  Leibnitz 
these  monads  are  spiritual  atoms,  not  the  hard,  impenetra- 
ble, insoluble  things  of  Epicurus  and  Descartes,  (by  the  Gre- 
cian these  atoms  were  so  called  on  account  of  their  supposed 
impenetrable  nature  and  their  indissolubleness,  atofioi,  r{Kov- 
rai  dca  Tr\v  aXvtov  (TTEgQotrjioi,)  but  substances  all  permeable 
to  a  higher  power,  and  actually  permeated  by  a  higher  pow- 
er. They  are  simple,  uncompounded,  without  parts,  without 
divisibility,  without  extension  or  figure  ;  they  constitute  the 
elements  of  things,  and  bodies  are  nothing  more  than  the 
phenomena  or  aggregate  of  these  monads.  These  units 
are  living,  animated,  spiritual.  "Les  substances  simples,  les 
vies,  les  ^mes,  les  esprits,  sont  des  unites."  All  creation, 
therefore,  is  pregnant  with  life;  and,  if  the  word  be  taken 


Jl^(/'-'^'    f^^/l 


89 

main  of  science,  that  the  writings  of  Schelling  have  of 
late  awakened  a  more  comprehensive  view  of  the  world, 
and  in  particular  have  spread  abroad  a  more  living  in- 
sight into  nature ;  that  through  the  influence  of  this 
philosophy  upon  the  age  a  new  impulse  has  been  excit- 
ed for  the  love  of  nature,  and  a  more  spiritual  apprehen- 
sion of  its  laws,  in  as  much  as  he  strives  to  catch  the 
Spirit  of  Life  which  manifests  itself  in  the  visible  world, 
and  through  which  nature  becomes  to  us  both  human 
and  divine.  By  saying  this  however,  it  is  not  intended 
to  be  asserted  that  this  has  already  been  fully  effected, 
but  rather  that  there  is  a  strong  tendency  that  way,  and 
still  more  is  continually  sought.^     But  a  scientific  the- 

with  rigouroiis  and  philosophic  precision,  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  death  to  be  found.  Thus  Leibnitz  removed  the  essential 
dualism  which  had  previously  been  thought  to  exist  between 
matter  and  spirit,  and  he  boldly  denied  that  there  was  any 
vast  chasm  between  the  creation  and  the  Creator.  He  main- 
tained that  there  was  no  cleft  or  saltus  in  nature,  but  that  in 
the  physical  and  moral  world,  all  was  one  continuous  and 
connected  chain  of  gradation.  "  Leibnitz  admettoit  comme 
un  principe  fondamental  de  sa  sublime  philosophic :  qu'il  n'y 
a  jamais  de  sauts  dans  la  nature,  et  que  tout  est  continu  ou  nu- 
ance dans  le  physique  et  dans  le  moral."  These  specula- 
tions were  the  precursor  of  the  Dynamic  theory,  and  this,  in 
its  turn,  prepared  the  way  for  the  Magnetism  of  Germany. 
Tr. 

^  The  writings  of  Schelling  produced  a  deep  and  exten- 
sive effect  upon  Germany.  His  followers  were  exceed- 
ingly numerous,  and   they  were  made   up  of  Philosophers, 

8* 


90 

ory  which  contemplates  nature  as  no  machine,  and  every 
activity  in  it  as  a  real  life  ;  which,  consequently,  in 
the  productions  of  creation  recognizes  not  merely  the 
results  of  mathematical  laws,  but  an  exhibition  of  soul 
and  mind,  so  that  to  it  even  body  appears  as  soul,  and 
every  plant  as  some  intricate  feature  of  spirit ;  ^ — should 
not  such  a  theory  have  determined  first  of  all  whether 
there  is  in  nature  a  changeless,  necessary  connexion 

Theologians,  Philologists,  Physicians  and  Naturalists.  They 
attempted  to  comprehend  all  things  according  to  the  point 
of  view  held  forth  in  the  doctrine  of  Absolute  Identity  ; 
they  sought  also  to  give  systematic  completion  to  this  sys- 
tem which  had  been  left  imperfect.  His  speculations  had  a 
very  remarkable  influence  particularly  upon  inquiries  into 
nature,  upon  Mythology,  History,  the  Arts  and  aesthetic  Crit- 
icism.    Tr. 

1  Schelling  held  that  strictly  speaking  all  things  are  but 
one  and  the  same  original  Being.  The  difference  of  things 
with  respect  to  their  essence  is  in  quantity  only,  not  in  qual- 
ity, (quantitativer  kein  qualitativer  Unterschied ;)  in  the 
preponderance  of  the  objective  and  the  subjective,  of  the 
ideal  and  the  real.  Every  finite  thing,  as  a  product  of  a  re- 
flection existing  only  relatively,  has  a  reality  in  appearance 
only.  The  One  absolute  Being  manifests  himself  in  the 
eternal  generation  of  things;  and  these  things  constitute  the 
Forms  of  this  Being.  Consequently  every  thing  is  a  mani- 
festation of  the  absolute  in  a  determinate  Form.  Nothing 
therefore  exists  which  is  not  participant  of  the  Divine  Being. 
Hence  also  Nature  is  not  dead  but  hving,  and  divine  also  as 
well  as  the  Ideal.  All  events  in  the  universe,  all  history,  is  but 
the  developement  of  God  gradually  unfolding  itself.     Tr. 


91 

between  cause  and  effect,  or  whether  will  and  Spirit 
may  not  be  the  ruling  powers  in  it  ?  And  if  the  latter, 
how  can  an  eternal  predetermination  and  necessity  of  all 
human  actions  appear  tenable  ? — That  one  intelligible 
act — an  act  which  was  never  the  object  of  consciousness, 
and  which  in  the  whole  subsequent  life  must  be  atoned 
for  or  its  bitter  fruits  gathered — offers,  to  say  the  least, 
but  a  poor  indemnification  for  the  loss  of  liberty  in  this 
life,  which  alone  for  the  present  is  ours.  The  thought 
that  each  one  has  been  from  eternity  what  he  now  is,  and 
that  in  consequence  of  that  intelligible  act  he  could  not 
possibly  have  been  otherwise,  is  repulsive,  not  so  much 
because  it  is  difficult  to  be  comprehended,  as  because  it 
does  not  answer  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  invented. 
It  does  not  remove  the  difficulties  in  which  the  question  is 
involved  ;  it  not  only  renders  unintelligible  the  most  re- 
markable facts  of  our  moral  nature,  but  it  directly  contra- 
dicts them.  What  concerns  the  first  of  these  points  must 
be  treated  of  subsequently  ;  but  some  examination  in 
regard  to  the  second  may  here  find  its  appropriate  place. 
How  that  intelligible  act  could  be  a  free  act,  and 
how,  in  consequence  of  it,  there  can  justly  be  any  impu- 
tation of  moral  character,  is  at  least  not  rendered  com- 
prehensible. It  would  seem  rather,  that  inasmuch  as 
that  act  lies  without  the  province  of  and  anterior  to  all 
consciousness — the  indispensable  condition  of  moral 
freedom — it  must  be  unfree,  and  that  consequently 
there  can  be  no  imputation  of  it.  But  as  the  imputation 
of  moral  character  is  unavoidable,  so  this  imputation  . 
must  be  grounded  upon  acts  of  an  entirely  different  char- 


92 

acter,  that  is,  upon  acts  absolutely  free. — To  the  remar- 
kable moral  phenomena  which  receives  no  elucidation 
from  this  hypothesis,  we  reckon,  farther,  the  gradual  de- 
terioration of  those  who  attain  to  a  high  degree  of  reck- 
lessness. It  is  undeniable  that  this  does  not  take  place 
at  once,  but  progressively,  and  in  the  course  of  time- 
The  fact  has  already  been  noticed  above,  that  the  evil  as 
well  as  the  good  in  man  is  susceptible  of  cultivation,  and 
that  it  has  a  growth  ;  nay,  if  not  early  and  vigorously  op- 
posed, it  will  ultimately  acquire  an  unconquerable  power. 
On  this  view  the  conflict  between  good  and  evil,  in  so 
far  as  it  concerns  the  human  soul,  is  confined  to  a  tem- 
poral state  ;  and  the  life  time  of  each  individual  is  the 
appropriate  period  in  which  the  processes  of  fermentation 
and  clarification  must  go  on  between  these  hostile  ele- 
ments. According  to  the  other  view  the  most  perfect  im- 
morality,—for  which  the  perfected  villain  was  already  des-  • 
tined  from  eternity — must  break  forth  with  the  first  dawn 
of  conciousness  ;  but  this  is  evidently  not  the  case,  any 
more  than  that  moral  maturity  and  manly  energy  in  good, 
are  found  to  be  coeval  with  the  first  awakening  of  con- 
sciousness.— Besides,  the  warning  conscience,  and  that 
inward  conflict  accompanying  an  immoral  life,  receive 
at  least  but  a  very  unsatisfying  explanation  from  the 
theory  here  brought  into  view.  This  internal  strife  ev- 
idently points — not  to  a  determination  now  fully  made, 
but  to  a  struggling  of  powers  still  arrayed  in  battle.  But  if 
the  evil  man  were  already  evil  from  eternity,  and  if  it 
were  impossible  for  him  to  be  otherwise,  whence  is  that 
better  voice    in  him,  and  to  what  end  ?     The  better 


93 

voice  in  him  plainly  shows  that  the  contest  has  not  yet 
been  determined  ;  and  indicates  that  the  decision  cannot 
be  made  before  the  termination  of  the  conflict.  On  no 
other  supposition  than  the  one  here  maintained  could  the 
warning  conscience  have  any  end.  Otherwise  its  resis- 
tance to  evil  were  but  a  sport  of  nature,  and  would 
have  to  be  regarded  as  the  after-pain  consequent  on 
sin ;  by  means  of  which,  after  the  perfected  birth  of 
evil,  no  regeneration  could  be  effected.  Or  we  should 
have  to  look  upon  it  as  the  last  convulsive  effort  of 
better  powers  already  destroyed  from  eternity,  even  as 
in  many  animals  when  killed  we  may  still  observe  a 
lively  play  of  the  fibres,  as  the  last  vain  reaction  of  de- 
parting Hfe.  And  another  objection,  though  not  the 
only  one,  yet  one  of  very  great  weight  against  this^ 
view,  is,  to  use  the  very  expression  of  the  author  him- 
self, that  it  entirely  cuts  off  from  man,  for  the  present 
life  at  least,  and  we  may  add  for  eternity  too,  all  hope 
of  change  from  good  to  evil  and  from  evil  to  good.  A 
consequence  which  is  not  removed  by  the  fact  that 
the  author  of  that  oft  named  treatise,  influenced  less  by 
the  theory  presented  than  by  a  strong  moral  feeling, 
could  not  forbear  attempting  to  show  the  purpose  of 
this  better  voice,  which  warns  the  unreformed  to  re- 
pent, and  by  yielding  obedience  to  which  he  first  ob- 
tains inward  peace  ;  and,  as  though  satisfaction  had 
now  first  been  rendered  to  the  original  idea,  he  finds 
himself  in  a  state  of  reconciliation  with  his  guardian 
spirit.  But  that  stern  demand  which  can  endure  no 
evasion,  and  the  universal  validity  of  this  inward  mor|t 


94 

itor  felt  by  every  one  without  exception,  or  rather  the 
sacred  and  at  the  same  time  terrifying  character  of  this 
better  voice,  proves  the  presence  of  something  actually 
better,  of  that  freedom  namely,  in  the  possession  of 
which  It  must  be  possible  for  every  individual,  even 
now  in  the  present  life — in  this  period  so  full  of  other 
and  varied  transmutations — to  effect  that  conversion  of 
his  inward  self  which  conscience  demands,  and  which 
alone  can  deliver  him  from  the  pangs  of  remorse  ;  to 
effect  it  even  by  a  free  return  to  God,  whether  this  re- 
turn ultimately  rests  upon  aid  human  or  Divine. 

If  now  one  should  wish  to  explain  and  determine 
more  narrowly  in  regard  to  that  inward  calling,  he 
would  have  to  find  its  ultimate  ground  in  God  alone, 
and  would  be  obliged  to  consider  it  as  but  the  voice  of 
God  heard  in  the  heart.  Hence  that  freedom  also,  to 
which  this  Divine  voice  so  definitely  appeals,  must  be 
conceived  of  as  in  the  Divine  understanding,  and  as 
willed  by  the  Divine  will ;  that  is,  it  must  actu- 
ally he.  He  who  would  deny  this,  must  point  out 
in  the  very  idea  of  God  such  traits  as  could  not,  in  the 
present  life  at  least,  be  reconciled  with  the  freedom  of 
the  human  will.  But  one  who  denies  the  freedom  of 
man  ought  to  be  the  last,  it  would  seem,  to  make  his 
appeal  to  the  Will  of  God  generally,  or  to  the  Divine 
Holiness  in  particular.  For,  if  there  be  a  Will  in  God, 
and  even  pre-eminently  an  Holy  Will,  why  should  he 
not  have  willed  that,  without  which  it  would  have 
been  impossible  that  he  could  ever  have  been  mani- 
fested as  a  Holy  Being ; — viz.,   the  Freedom  of  the 


95 

Will  ?  The  more  the  idea  of  a  free  and  living  Person- 
ality is  retained  in  reference   to  God,  the  moj-e  cer- 
tainly does  the  consequence  follow,  that  such  a  Being, 
(according  to  the  word  of  Schelling  taken  by  us  in  its 
most  literal  sense,)  could  never  find  his  pleasure  in  a 
machine  how  perfectly  soever  it  might  be  constructed. 
He  must  rather  will  the  Free  and  the  Personal,  and 
oppose  these  to  himself  as  his  own  image  reflected ; 
and  they  alone  can  correspond  to  the  proper  life  of  the 
original  Author.     To  none  but  beings  of  this  kind,  in 
whom  God   again  recognizes   his  own   spirit,  could  the 
Creator  direct  himself  as  to  the  proper  and  worthy  ob- 
jects of  that  intellectual  and  Divine  love  with   which 
he  loved  the  world  from  eternity  ;    and   on  the  other 
hand,  none  but  such  beings  would  be  able  to  know  or 
love  Him.      For  none    but  personal  beings  are   the 
proper  objects  of  love  ;  and  none  other  than  they  pos- 
sess the  capability  of  loving.     Now  although  it  was 
necessary  that  man  should  be  a  personal  being  in  order 
that  God  might  be  manifested,  yet  he  is  surely  not  to 
be  considered  as  simply  a  means  for  the  attainment  of 
this  end  ;  for  from  the  fact  that  he  possesses  personal- 
ity, the  end  of  his  existence  is  at  the  same  time  placed 
in  himself;  that  is,  by  means  of  a  kind  of  self-with- 
drawal of  God,  man  is  elevated  to  that  degree  of  spir- 
itual dignity  and  self-subsistence,  upon  which  he  is  ca- 
pable of  being  somewhat  for  himself,  and  by  himself: 
wherefore,  also,  the  attainment  of  the  end  of  his  exist- 
ence stands  in  the  strictest  possible  connexion  with  his 
own  inward  energy.     True,  indeed,  man  is  placed  up- 


96 

on  that  elevated  position  for  the  very  reason  that 
God  nmust  manifest  himself;  but  still,  he  never  would 
have  been  manifested  as  a  Will  of  love  and  of  holiness, 
had  not  man  at  the  same  time  been  capable  of  recog- 
nizing himself  as  a  personal  being,  and  as  having  in 
him  a  self-end,  and  were  he  not  able  through  his  own 
natural  power  to  strive  after  the  most  perfect  state  of 
being.  But  this  perfectness  of  being,  wherein  does  it 
consist,  if  not  in  the  realization  of  the  original  idea  in 
life,  when  man  through  his  own  agency  comes  to  be 
conformed  to  the  likeness  of  God?  Thus  an  obligation, 
[an  absolute  Ought,]  is  imposed  upon  man,  and  his 
personal  relation  with  God  becomes  at  the  same  time 
a  moral  one.  But  certain  as  it  is  that  God,  as  a  holy 
Being,  wills  morality,  so  certain  is  it  also  that  he  must 
will  the  conditions  under  which  alone  morality  is  possi- 
ble. Now  whether  morality  appears  under  the  strict- 
est form  of  self-denial  yielding  obedience  to  the  law, 
and  brings  as  a  sacrifice  to  right  all  opposing  feelings, 
or  whether  it  shines  out  as  love ;  yet  always,  under 
both  forms,  its  possibility  and  its  worth  are  given  only 
through  the  freedom  of  the  will.  For  though  love 
follows  the  Beautiful  without  artifice  or  calculation,  yet 
it  is  love  only  on  condition  that  every  compulsive 
power  is  removed  from  it,  and  that  the  devotion  to  its 
object  is  a  most  free  act  of  the  soul.  Thus,  too,  the  pi- 
ous tendency  of  the  mind  towards  God  ;  on  the  one  side, 
indeed,  it  appears  simply  to  be  a  natural  return  to  the 
living  Central-point  which  always  attracts  the  wander- 
ing spirit ;  yet  on  the  other  hand  there  is  demanded  a 


97 

most  free  directing  act  of  the  spirit  itself,  and  this  re- 
turn cannot  be  effected  without  a  struggle,  and  a  con- 
quest over  counteracting  obstacles.  Even  self-denial, 
in  its  rigid  adherence  to  law  and  right,  from  its  very- 
name  directs  to  an  individuality  of  effort,  a  self-energy, 
which  can  vanquish  as  well  as  be  vanquished  ;  so  also 
law  and  right,  (rules  of  conduct  for  such  as  are  not  de- 
termined by  the  law  of  nature,)  are  conceptions  which 
have  significance  only  for  those  who  are  free.  But 
since  the  validity  of  these  conceptions,  especially  for 
the  present  state  of  being,  cannot  for  one  moment  be 
disputed,  and  since  the  demand  to  lead  a  moral  hfe  is 
continually  repeated  and  urged  upon  every  one  ;  so  it 
would  seem  that  no  one  can  be  destitute  of  the  only 
condition  under  which  such  a  life  is  possible  in  the 
present  period  of  existence — that  is,  no  one  can  be 
without  empirical  freedom.  He  who  has  placed  man 
in  this  period  of  trial  and  of  conflict,  and  imposed  upon 
him  an  obligation  to  fight  the  battle  of  light  with  dark- 
ness, surely  could  not  have  willed  that  this  should  be  a 
conflict  in  appearance  simply — the  decision  of  which 
had  been  long  before  made— but  must  have  designed 
that  it  should  be  an  actual  and  severe  contest,  for  which 
also  he  must  have  bestowed  upon  him  placed  on  the 
battle-field  the  necessary  powers  and  weapons — the 
arms  of  the  spirit  and  of  freedom. 

To   render   intelhgible    the    manner  in    which    a 

power  at  least   relatively  independent  of    God,  can, 

together  with  the  freedom  of  the  will,  be  imparted  to 

a  creature,  is,   without  doubt,  a  task  of    very  great 

9 


'7 


98 

difficulty — and  this  difficulty  presses  itself  in  no  small 
degree  upon  every  theory  of  freedom  where  real  free- 
dom is  retained.  Be  it  now  that  in  this  relation  God 
is  conceived  of  simply  as  might  and  power,  or  that  he 
is  thought  of  under  the  form  of  Will  also,  still  there  is 
always  involved  a  self-subsistence  of  the  Finite  in 
opposition  to  the  Infinite,  and  the  problem  is  this  : 
To  show  how  other  self-subsist^nt  powers  may  exist  at 
the  same  time  with  the  absolute  and  unlimited  power 
of  God,  or  how  a  particular  individual  Will  can  co-exist 
with  a  universal  Will  ?  That  all  beings  in  the  world 
are  necessarily  dependent  upon  God,  cannot  by  any 
one  be  called  in  question.  The  dependence  of 
creatures  upon  God,  is  not,  as  it  were,  a  mere  con- 
sequence of  the  Divine  Omnipotence,  but  is  the  imme- 
diate condition  of  the  continued  existence  of  things. 
Even  in  wicked  persons — to  notice  here,  by  way  of 
anticipation,  an  objection  which  appears  still  more  diffi- 
cult— God  must  still  continually  co-operate,  in  order 
that  their  existence  may  be  possible,  [for  if  his  sustain- 
ing agency  were  withdrawn  they  would  be  nothing.] 
.,— But  certain  as  it  is  that  the  creature  is  always  de- 
pendent upon  God,  yet  the  freedom  of  the  human  will 
must  be  maintained  to  be  as  certain,  and  this,  too,  from 
grounds  of  the  highest  importance.  There  must, 
therefore,  be  a  state  of  dependency  with  which  self- 
subsistence  may  co-exist,  and  such  a  relation  of  both 
may  be  conceived  of,  (at  least  in  the  Divine  under- 
standing,) that  neither  the  freedom  of  the  finite  being  is 
destroyed  by  the  infinite  power  of  God,  nor  is  His 


99 

power  infringed  by  the  freedom  of  the  human  will. 
Were  God  merely  a  dead  conformity  to  law,  or  the 
totality  of  powers  blindly  operative,  then  indeed  the  re- 
lation demanded  could  not  at  all  exist.  From  such  a  na- 
ture in  God,  had  it  even  been  possessed  of  a  might  twice 
as  great  as  omnipotence,  nothing  personal  could  ever 
have  been  developed  ;  and  no  self-subsistence  could  be 
maintained  in  opposition  to  its  unconditioned  causality. 
But  the  case  is  very  different  with  the  much  higher 
idea  of  a  most  perfect  Being — the  Personal  God. 
True,  indeed,  every  life,  even  the  most  perfect,  is  de- 
pendent upon  Him  in  a  twofold  sense  :  dependent 
as  having  derived  its  existence  from  Him,  and  depend- 
ent, also,  upon  his  continuous  necessary  co-operation 
and  sustaining  agency,  which  must  extend  through  the 
whole  as  well  as  to  each  individual  part.  This,  view 
of  dependency,  however,  does  not  in  any  sense  involve 
an  actual  denial  of  the  freedom  of  the  will.  To  have 
come  into  being  through  the  agency  of  another  is  not 
to  be  bound  to  this  agent  in  every  movement  of  life. 
Even  that  which  may  stand  in  need  of  another  for  its 
continued  existence,  does  not  therefore  cease  to  be 
and  to  act  for  itself;  and  notwithstanding  the  continual 
influences  of  this  other,  yet  to  a  being  dependent  in 
this  manner,  inward  individuality,  and  a  self-subsistent 
agency  acting  from  itself,  always  remain  possible. 

Visible  nature  even  furnishes  us  with  a  proof  of 
this  relation.  That  which  is  produced  is  dependent 
upon  that  which  produces  it  only  in  reference  to  its 
coming  into  existence,  and  not  in  regard  to  its  after- 


100 

life.  The  plant  which  originally  sprouts  from  the 
earth  and  is  rooted  in  it,  is,  indeed,  dependent  upon 
its  mother  in  a  twofold  sense.  Yet  even  to  this  plant, 
although  placed  much  lower  in  the  scale  of  life,  there 
belongs  a  self-subsistence,  which,  by  its  specific  indi- 
viduality, and  through  the  particular  mode  of  its 
formation  and  growth,  it  maintains  hi  opposition  to  the 
universal  mother  of  all  organized  forms  that  belong  to 
the  earth.  What  to  creatures  placed  much  lower  in 
the  order  of  being  is  a  relative  self-subsistence,  that, 
upon  the  highest  point  of  developement,  is  the  free- 
dom of  the  human  will.  The  ground  of  the  perfection 
of  the  creature  must  be  sought  for  only  in  the  perfec- 
tion of  God  ;  the  more  perfect  He  is,  the  more  will  a 
perfection  similar  to  his  own  be  exhibited  in  the  most 
exalted  of  his  creatures.  It  belongs  to  the  perfection 
of  God  alone  not  to  be  continually  striving  and  work- 
ing through  endless  impulsion  as  a  blind  power  without 
rule  or  aim,  but  as  a  will  of  wisdom  and  of  love  to  gov- 
ern creatures  bearing  a  resemblance  to  himself.  And  to 
the  end  that  the  Free  and  the  Personal  may  exist  at 
the  same  time  with  him,  his  power  does  not  operate 
with  violence  or  unconditionally,  but  is  conditioned — 
conditioned,  namely,  by  his  own  will.  This  may  be 
regarded  as  an  act  of  Divine  self-denial,  or,  if  any  one 
prefers  the  expression,  as  an  act  of  self-limitation. 
Should  any  one  say  that  according  lo  this  mode  of 
representation  God  himself,  in  a  certain  sense,  would 
seem  to  be  subjected  to  the  form  of  the  finite,  he 
would  thereby  express  a  true  and  religious  idea,  provided 


101 

at  the  same  time  he  did  not  exclude  the  consideration, 
(which  in  the  domain  of  the  eternal  is  perfectly  con- 
ceivable,) that  God  does  not  therefore  cease  to  be  in- 
finite. But  if  it  be  asked,  how  could  God  impart  to 
man  an  unconditioned  freedom  of  action,  without  any 
disturbance  of  the  most  necessary  relations  in  his  gov- 
ernment ?  we  at  once  deny  that  human  freedom  is  un- 
conditioned ;  it  is  rather  the  freedom  of  a  finite  being, 
and  is  confined  within  the  bounds  of  a  limited  circle  of 
action : — it  is  precisely  the  freedom  of  willing^  not  an 
unconditional  power  of  operating  on  creation  in  gen- 
eral. Finally,  should  any  one  be  displeased  that  limits 
are  here  assigned  to  God,  only  relatively  however,  and 
by  his  own  most  free  determination  ;  to  such  an  one 
we  answer  that  the  conception  of  an  entire  illimitedness 
is  in  itself  merely  notional,  and  is  erroneously  sup- 
posed to  belong  to  the  highest  perfection.  If  no  limits 
whatever  be  ascribed  to  God — not  even  those  which 
he  may  have  imposed  upon  himself — then  no  real 
[)redicates  should  be  applied  to  him  ;  for  every  predi- 
cate involves  some  limitation,  either  that  which  ex- 
cludes or  that  which  more  narrowly  defines  every 
other. 

But  without  predicates  the  idea  itself  evaporates 
into  dim  incomprehensible  mist ; — into  that  which  is 
infinite,  but  indeterminate  and  without  character. 
Were  the  Eternal  but  a  continuous  streaming  forth  of 
infinite  power,  (somewhat  comparable  to  an  infinite 
straight  line,  which  from  its  very  nature  is  susceptible 
of  no  specific  form,  or  inclination,  not  even  to  itself,)  it 
9* 


102 

would  be  impossible  to  make  him  an  object  of  distinct 
thought — for  there  would  be  darkness  upon  such  a  depth. 
But  since  the  Eternal  comprehends  himself  as  Spirit 
in  that  streaming  forth,  and  recognizes  himself  as 
somewhat  limited  ;  and  since,  as  it  were,  the  flow  of  the 
eternal  tide  sets  in  against  the  ebb,  from  the  beholding 
of  this  opposition  there  arises  a  personal  life  in  God — 
and  there  is  light.  Thereby  God  exists  as  Spirit, 
but  for  himself  alone  ;  like  as  a  vast  depth  enclosing  the 
light  within  itself.  But  with  the  Spirit,  is  also  connect- 
ed the  Will,  which  is  originally  directed  to  itself  alone, 
and  is  hence  to  be  regarded  as  an  intellectual  love  of  God 
towards  himself,  as  a  delight  which  he  takes  in  his  own 
self-contemplation.  Whilst  yet  the  active  operation 
of  powers  in  him  is  not  destroyed  by  that  act  of  Divine 
self-knowledge,  but  only  determined  or  directed  by  it, 
so  the  stream  of  life  is  not  held  in  check  or  inj;errupt- 
ed,  but  is  brightened  into  light.  And  because  this  life 
in  God  is  at  the  same  time  a  will  of  love,  and  as  all 
love  would  make  itself  known  to  that  which  is  not  self, 
there  is  therefore  in  God  also  a  will  for  manifestation. 
This  will  is  the  Word  through  whom  all  things  exist ; 
the  Word  by  whom  the  divine  thoughts  are  brought  to 
a  manifestation,  are  made,  as  it  were,  to  become  Man, 
(or  are  formed  into  humanity,  Menschwerdung.)  As 
in  man  himself,  without  that  redeeming  or  creative 
Word,  the  whole  spiritual  life  would  have  lain  buried 
under  the  darkness  of  a  nature  still  teeming  unintelli- 
gently  to  the  birth ;  so  also,  nothing  individual  or  par- 
ticular could   have   ever  been   developed   from    the 


103 

depth  of  the  Divine  Being,  had  it  not  been  for  the  co- 
presence  and  co-agency  of  that  Primal  Word.  Con- 
sidered in  itself,  that  power  which  constantly  co-operates 
with  the  creature,  is  indeed  infinite,  the  more  especially  so 
as  it  is  exhibited  in  man ;  but  nevertheless  this  power 
acts  in  a  determinate  mode,  in  that  manner,  namely, 
which  is  conformable  to  the  Will  of  Love.  Now  this 
Will  of  love  does  not  desire  itself  only,  and  hence  does 
not  wish  that  the  pure  Godhead  alone  should  exist,  but 
it  determines  also  that  at  the  head  of  all  earthly  beings 
the  personal  and  free  creature  shall  stand  as  the  re- 
flected image  of  the  Creator.  Hence  it  is,  that  be- 
tween God  and  man  there  exists  a  double  bond  of 
union  : — the  bond  of  nature  or  of  life,  and  also  the 
bond  of  love  and  of  spirit.  The  first  expresses  a  ne- 
cessary, the  other  a  free  relation.  By  means  of  the 
first,  the  soul  is  rooted  in  a  necessary  and  indissoluble 
union  with  God  ;  and  no  freedom  can  be  predicated  of 
this  relation  in  which  man,  as  a  natural  being,  stands 
to  his  Creator.  The  other  relation,  which  in  its  very 
nature  is  a  moral  one,  consists  in  a  free  surrender  of 
one's  self  to  God  through  love  and  humble  acknowledge- 
ment. Man's  obhgation  to  add  the  moral  to  the  natural 
bond  is  enhanced  in  proportion  as  the  original  love 
has  been  the  more  bestowed  on  him.  If  this  relation 
be  sustained,  it  is  accounted  to  man  as  a  merit ;  if  in- 
terrupted or  destroyed,  it  is  reckoned  guilt : — that  is,  it 
must  be  regarded  as  his  own  act. 

By  the  representations  which  have  now  been  made, 
although  the  subject  is  by  no  means  exhausted,  yet  we 


104 

think  that  it  has  at  least  been  satisfactorily  shown  that  with 
the  relation  of  dependency  there  may  yet  at  the  same 
time  exist  self-subsistence  and  freedom ;  and  that 
even  the  perfection  of  the  Creator — that  is,  the  moral 
perfection  of  God — renders  it  necessary  for  us  to  as- 
sume such  a  relation  between  himself  and  man — a  rela- 
tion which  does  not  destroy  freedom,  and  makes  moral- 
ity possible.  The  highest  power  only  becomes  the 
more  perfect  from  the  fact  that  instead  of  acting  with 
all-subduing  violence,  it  operates  in  a  determinate  mode 
as  a  spirit  of  holiness  and  of  love.  On  the  other  hand, 
this  higher  power  may  safely  leave  man  free,  for  the 
very  reason  that  it  is  onmipotent,  for  it  is  the  character 
of  strength  not  to  fear  freedom  ;  and  it  is  precisely  be- 
cause Omnipotence  governs  the  world,  that  no  infringe- 
ment of  universal  order  is  to  be  apprehended  from  the 
personal  self-subsistence  of  finite  spirits. 

Besides,  the  difficulty,  a  solution  of  which  has  now 
been  attempted,  is  not  removed  by  the  surrender  of  em- 
pirical freedom  merely,  if  instead  of  it.  One  free  intelligi- 
ble act  be  conceded,  but  it  is  only  concentrating  the  dif- 
ficulty upon  a  different  point — namely,  upon  that  in- 
telligible act  itself.  For  either  the  absolute  depen- 
dence of  man  upon  God,  without  the  possibility  of  free- 
dom, is  asserted,  or  it  is  not.  If  not,  then  empirical  free- 
dom is  also  possible  ;  but  if  on  the  contary  it  be  so  as- 
serted, then  without  controversy  that  intelligible  act 
was  not  really  a  free  act,  but  one  unconditionally  de- 
pendent upon  God.  All  the  other  objections,  too,  which 
are  commonly  made  against  freedom,  urge  themselves 


105 

wiih  the  same  correctness  or  incorrectness  against 
that  one  presuppossed  intelligible  act ;  nor  does  this  as- 
sumption, in  fact,  remove  one  of  the  important  difficulties 
.  in  which  the  question  is  involved.  For  example,  to  re- 
concile the  permission  of  One  e  vil  act  irrevocably  de- 
termining for  the  rest  of  his  hfe  the  destiny  of  the  in- 
dividual who  commits  it — to  reconcile  this  with  the  ho- 
liness of  God,  is  still  more  difficult  than  to  reconcile 
with  it  the  permission  of  such  sins,  from  which  conver- 
sion to  ti  better  state  always  remains  possible,  and  in 
which  actual  regeneration  is  not  excluded. 

In  reference  to  the  unity  and  connexion  of  the 
universe,  however,  and  in  regard  to  the  infringement  of 
the  course  of  nature  apprehended  from  freedom,  it  is 
conceded,  indeed,  that  that  eternal  act,  being  antecedent 
to  all  phenomena,  could  not  effect  any  interruption  in  their 
order.  But  still,  since  the  acts  of  each  individual  first 
come  to  be  manifested  in  the  progress  of  natural  events,  if 
the  difficulty  respecting  the  infringement  of  universal  or- 
der have  full  and  perfect  validity  under  other  circum- 
stances, why  would  not  the  course  of  nature  be  des- 
troyed or  interrupted  by  the  manifestation  of  free  acts, 
originating  from  a  freedom  that  was  before  all  time  ? 
If  that  intelligible  acting  was  absolutely  free,  it  must 
without  question  be  assumed  that  from  eternity  every 
phenomenon  of  freedom  was  brought  into  the  most 
strict  accordance  with  the  course  of  nature,  and  the  lat- 
ter with  the  former,  by  means  of  a  predetermined  har- 
mony ;  so  that  on  such  a  supposition,  the  Determiner 
of  events  in  this  government  of  the  world  would  not 


106 

properly  have  been  the  will  of  God,  but  rather  the 
good  or  evil  acts  of  men.  But  according  to  this  re- 
presentation the  Creator  would  appear  to  be  dependent 
upon  the  creature.  And  it  is  altogether  more  conceiv- 
able, and  probable,  that  God  should  govern  the  w^orld 
by  imposing  upon  himself  that  limitation  which  we 
have  defended,  and  by  giving  to  beings  actually  free 
a  circle  of  action  in  which  they  might  move  without 
constraint,  than  to  imagine  that  the  only  end  of  crea- 
tion should  have  been  the  manifestation  of  those  intelli- 
gible acts  which  can  never  more  be  changed.  The 
objections,  finally,  which  are  commonly  urged  against 
freedom  from  the  fore-knowledge  of  God,  apply  with 
equal  force  against  that  oft  named  hypothesis.  If 
Divine  fore-knowledge  be  one  and  the  same  with  pre- 
determination, and  if  it  be  irreconcileable  with  free- 
dom ;  then  this  objection,  if  it  have  any  force  when 
urged  against  the  freedom  of  empirical  actions,  destroys 
that  also  of  the  intelligible  acts.  For  God  must  al- 
ways be  thought  of  as  the  First  of  all,  and  consequent- 
ly we  must  suppose  that  he  was  in  reality  anterior  to 
that  intelligible  act  of  man,  and  therefore  foresaw  it. 
If,  however,  this  act  be  made  co-eternal  with  God, 
then  indeed  he  could  neither  have  foreseen  nor  prede- 
termined it ;  but  then  on  such  a  supposition  there  would 
arise  a  series  of  other,  and  much  greater  difficulties, 
which  do  not  here  seem  to  demand  any  particular  in- 
vestigation. 

The  author  of  this  essay  feels  unwilling  to  express 
anything  determinately  upon  the  question,  whether  the 


co-existence  of  the  Divine  fore-knowftogaovith  l>uraan 
freedom,  can  be  made  perfectly  intellig^TfTto  TBe  un- 
derstanding; but  would  only  say,  as  at  the  beginning, 
that  the  proposition  in  general  seems  to  belong  to  the  in- 
finite. Still;  however,  as  no  circumscribing  limit  is  placed 
upon  the  inquiry  by  this  concession,  so  also  human 
freedom  would  not  be  deprived  of  its  sphere  of  action, 
even  though  it  were  in  a  manner  conceded  that  its  con- 
nexion with  any  other  idea  could  not  be  fully  compre- 
hended by  the  understanding.     That  which  from  the 
other  grounds  is  sufficiently  certain,  does  not  become 
impossible,  even  though  on  comparison  with  other  indi- 
vidual truths  it  may  appear  paradoxical.     Even  the  idea 
of  God  is  by  no  means  one  of  ordinary  comprehensible- 
ness,  yet  it  is  always  accompanied  with  the  assurance 
of  unquestionable  certainty.     And  generally,  it  is  in 
the  domain  of  eternal  truths,  where  the  most  wonder- 
ful  paradoxes  are  found  as  in  the  proper  place  ;  yet 
those  truths  do  not  on  account  of  these  paradoxes,  lose 
any  thing  whatever  of  their  certainty  or  influence.  The 
acts  of  Divine  cognition  and  of  thought  are,  without 
doubt,  something  very  different  from  what  these  words 
express  in  the  ordinary  language  of  men.     So  also  if 
any  one  would  speak  of  the  knowledge  of  God  accquir- 
ed  by  conceptions  and  logical  deductions,  the  expres- 
sions would  have  to  be  taken  in  an  entirely  figurative 
sense.    For  the  supreme  Reason  which  lives  in  the  eter- 
nal beholding  of  the  universe  needs  no  conceptions  ;  be- 
cause conceptions  are  but  shadows  of  their  essential  equi- 
valents, and  necessary  only  on  account  of  the  poverty  and 


108 

imperfectness  of  human  intuitions.  Still  less  does  it 
stand  in  need  of  logical  conclusions,  which  proceed 
solely  from  the  effort  to  widen  the  circumscribed  lim- 
its of  human  insight.  In  the  same  manner  we  cannot 
speak  of  God  as  having  memory,  or  a  recollection  of 
events  that  are  past,  for  with  him  nothing  can  pass 
away ;  and  for  a  like  reason  we  cannot,  in  its  liter- 
al sense,  ascribe  to  him  a  fore-knowledge  of  the  future, 
because  Eternity  has  no  future.  Without  attempting 
to  relieve  ourselves  from  embarrassment  by  asserting 
that  time,  viewed  from  its  loftiest  stand- point,  is  noth- 
ing, (since  we  do  not  utter  a  proposition  without  meaning 
when  we  say  that  things  are  temporal,)  yet  thus  much 
is  clear,  that  with  God  time  cannot  be  the  same  as 
it  is  in  relation  to  things,  and  that  therefore  we  must 
conceive  of  the  Divine  fore-knowledge  in  a  manner 
entirely  different  from  that  in  which  we  are  accustomed 
to  view  the  things  of  time  : — provided,  however,  that 
nothing  inappropriate  or  contradictory  be  connected 
with  this  form  of  thought. 

The  common  conception  of  prescience,  as  the  fore- 
knowledge of  that  which  is  to  take  place  in  future  time, 
is  merely  a  human  notion,  resting  upon  the  ground  of  the 
limited  and  the  finite,  whose  character  is  succession ;  and 
consequently  it  can  in  this  manner  by  no  means  be  pre- 
dicated of  God.  As  Omnipresence  is  not  material  and 
does  not  occupy  space,  so  also  fore-knowledge  must  be 
conceived  of  as  not  successive  or  temporal.  God's 
knowledge  of  what  is  in  man  cannot  be  a  knowledge 
acquired  gradually  in  the  way  of  learning ;  it  must  be 


109 

an  intellectual  intuition  of  human  life  as  a  whole. 
We  now  acquire  our  knowledge  in  a  fragmentary 
manner,  but  we  hope  that  hereafter,  face  to  face,  we 
shall,  by  immediate  intuition,  know  even  as  we  are 
known,  that  is,  as  we  are  known  to  God,  in  whose  un- 
derstanding our  life  must  be  delineated  as  a  whole,  not 
separately  in  itself  alone,  but  all  its  relations  taken  in 
connexion  with  the  whole  universe.  All  things  pre- 
sent themselves  as  they  are  in  their  essential  nature  to 
the  contemplation  of  God,  and  man  also  every  mo- 
ment stands  before  Him  as  that  which  he  really  is. 
Our  form  of  thought  being  so  intimately  connected 
with  succession,  we  seek  to  render  this  intelligible  by 
representing  it  as  fore-knowledge  ;  but  in  reference  to 
God  himself  it  can  neither  be  designated  as  fore-seeing 
nor  as  predetermining,  but  as  an  eternal  changeless  act 
of  Knowing,  as  an  ever  present,  clear  insight  into  the 
life  and  connexion  of  all  things. 

The  question.  How  can  it  be  that  this  Divine  in- 
tuition does  not  determine  the  life  of  man  in  such  a 
manner  that  predetermination  alone  remains,  but  no 
liberty  ?— is  essentially  one  and  the  same  with  that 
which  has  already  been  discussed — that  of  the  relation 
between  God  and  man,  which  permits  personal  free- 
dom to  co-exist  with  a  state  of  dependency.  For 
such  an  individualizing  and  separating  of  the  act  of 
thinking  and  the  act  of  willing,  of  knowing  and  of  being, 
as  human  abstraction  has  derived  from  experience,  can- 
not for  one  moment  be  supposed  to  exist  in  the  Divine 
Life,  which  excludes  all  parts  and  fragments.  The 
10 


no 

eternally  Present  stood  in  no  need  either  of  fore-know- 
ledge or  predetermination  in  order  that  the  Divine 
wisdom  might  not  err  in  regard  to  man. — Finally  ;  it 
appears  to  us  that  when  the  relation  of  a  free  spirit  to 
the  Divine  Spirit  is  the  subject  of  discourse,  concep- 
tions entirely  inappropriate  to  this  domain  are  too  fre- 
quently employed — such  conceptions,  namely,  as  are 
abstracted  from  a  consideration  of  the  physical  world, 
and  the  co-operation  of  material  powers.  But  as  spirit- 
ual presence,  so  spiritual  agency,  is,  in  its  nature,  not 
fitted  to  jar  with  or  exclude  other  spirits.  True,  in- 
deed, two  or  more  bodies  cannot  at  the  same  moment 
of  time  fill  the  same  point  in  space,  nor  can  they  move 
on  the  same  line  without  striking  against  each  other. 
But  all  those  laws  lose  their  force  when  attempted  to 
be  transferred  to  a  supersensuous  world.  Thoughts  and 
sentiments  the  most  diverse,  nay  even  the  most  contra- 
dictory, may  exist  in  reference  to  one  and  the  same  ob- 
ject at  one  and  the  same  time,  without  any,  even  the 
least  infringement  resulting  thence  to  the  spiritual  self- 
subsistence,  or  uninterrupted  freedom  of  different  indi- 
viduals. Those  phenomena  of  infringement  and  inter- 
ruption can  occur  only  under  the  condition  of  space, 
and  existence  in  dimensions,  under  which  circumstances 
there  may,  indeed,  a  multitude  of  possible  bodily  colli- 
sions result  from  matter  and  its  impenetrability ;  and 
hence  bodies  moving  in  different  directions,  if  they 
meet  in  the  same  point,  must  necessarily  interrupt  or 
destroy  each  other's  motion.  Were  the  relation  of  the 
human  spirit  to  Ood  to  be  judged  of  according  to  these 


Ill 

laws,  then  the  conclusion  to  be  deduced  from  them 
would  be  very  plain  and  easily  to  be  formed  ;  but  by  so 
doing  the  spiritual  would  be  transferred  from  its  own 
sphere  into  one  to  which  it  does  not  at  all  belong, 
namely,  from  the  domain  of  the  spiritual  into  that  of 
the  physical  and  mechanical.^ 

1  These  remarks  deserve  to  be  thoughtfully  considered. 
May  not  all  our  contradictions  in  philosophy  spring  from  the 
attempt  to  bring  down  to  the  comprehension  of  the  Under- 
standing those  truths  which  appropriately  belong  to  the  do- 
main of  pure  Reason  .^  And  are  not  many  led  to  reject 
with  scorn  the  mysteries  of  our  Holy  Religion,,  as  contra- 
dictious and  absurd,  from  the  fact  that  some  of  its  friends 
have  attempted  to  embody  in  logical  propositions  and  under 
the  forms  of  conception,  those  truths  which  are  appropriate 
only  to  intuition  and  to  faith  ?  The  difficulties  above  notic- 
ed are  not  confined  to  Metaphysics  and  Theology.  They 
are  found  equally  in  Physics  and  Mathematics.  The  sub- 
joined extracts,  taken  from  the  Philosophical  Collection  of 
the  learned  Dr.  Henry  More,  will  serve  to  illustrate  the  prin- 
ciple alluded  to. 

*^If  the  difficulty  of  framing  a  conception  of  a  thing  must 
take  away  the  existence  of  the  thing  itself,  there  will  be  no 
such  thing  as  hody  left  in  the  world,  and  then  all  will  be  spi- 
rit^ or  nothing.  For  who  can  frame  so  safe  a  notion  of  a 
hody,  as  to  free  himself  from  the  entanglements  that  the  ex- 
tension thereof  will  bring  along  with  it  7  Fpr  this  extended 
matter  consists  of  either  indivisble  points,  or  of  particles  di- 
visible in  inJinUum,  Take  which  of  these  you  will,  (and  you 
can  find  no  third,)  you  will  be  wound  into  the  most  notori- 
ous absurdities  that  may  be.     For  if  you  say  it  consists  of 


112 

It  were  an  entirely  different  question,  though  nearly 
allied  to  the  one  last  under  consideration,  to  ask  wheth- 

points,  from  this  position  I  can  necessarily  demonstrate  that  eve- 
ry spear  or  spire-steeple,  or  what  long  body  you  will,  is  as  thick  as 
it  is  long ;  that  the  tallest  cedar  is  not  so  high  as  the  lowest 
mushroom ;  and  that  the  moon  and  the  earth  are  so  near 
one  another  that  the  thickness  of  your  hand  will  not  go  be- 
twixt ;  that  rounds  and  squares  are  all  one  figure ;  that  even 
and  odd  numbers  are  equal  one  with  another ;  and  that  the 
clearest  day  is  as  dark  as  the  blackest  night.  And  if  you 
make  choice  of  the  other  member  of  the  disjunction,  your 
fancy  will  be  little  better  at  ease  ;  for  nothing  can  be  divisi- 
ble into  parts  it  has  not:  therefore  if  a  body  be  divisible  into 
infinite  parts,  it  has  infinite  extended  parts:  and  if  it  has  an 
infinite  number  of  extended  parts,  it  cannot  be  but  a  hard 
mystery  to  the  imagination  of  man,  that  infinite  extended 
parts  should  not  amount  to  one  whole  infinite  extension. 
And  thus  a  grain  of  mustard-seed  would  be  as  well  infinite- 
ly extended  as  the  whole  matter  of  the  Universe,  and  a  thou- 
sandth part  of  that  grain  as  well  as  the  grain  itself.  Which 
things  are  more  inconceivable  than  any  thing  in  the  notion 
of  a  spirit.  Therefore  we  are  not  scornfully  and  contemptu- 
ously to  reject  any  notion,  for  seeming  at  first  to  be  clouded 
and  obscured  with  some  difficulties  and  intricacies  of  con- 
ception ;  since  that  of  whose  being  we  seem  most  assured, 
is  the  most  entangled  and  perplexed  in  the  conceiving,  of 
any  thing  that  can  be  propounded  to  the  apprehension  of 
man."     Antidote  to  Atheism,  p.  14. 

"  Reason  attending  to  the  nature  of  an  exact  globe  and 
plane,  will  undoubtedly  pronounce  that  they  will  touch  in 
a  point,  and  that  they  may  be  moved  one  upon  another  ;  but 
our  imagination  cannot  but  make  this  exception,  that  the 


113 

er  the  freedom  of  the  human  will  can  in  general  co- 
exist with  the  regular  order  and  law-hondage  to  w^hich 
nature  is  subjected  ? — and  whether  the  former  would 
not  constantly  be  making  insufferable  interruptions  in 
the  latter  ? — Since  the  life  of  man  has  its  root  in  the 
Ground  of  nature  and  is  inwardly  conjoined  with  the 
same,  from  the  alleged  freedom  of  the  human  will 
there  follows  a  view  of  the  world  in  every  respect 
double,  and,  as  it  might  seem,  contradictory  too.  For 
according  to  this  representation  we  must  suppose  that 
within  the   hmits  of  one  and  the  same  universe,  there 

globe  thus  drawn  upon  the  plane  describes  a  line  which 
juust  necessarily  consist  of  points,  point  perpetually  follow- 
ing point  in  the  whole  description.  So  likewise  the  angle  of 
contact  included  betwixt  the  periphery  and  a  perpendicular 
falling  on  the  end  of  tlie  diameter  of  a  circle,  geometricians 
prove  by  Reason  to  be  less  than  any  acute  angle  whatso- 
«jver,  insomuch  that  a  line  cannot  fall  betwixt  the  periphery 
and  the  perpendicular :  whence  the /anr^i/ cannot  but  imag- 
ine this  angle  to  be  indivisible  ;  which  is  a  perfect  contradic- 
tion, and  against  the  definition  of  an  angle,  which  is  not  llie 
coincidence  hut  the  inclination  of  two  lines.  Besides,  a  lesser 
circle  inscribed  in  a  greater,  so  that  it  touches  in  one  point, 
through  which  let  there  be  drawn  the  common  diameter  of 
them  both,  and  then  let  fall  a  perpendicular  on  that  end  of 
the  diameter  where  the  circles  touch  ;  it  will  be  evident  that 
one  angle  of  contact  is  bigger  than  the  other,  when  yet  they 
are  both  indivisible  as  was  acknowledged  by  our  imagina- 
tion before  :  so  that  one  and  the  same  angle  will  be  both  di- 
visible and  indivisible,  which  is  a  plain  contradiction."  Ap- 
pendix to  the  same,  p.  15 J,  152.  Tr. 
10* 


114 

is  on  the  one  side  the  sternest  Necessity ,  in  the  most 
strictly  interlinked  series  of  causes  and  effects  ;  and  on 
the  other,  a  Freedom  from  the  law  of  this  necessary  con- 
secutive series.  If,  now,  in  this  two-fold  view  of  the 
world  there  be  involved  an  actual  and  inexplicable  con- 
tradiction, or  in  other  words,  if  we  are  obliged  to  con- 
cede in  conformity  with  what  has  hitherto  been  said, 
that  the  freedom  of  the  human  will  must  be  suppos- 
ed to  be  correspondent  to  the  will  of  a  personal  God, 
and  may  yet  run  counter  to  the  course  of  nature  regula- 
ted by  law — which  course  of  nature,  however,  is  also 
to  be  regarded  as  an  expression  of  the  Divine  Will — 
then  it  would  necessarily  follow  that  something — the 
freedom  of  the  human  will — may  at  the  same  time  be 
conformed  and  not  conformed  to  the  will  of  God. 
Should  any  one,  in  order  to  avoid  this  startling  con- 
tradiction, wish  to  give  up  either  the  necessary  confor- 
mity of  nature  to  law,  or  the  freedom  of  the  human  will, 
then  indeed  the  question  would  be  quickly  settled  ; — ' 
but  certainly  not  to  the  satisfaction  of  science,  in  whose 
domain  those  victories  most  easily  achieved  are  not  al- 
ways the  most  glorious. 

In  the  higher  realm  of  thought,  the  immediate  and 
direct  problem  for  speculation  is  not  to  reject  one  of 
two  apparently  contradictious  truths,  but  frequently 
this  more  difficult  problem,  viz.  without  the  rejection 
of  one  or  the  other,  to  change  their  dissonance  into  har- 
mony. In  the  case  before  us  it  is  impossible  not  to 
perceive  that  such  a  demand  is  made  directly  upon  our 
reason,  because  that  grounds  of  equal  importance  de- 
termine us  to  hold  fast  both :  i.  e.  we  must  believe  in 


115 

a  fixed  order  and  necessary  connexion  in  nature,  since 
otherwise  neither  a  science  of  nature,  nor  the  possibili- 
ty of  seeking  or  finding  God  in  it,  would  remain  to  man  ; 
but  at  the  same  time  also,  we  must  maintain  the  self- 
subsistence  of  the  human  will,  for  without  this  there 
could  be  neither  true  morality,  nor  veneration  for  God  as 
a  holy  Being.  But  the  thought  which  naturally  arises 
upon  close  examination — the  thought  that  the  same 
Divine  will  which  is  a  will  to  nature,  is  also  a  will  to 
the  personality  and  self-subsistence  of  better  creatures, — 
makes  an  absolute  contradiction  between  spiritual  free- 
dom and  the  physical  arrangement  of  the  world  actual- 
ly inconceivable.  If  creation  be  not  in  general  a  ma- 
chine, but  an  ascending  series  of  powers  organically  de- 
veloped, then  it  is  impossible  to  understand  how  reci- 
procal interruption  could  take  place,  or  how  irreconcile- 
able  dissension  could  reign  between  powers  of  a  lower 
order  and  that  higher  point  of  developement  on  which 
man  is  placed.  That  energy  which  pervades  and  ani- 
mates the  rest  of  nature  is  no  foreign  power  hostile  to 
spirit.  If  we  are  correct  in  calling  this  creation  a 
creation  of  God,  we  indicate  by  the  expression  some- 
thing more  than  a  mere  fabric  which  he  has  constructed 
and  framed  together  from  one  knows  not  how  many 
different  materials, — a  machine  which  he  has  now  left 
to  regulate  its  own  movements ; — we  rather  mean  by  it 
a  manifestation  and  a  realizing  of  the  Divine  thoughts.^ 

^  Hooker  seems  to  have  entertained  views  not  essentially 
different :  "  All  things  which  Grod  in  their  times  and  seasons 
hath  brought  forth,  were   eternally  and  before  all  times  in 


/ 


116 

Yet  the  Divine  thoughts  thus  reahzed  do  not  at 
first  indeed,  nor  at  once,  as  by  one  bound,  exhibit 
themselves  under  the  highest  and  most  spiritual  forms ; 
but  starting  from  the  basis  they  rise  after  a  fit  and  reg- 
ular mode  in  an  ascending  order,  and  in  this  manner 
they  proceed  through  every  link  of  the  series,  not 
merely  according  to  the  notional  representations  of 
men,  but  in  a  manner  actually  creative.  In  this  way  " 
every  step  of  the  ascending  system  becomes  distin- 
guished by  some  peculiar  formation.  Hence  also  ev- 
ery creature,  although  at  first  view  it  appears  only 
as  a  finite  individuality,  yet  for  the  thoughtful  in- 
quirer carries  within  it  somewhat  of  the  character  of 
infinity.  It  is  not  matter,  (a  word  which  conveys  little 
or  no  meaning,)  but  Will  and  active  Power,  which  ul- 
timately constitute   the  true   essence  of  nature  also ; 

God,  as  a  work  unbegun  is  in  the  artificer  which  afterwards 
brjngeth  it  into  effect.  [The  comparison  cannot  be  carried 
out  to  the  extreme  in  all  respects;  for  in  the  latter  case  the 
artificer  has  the  material  provided  ready  to  his  hand,  hut  in 
the  formef  case  the  Material,  as  well  as  the  Form,  was  abso- 
lutely dependent  upon  God.]  Therefore  whatsoever  we  do 
behold  now  in  this  present  world,  it  was  enwrapped  within 
the  bowels  of  the  Divine  Mercy,  written  in  the  book  of  Eter- 
nal Wisdom,  and  held  in  the  hands  of  Omnipotent  Power, 
the  first  foundations  of  the  world  being  as  jet  unlaid.  So 
that  all  things  which  God  hath  made  are  in  that  respect  the 
offspring  of  God,  they  are  in  him  as  effects  in  their  highest 
cause  ;  he  likewise  actually  is  in  them,  the  assistance  and  in- 
Jluence  of  his  Deity  is  their  lifey     Eccles.  Pol.  B.  V.     Tr. 


117 

and  the  so  called  bodily  or  material  things  are  nothing 
else  than  a  deeply  depressed,  and  thereby  concealed 
and  misapprehended  spiritual  being. 

One  cannot  say  that  any  where  in  nature  life 
ceases  or  begins  ;  ^  there  is  every  where  found — as  a 
mark  of  the  spirit's  presence — an  energy  and  forma- 
tive power.  These  active  forces  are,  however,  fre- 
quently concealed,  and  in  a  state  of  confinement.  To- 
gether with  many  serene  and  glorious  appearances  in 
nature,  there  are  at  the  same  time  spread  over  creation 
traces  of  lowliness  and  pensive  sorrow  ; — that  depres- 
sion which  operates  silently  in  hidden  depths,  and  nev- 
er becomes  visible  to  man  ;  and  that  sadness  which, 
with  inward  mourning,  feels  the  want  of  a  still  higher 
freedom,  and  which  sometimes,  as  it  were  with  con- 
vulsive throes,  dilates  its  ancient  bonds  and  strives  to 
burst  them.  Where  do  we  not  see  betrayed,  as  if  un- 
intentionally, that  inward  principle  of  activity  which 
gives  the  lie  to  all  opinions  of  a  merely  outward  and 

^  Locke  expands  the  same  sentiment  in  the  following 
language.  "  It  is  a  hard  matter  to  say  where  sensible  and 
rational  begin,  and  where  insensible  and  irrational  end  ;  and 
who  is  there  quick-sighted  enougk  to  determine  precisely, 
which  is  the  lowest  species  of  living  things,  and  which  is 
the  first  of  those  who  have  no  life  ?  Things,  as  far  as  we 
can  observe,  lessen  and  augment,  as  the  quantity  does  in  a 
regular  cone,  where,  though  there  be  a  manifest  odds  betwixt 
the  bigness  of  the  diameter  at  a  remote  distance,  yet  the 
difference  between  the  upper  and  under,  where  they  touch 
one  another,  is  hardly  discernible."     Tr. 


118 

artificial  world — a  world  which  is  inanimate  and  has 
nothing  kindred  to  spirit  ?  You  will  say  that  nature  is 
dead  ; — for  you,  then,  all  the  mighty  piles  of  moun- 
tains are  but  inert  masses.  Yet  they  send  up  wit- 
nesses of  their  life  in  every  fountain,  and  in  their  won- 
derful strata  of  rocks  and  minerals.  Thus  in  those 
subterraneous  regions  the  active  spirit  of  the  earth  pur- 
sues its  labour  with  unheard  but  ceaseless  energy,  and 
when  man  penetrates  thither  he  finds  the  work  already 
performed.  Yet  the  forming  process  and  the  labourer 
he  sees  not ;  no  whispering  sound  of  their  operation 
ever  reaches  his  ear. 

But  notwithstanding  this  profound  repose,  we  still 
have  evidences  of  an  inward  striving ;  and  on  the  con- 
templation of  these  powers  strictly  bound,  there  invol- 
untarily arises  in  the  reflecting  mind  a  feeling  that  this 
confined  life  may  yet  at  some  future  time  break 
through  the  covering  which  now  envelopes  it.  This 
is  especially  the  case  when  that  hardness  and  rigidity 
of  form,  which  is  frequently  deemed  the  most  essential 
of  all  things,  vanishes  as  something  unreal :  and  on  the 
contrary  the  so  called  inert  masses  dissolve  into  bright 
activity,  and  an  active  power  not  in  the"  least  antici- 
pated manifests  itself  throughout  nature  as  it  lies  sup- 
pressed beneath  our  feet.  In  some  particular  phe- 
nomena there  is  evinced,  not  only  the  possibility,  but 
the  actualness  of  such  an  effort  of  struggling  powers, 
when  the  painful  continuance  of  the  creature  is  no  lon- 
ger tolerable,  and  it  attempts  a  disseverance  of  the  an- 
cient bond ;    as,  for  example,  in  earthquakes  and  vol- 


119 

canoes,  the  mute  power  that  had  for  years  been  held 
in  bondage,  begms  to  roar  from  its  depth  and  call 
aloud  for  freedom.  This  energetic  striving  of  rigid 
powers,  which,  as  if  tormented  by  their  bondage  to 
the  earthly,  aspire  after  perfection,  is  not  the  less  per- 
ceptible upon  a  higher  scale  of  organic  nature's  devel- 
opement,  and  is  therefore  hfere  presupposed  as  ac- 
knowledged. Even  man,  pious  and  enlightened 
though  he  may  be,  is  yet,  whilst  on  earth,  subject  to 
the  destiny  of  a  creature  ;  and  he  too,  as  if  interwoven 
with  the  life  of  nature  and  borne  down  with  frailties,  is 
often  inwardly  moved  with  anxious  longing  after  deliv- 
erance from  this  bondage.  But  man  differs  from  the 
lower  nature  in  this,  that  standing  between  the  phe- 
nomenal and  supersensuous  v;orlds,  he  is  still  as  a  nat- 
ural being  elevated  to  bright  spiritual  consciousness, 
and  is  even  here  already  made  a  participant  of  moral 
freedom  ;  so  that  both  the  Divine  and  the  earthly  are 
at  the  same  time  combined  in  one  person,  and  he  sus- 
tains towards  God  the  double  relation  of  a  child  and  of 
a  creature  absolutely  dependent. 

But  since  things  are  so,  it  may  be  asked,  How 
should  hostility  and  contradiction  exist  between  man 
and  the  rest  of  nature  ?  It  would  seem  rather  that 
nature  aspires  upward  to  the  state  of  man,  or  longs  to 
be  placed  in  a  condition  similar  to  his,  whence  arises  a 
relation  of  harmony  rather  than  of  discord  :  so  that  it 
is  not  possible  for  nature  itself  to  stand  in  contradiction 
to  freedom,  that  is,  to  the  highest  attribute  which  can 
be  possessed  v/ithin  the  limits  of  creation. 


120 

But  nature  itself  being  unfree,  it  is  alleged  that  it 
cannot  at  least  afford  to  the  free  will  any  sphere  of  ac- 
tion within  the  limits  of  its  domain. — If  by  the  asser- 
tion it  is  only  meant  that  man  cannot  destroy  or  inter- 
rupt the  entire  course  of  nature,  nor  abrogate  those 
laws  under  which  it  was  created,  but  that  he  himself 
is  rather  on  his  part  also  bound  to  the  fixed  order  and 
connexion  of  powers  interlinked  with  each  other,  and 
that  consequently  the  laws  imposed  upon  creation  by 
a  higher  tribunal  are  inviolable  :  all  this  must  be  ac- 
knowledged as  unquestionably  true.  But  surely  by 
the  term  Freedom  of  the  Will,  no  one  ever  seriously 
understood  an  unbounded  power  of  controlling  the 
laws  of  the  world,  or  maintained  that  the  will  possess- 
ed an  absolute  dominion  over  nature.  Such  a  power 
would  exalt  the  creature  to  the  place  of  the  Creator, 
and  instead  of  a  careful  and  rational  investigation  of 
nature,  those  magic  arts  forbidden  to  man  would  be 
universally  introduced. 

But  if  the  objection  implies  that  nothing  whatever 
can  act  in  nature  except  a  stern  necessity,  and  that 
therefore  a  self-subsistent  personal  life  is  not  at  all  ad- 
missible without  prejudice  to  her  laws,  and  that  every 
actual  manifestation  of  free  will  must  be  an  impossibili- 
ty ; — then  we  deny  all  this,  because  that  up  to  the 
present  moment  at  least  not  a  shadow  of  proof  has 
ever  been  adduced  to  establish  the  proposition  thus  de- 
fined. He  who  would  maintain  such  a  position  must 
in  the  first  place  show — not  that  things  phenomenal, 
of  a  lower  order  in  the  scale  of  existence,  are  unfree. 


121 

which  no  one  denies — but  that  no  free  being  can  find 
place  above  them,  and  that  the  moral  freedom  of  a 
higher  class  of  beings,  standing  upon  the  summit  of 
nature,  cannot  possibly  consist  with  its  fixed  arrange- 
ment. It  is  not  at  all  contradictory  to  suppose  that 
upon  the  highest  point  of  developement  there  should  be 
found  somewhat  which  could  not  be  manifested  upon 
a  lower  point ;  and  the  less  contradictory  will  this  ap^ 
pear  in  reference  to  freedom,  if,  (as  is  in  fact  the  case,) 
it  must  be  assumed  that  spirit  and  freedom,  which  are 
first  actualized  in  man,  constitute  the  essential  being  of 
nature  also.  But  notwithstanding  that  the  essence  of 
nature  must  ultimately  be  resolved  into  spirit  and  free- 
dom, we  must  still  bear  in  mind  that  in  these  lower  or- 
ders they  lie  circumscribed  and  buried,  making  known 
their  existence  and  presence  only  in  numberless  at- 
tempted formations,  as  in  dark  strivings  and  desires  ; 
so  that  they  cannot  be  seen  in  their  absolute  form  at 
the  base,  but  are  realized  at  the  apex  only.  On  the 
other  hand-,  it  w^ould  be  very  strange,  and  contradictory 
to  the  law  of  progressive  formation,  if  upon  the  highest 
and  most  perfect  point  of  developement  there  were 
found  nothing  which  is  not  also  to  be  met  with  at  the 
first  step  of  the  same  ;  and  if  the  creation,  thus  always 
remaining  in  an  incipient  state,  although  deriving  its 
origin  from  will  and  spirit,  should  yet  never  in  any  of 
its  forms  attain  to  spirit  and  will.  These  last  named 
powers,  spirit  and  will,  do  not  indeed  belong  to  a  se- 
ries of  things  sensuously  developed,  they  are  rather  in 
their  nature  above  sense,  they  spring  from  the  Super-^ 
11 


122 

sensuous,  but  first  make  their  appearance  in  the  circle 
of  phenomenal  nature. 

No  one  has  ^^et  proved  that  the  agency  of  super- 
sensuous  powers  is  irreconcileable  with  the  course  of 
sensuous  things  controled  by  natural  law.  On  the 
contrary  it  might  be  satisfactorily  shown  that  it  is  only 
through  the  constant  influence  of  a  supersensuous  pow- 
er, through  the  unceasing  influx  of  a  higher  life,  that 
the  whole  phenomenal  world  has  its  existence  and 
maintains  its  continuance  in  being.  Belief  in  God,  in 
his  being  the  Creator  and  Governour  of  the  world,  im- 
plies nothing  else  than  a  belief  that  the  phenomenal 
world  is  sustained  and  interpenetrated  by  a  power  that 
is  above  sense.  To  say  that  the  influences  of  spi- 
rit and  will  upon  nature  would  universally  produce  ef- 
/  fects  destructive  of  it,  and  in  opposition  to  its  law  of 
/  order,  is  the  same  as  to  explain  that  vital  principle 
which  pervades  and  animates  creation,  to  be  this  same 
destroying  principle.  Evidently  that  which  is  here 
true  of  the  all-powerful  Spirit,  or  the  universal  Will, 
(namely,  that  its  agency  and  influence  do  not  interrupt 
the  course  of  nature,)  must  be  still  more  true  when  ap- 
plied to  the  limited  action  of  finite  spirits  that  are  free. 
And  it  has  already  been  shown  that  a  relation  of  de- 
pendency upon  God,  and  in  a  certain  sense  upon 
nature  also,  may  be  consistently  reconciled  with  this 
attribute  of  finite  freedom. 

But  it  may  here  be  asked  in  turn.  What  kind  of 
representation  then  lies  at  the  foundation  of  that  view 
of  nature  and  creation,  which  assumes  it  as  an  irapossi- 


123 

bility  that  there  should  be  in  them  any  manifestation  of 
free  will  ?  None  other  than  that  of  a  lifeless  machine, 
of  a  compacted  structure  framed  from  rigid  and  inert 
masses,  and  dove-tailed  together :  it  has  for  its  basis 
the  conception  of  some  Thing,  which,  (though  it  first 
becomes  so  indeed,  through  artificially  invented  predi- 
cates,) is  totally  and  absolutely  heterogeneous  to  spirit. 
Yet  it  can  scarcely  be  denied  that  an  entirely  different 
view  is  far  more  worthy  of  acceptation.  Notwith- 
standing all  its  apparent  inflexibleness  and  impenetra- 
bility, nature  is  still  throughout  open  to  higher  influen- 
ces,— even  to  the  influences  of  spirit.  But  since  God 
can  work  in  it  and  control  its  movements,  therefore  the 
less  is  to  be  apprehended  for  the  order  of  the  whole 
from  the  influence  and  working  of  free  man ;  and  un- 
der these  relations  the  world's  laws  must  ever  continue 
to  remain  inviolate  and  inviolable.  Besides,  we  never 
in  reality  meet  with  that  chasm,  which,  (only  in  con- 
sequence of  arbitrary  conceptions,  however,)  has  fre- 
quently been  supposed  to  exist  between  nature  and 
freedom  ;  and  which  has  been  represented  as  eternally 
separating,  and  rendering  inaccessible  to  each  other,  the 
world  of  spirits  and  the  world  of  material  things  so  called. 
Even  universal  experience  shows  what  is  to  be  regarded 
as  true  In  reference  to  the  pretended  rigidity  and  hardness 
of  natural  things.  Those  things  which  are  most  unyield- 
ing and  rigid,  are  always  at  the  same  time  the  weakest 
and  most  unsubstantial;  whilst  those  which  are  more  re- 
fined, and  approximate  nearer  to  the  spiritual,  approve 
themselves  as  the  most  powerful  and  essential  qualities 


134 

in  nature,  and  hold  dominion  over  that  which  is  more 
gross.  Hither  are  to  be  referred  those  principles 
which  in  physics  are  figuratively,  though  not  inappo- 
sitely,  called  spirits  ;  and  which,  notwithstanding  that 
they  are  so  volatile,  yet  overcome  and  dissolve  such 
materials  as  seem  most  insoluble.  To  the  same  class  are 
to  be  reckoned  the  so  called  imponderable  materials, 
which,  although  to  the  common  observation  they  seem  tri- 
fling and  unimportant,  yet  constitute,  in  fact,  the  very  life 
and  energy  of  nature.  This  being  the  case,  we  may  with 
correctness  say  that  the  actualized  spirit,  the  spirit  as 
it  exists  in  man,  is  in  every  respect  more  powerful  and 
more  essential  than  those  spirits  which  are  such  in 
name  only.  That  nature,  then,  which  affords  a  theatre 
of  action  to  the  latter,  cannot  exclude  the  former ;  and 
in  the  system  of  the  Universe,  through  which  the 
beam  of  light  finds  its  way,  there  may  also  be  opened 
a  passage  for  the  free  spirit  without  introducing  any 
confusion  or  derangement. 

It  is  evident  that  the  phenomenon  of  light  is  al- 
ready to  be  regarded  as  the  entrance  of  a  higher  potency 
into  the  corporeal  world  ;  and  hence  a  remarkable  an- 
alogy— an  analogy  frequently  observed — nay  even  a 
certain  homogeneous  relation  between  it  and  the 
spirit,  cannot  be  denied.  As  the  whole  corporeal 
world  is  first  unfolded  to  our  view  through  the  agency 
of  immaterial  light ;  so,  in  a  certain  sense,  it  is  the 
supernatural  will  of  the  spirit  which  first  renders  it 
possible  for  us  to  take  a  rational  view  of  nature.  As 
the  herald  of  spirit,  light  entered  already  into  the  first 


125 

creation,  to  make  nature,  yet  void  and  waste,  suscep- 
tible of  higher  formations,  and  to  prepai:e  it  for  the 
future  arrival  of  the  spirit.  Throughout  the  whole 
phenomenal  world,  light  approves  itself  as  the  symbol 
and  forerunner  of  the  Will.  For  as  the  former  pervades 
space  without  filHng  it,  as  it  oftentimes  disports  in  bright 
appearances  with  the  hardest  and  most  inflexible  bodies, 
and,  almost  as  though  they  were  not  present,  swiftly 
pierces  through  such  substances  as  yield  no  entrance 
to  the  finest  material  air ;  so  also  many  facts  have  been 
presented  of  those  higher  influences  of  Will  upon  the 
corporeal  world,  which,  although  they  did  not  derange 
the  order  of  nature,  are  not  yet  to  be  referred  to  the 
laws  of  dark  and  ponderable  matter.  This  inbreaking 
of  light  as  a  higher  potency  upon  the  material  world  is 
now  admitted  as  a  daily  phenomenon,  and  there  has 
long  been  an  agreement  upon  it  in  the  theory  of  nature. 
Only  in  so  far  as  it  was  necessary  to  constitute  a  science 
of  light,  is  it  subject  to  the  laws  which  were  imposed 
upon  the  rest  of  the  material  world.  But  as  optics  are 
not  to  be  given  up  because  it  is  not  possible  to  explain 
from  the  ordinary  views  of  matter  what  transparency  is ; 
so  also  the  doctrines  and  the  hopes  grounded  upon  the 
assumption  of  freedom  are  to  be  held  fast,  even  though 
many  questions  should  remain  unanswered  in  regard  to 
the  possibility  of  a  free  will's  shining  through  and  illu- 
minating the  system  of  nature. 

And  what  then  were  moral  feeling,  virtue,  and  ex- 
pected recompense, — what  were  the  most  holy  faith,  and 
the  noblest  efforts  of  humanity ,-without  that  illuminatioq 
11* 


126 

of  the  free  will  in  nature,  and  without  that  beam  of  the 
spirit,  ofttimes  though  broken  by  an  opposing  power  ? 
A  higher  life  universally  pervades  the  visible  creation, 
and  breaks  out  from  it,  as  it  were  before  our  eyes.  In 
every  lofty  thought,  in  every  virtuous  resolve,  there 
takes  place  in  the  midst  of  nature  somewhat,  which,  as 
it  were,  enlightens  and  sanctifies  it ;  and  which  would 
be  incomprehensible  on  the  supposition  of  any  system 
of  mechanism,  even  though  it  were  called  heavenly. 
In  every  word  of  truth  that  is  uttered  the  supersensuous 
enters  into  the  world  ;  and  the  whole  language  of  man, 
by  which  the  spirit  is  continually  re-created  in  nature,^ 
is  a  very  ancient  and  holy  testimonial  of  its  better  de- 
scent— a  testimonial  hereditarily  transmitted  from  the 
first  creation. 

Those  varied  modes  of  the  spirit^s  manifestation 
upon  the  earth,and  especially  the  interpenetration  of  free- 
dom in  the  midst  of  necessity,  might,  perhaps,  be  denom- 
inated miraculous  in  so  far  as  the  laws  of  an  earthly 
nature  are  of  themselves  alone  not  sufficient  to  afford  an 
explanation.  Yet  because  these  physical  laws  are  not 
sufficient  to  afford  a  solution  of  such  manifestations, 
we  are  not  thence  obliged  to  deduce  the  impossibility 
of  a  spiritual  freedom  elevated  above  this  series  of  phe- 
nomena, nor  is  it  necessary  to  infer  that  there  are 
therefore  no  higher  grounds  of  explanation.  This 
holds  true  also  in   reference  to  an  actual  miracle,  lite- 

^  Speech  is  the  very  image  whereby  the  mind  and  soul 
of  the  speaker  conveyeth  itself  into  the  bosom  of  him  which 
heareth. 


127 

rally  so  called.  Human  freedom  is  not  a  miracle  in  the 
ultimate  strict  sense  of  the  word,  because  in  the  present 
ordinary  course  of  events  it  effects  no  changes  which 
are  difficult  of  explanation  ;  and  because  no  one  won- 
ders at  the  cases  of  its  daily  occurrence  which  are  so 
frequently  observed.  The  capability  of  the  will's  action 
might  be  called  miraculous  in  the  strictest  sense,  if,  by 
its  own  immediate  influence  it  were  able  so  to  modify 
the  course  of  nature,  that  by  its  own  direct  energy  phc" 
nomena  would  be  effected  in  it  contrary  to  the  ordi- 
nary current  of  events  as  known  to  us  from  long  contin- 
ued experience.  To  affirm  that  such  a  power  of  the 
spirit  over  the  sensible  world  is  in  itself  impossible, 
would  only  betray  an  ignorance  or  misapprehension  of 
both. 

From  the  position  that  nature  is  ultimately  anima- 
ted by  spiritual  and  moral  powers,  as  well  as  from  the 
idea  of  the  pure  will,  it  spontaneously  follows  that  in 
the  will  there  dwells  an  energy  of  acting  upon  nature 
which  cannot  be  estimated — a  power  of  acting  upon 
nature,  not  as  striving  against,  but  as  comprehended  in, 
and  hence  correspondent  to  the  will.  It  is  not  the 
visible  creation  directly  which  first  closes  itself  against 
the  spirit ;  but  the  energy  of  the  will  becomes  para- 
lyzed, the  vision  of  the  spirit  is  darkened,  and  thus 
true  living  cognition  becomes  as  it  were  dissipated. 
After  all  that  has  been  said  in  favour  of  the  position  we 
cannot  be  brought  to  persuade  ourselves  of  the  deep 
depravity  and  ruin  of  Creation  ;  and  least  of  all  can 
we  believe  that  nature  as  it  now  is — according  to  the 


128 

representations  of  some — 'is  almost  more  the  work  of 
the  Devil  than  of  God.  Without  wishing  to  deny 
that  in  many  particular  instances  there  is  found  much 
that  is  disagreeable  and  repulsive,  we  are  still  of  the 
opinion  that  the  chief  ground  of  the  unyielding  resist- 
ance by  which  the  sick  man  is  so  frequently  pressed 
down,  lies  less  in  nature  than  in  the  man  himself — in 
his  despondency  of  heart,  in  the  fluctuating  insight  of 
the  spirit,  and  in  the  powerlessness  of  a  will  not  free 
from  guilt. 

That  which  is  determined  with  an  energetic  will  in 
the  spirit  of  truth  and  purity,  is  determined  by  the  Spi- 
rit of  God ;  and  it  is  but  a  postulate  of  reason  to  as- 
sume that  nature  cannot  strive  against  such  a  will.  It 
was  on  this  account  that  Christ  was  a  worker  of  mira- 
cles, and  the  time  of  his  sojourn  upon  the  earth  was  a 
time  of  signs  and  wonders.  From  many  intimations 
one  might  be  led  to  suppose  that  the  momentary  in- 
terpretation of  the  idea,  and  the  dominion  of  the  spirit, 
were  a  derangement  not  to  be  tolerated,  nay,  as 
though  it  would  be  a  great  evil;  — but  such  is  not  the 
fact,  for  on  the  contrary  nature,  instead  of  suffering  vi- 
olence or  injury  from  it,  manifests  her  dignity  in  a 
miracle.  The  miracle  consists  in  this,  that  the  high- 
est energy  of  the  power  of  the  will  is  at  the  same  time 
an  act  of  reconciliation  between  the  Spirit  and  Nature  ; 
it  is  both  the  triumph  of  freedom  and  the  deliverance 
of  the  powers  of  nature  held  in  bondage  !  ^     The  more 

^  It  would  seem  that  the  performing  of  miracles  was  the 
natural  mode  of  the  Redeemer's  agency  ;   for  inasmuch  as 


129 

intimately  both  conceptions  are  conjoined, — that  of  free- 
dom and  that  of  miracles — and  the  more  powerfully  both 
energize  in  nature,  the  less  is  it  possible  to  think  anything 
satisfactory  of  the  first  without  being  borne  onward  to  the 
second,  and  the  more  certain  does  it  become  that  a  place 
is  due  to  both  in  the  philosophy  of  nature. 

Divine  powers  resided  in  him,  they  necessarily  gave  rise  to 
supernatural  phenomena.  Hence  it  is  that  we  cannot  adopt 
as  our  view  of  miracles  that  conception  which  represents 
them  as  suspensions  of  the  laws  of  nature.  If  we  receive 
the  biblical  representation  of  the  immanence  of  God  in  the 
world,  we  cannot  regard  the  laws  of  nature  as  mere  arbitrary 
and  mechanical  arrangements,  the  operation  of  which  can- 
not be  interrupted  except  by  some  invasion  from  without ;  but 
on  the  contrary  we  must  consider  them  all  as  ultimately  rest- 
ing upon  the  being  of  God.  Consequently,  those  phenome- 
na which  cannot  be  explained  either  from  known  or  un- 
known laws  as  developed  in  the  earthly  life,  must  not  there- 
fore be  regarded  as  opposed  to  law,  or  as  suspensions  of  the 
laws  of  nature.  These  are  themselves  rather  comprehended 
in  a  higher  whole  conformed  to  law ;  for  even  the  Heavenly 
and  the  Divine  constitute  the  essence  of  Law.  That,  there- 
fore, which  is  contrary  to  nature  is  opposed  to  God,  and  the 
true  miracle  is  only  a  higher  form  of  the  Natural  coming 
from  the  world  of  untroubled  harmony  and  shining  in  upon 
this  unharmonious  world.  Where  this  view  of  the  world 
is  retained  the  attempt  to  explain  miracles  from  natural  cau- 
ses must  be  rejected  as  evil ;  for  according  to  it  the  Miracu- 
lous,( taken  in  a  higher  sense,)  is  also  the  Natural,  and  the  Nat- 
ural, (commonly  so  called,)  is  the  Miraculous.  Olshausen's 
Bihlis,  Com,  B.  I.  s.  242,  243.  Views  corresponding  with 
these  may  be  seen  in  Heinroth's  Psychologic,    s,  632,     Tr, 


130 

But  notwithstanding  that  these  things  are  so,  yet 
the  performance  of  a  miracle,  or  even  the  will  to  per- 
form one,  cannot  be  the  determination  of  man,  nor  is 
that  the  immediate  end  of  moral  freedom.  By  means 
of  this  freedom  a  moral  relation  between  God  and  man 
is  rendered  possible,  and  it  is  imposed  upon  every  one 
as  his  first  and  prime  duty  to  realize  this  relation  in 
life  ;  wherefore  there  is  but  One  miracle  which  all 
should  endeavour  to  perform,  that,  namely,  of  effecting 
their  own  holiness  by  a  free  consecration  of  themselves 
to  God.  As  men  now  are,  the  more  frequent  bestowal 
of  the  gift  of  miracles  would  only  be  misused  to  dis- 
turb the  order  and  harmony  of  things  ;  and  the  world 
too,  in  and  over  which  the  Creator  reigns,  but  rarely 
stands  in  need  of  such  a  gift.  Hence  it  has  appeared 
seldom,  like  comets,  only  at  great  intervals  of  the 
world's  history  ;  whilst  moral  freedom,  as  indispensa- 
ble for  every  truly  human  being,  like  the  all-pervading 
light  of  the  sun,  illumines  every  day  of  our  earthly  ex- 
istence. Besides,  man  does  not  primarily  stand  in 
need  of  any  other  freedom  than  that  of  being  able  to 
act  upon  himself  and  to  determine  himself.  He  first  of 
all  demands  from  nature,  that  as  his  outward  existence  is 
under  her  control,  she  must  not  domineer  over  his  will; 
but  that  she  permit  him,  unfettered  by  her  iron  chain, 
with  his  inmost  self  to  look  down  from  a  secure  elevation 
upon  the  impulses  of  unconscious  powers,  and  to  aspire 
upward,  after  a  mark  placed  much  higher— a  goal  which 
is  either  not  at  all  attainable,  or  can  be  reached  only  in  the 
way  of  inward  free  election  and  self-determination.  The 


131 

proportion  in  which  the  transient  phenomena  of  the  vis- 
ible world  may  or  may  not  correspond  to  his  will,  can 
determine  nothing  for  his  moral  worth  or  ill  desert ;  yet 
this  he  knows,  that  the  will  is  in  its  essence  the  might- 
iest energy,  that  it  is  originally  the  creative  power  of 
motion,  (vohtion,)  and  that  therefore  it  is  God-like. 

Regarding  himself  as  an  individual  and  responsible 
agent  in  distinction  from  the  Creator,  he  feels  that  he 
is  neither  bound  by  an  inexorable  fate,  nor  yet  abso- 
lutely independent.  It  is  but  a  happy  necessity  that 
man  cannot  act  in  direct  opposition  to  the  Creator ; 
yet  he  can  ivill  contrary  to  Him,  and  he  must  have 
this  power  in  order  that  his  accordance  with  God  may 
be  a  harmony  of  love,  and  not  a  worthless  and  blind 
servitude — the  obedience  of  a  machine.  The  freedom 
of  each  individual  always  reaches  as  far  as  the  order  of 
the  whole  will  permit ;  and  this  whole  is  to  be  consid- 
ered as  a  great  Divine  state,  the  regulation  of  which 
corresponds  to  the  sense  of  a  Divine  government  in 
this,  that  a  personal  life  is  developed  and  freely  acts  in 
it.  It  is  not  accident  which  rules  in  this  state.  Those 
events  only  can  be  denominated  accidental  which  can- 
not be  explained  from  any  natural  cause,  or  which 
were  not  designed  by  some  act  of  will.  The  suppo- 
sition that  all  things  which  take  place  either  happen 
necessarily  or  accidentally,  pre-excludes  a  possible 
third,  the  action  of  freedom,  before  any  proof  is  given. 
Besides,  that  antithetic  proposition  is  in  itself  mere  noth- 
ingness, because  even  accident  is  but  an  obscure  necessi- 
ty— a  necessity  not  seen  into  nor  traced  from  its  premises ; 


consequently  it  is  a  mere  negative  notion,  the   whole 
sum  of  which  resolves  itself  into  a  confession  of  io-no- 

o 

ranee  of  the  efficient  cause. 

If  under  the   name    Nature  were  comprehended 
things  of  the  lower  orders  only,  and  if  it  were  considered 
as  something  existent  for  itself,  then  in  reference  to  this 
nature,  indeed,  free   action  might  be  denominated  ac- 
cidental, because  in  such  nature  no  true  ground  of  ex- 
planation could  be  found.     It  is  to  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration, however,  that  the  above  is  a  mere  notion  ar- 
bitrarily formed,  and  that  in  reality  there  is   no  nature 
found  which  constitutes  in  itself  a  strictly  finished  whole 
with  the  exclusion  of  the  Rational  and  the  Free.     We 
know  of  but  one  nature  only,  of  that  namely,  which, 
as  in  a  mirrour,  reflects  itself  in  the  cognitions  of  free  ra- 
tional beings.     A  nature  not  contemplated  by  mind,  a 
world  of  pure  objects,  were  an  entirely  vain  and  empty 
notion.     We  do  not  deny  the  actualness  of  nature,  but 
we  do  deny  that  a  series  of  unconscious  phenomena 
constitute  its  essential  being,  and  that  these  of  them- 
selves make  up  the  whole  sum  of  nature ;  for  to  living 
nature  in  its  proper  sense  spirit  and  will  are  communica- 
ted, and  they  are  something  of  a  much  more  essential 
character  than  motion  and  gravitation.     Still  less  has  it 
been  our  design,  by  what  has  been  said,  to  deny  the 
so-called  mathematical  laws  of  the  world.      It  may, 
however,  be  safely  asserted,  that  these  laws  explain  but 
one  side  of  nature  only,  and  not  the  whole  of  it  ;  and 
that  in  general  they  afford  but  a  subordinate,  and,  (as 
soon  as  they  are  taken  for  the  only  and  highest  truth,) 
but  a  partial  knowledge  of  nature. 


133 

Calculus  and  mensuration  are  always  immediately 
at  an  end  wherever  life  properly  begins.  That  which 
is  living  must  be  apprehended  with  a  Living  Sense, 
the  Spiritual  must  be  Spiritually  judged  of:  and  if 
any  where,  it  is  in  the  domain  of  freedom  that  this 
requisition  possesses  validity.  The  rich  multiformity 
of  nature  abounding  in  life  and  activity,  and  the 
mental  character  of  most  of  her  productions,  would  be 
entirely  inexplicable  from  a  mathematical  necessity  ; 
much  less  would,  such  necessity  suffice  to  explain  the 
thousand  varied  phenomena  of  the  spiritual  and  moral 
world.  In  the  domain  of  Thought  and  Will  there 
exists  in  love  and  hate, — in  hope  and  fear, — in  the 
investigation  and  apprehension  of  truth, — in  the  strife 
to  overcome  self, — in  the  effort  to  become  devotional 
and  heavenly  minded, — in  this  sphere  there  is  found  a 
realm  of  invisible  life,  which,  in  comparison  with  the 
impulses  of  material  things,  can  only  be  denominated 
.9t/per-terrestrial.  Even  perverseness  indicates  a  self- 
subsistence  ;  and  errour  can  be  explained  only  on  the 
supposition  that  the  spirit  which  is  susceptible  of  it, 
is  not  bound  by  an  eternal  unerring  necessity.  If, 
as  the  only  self-subsistent  Being,  the  One  and  first 
Good  were  alone  capable  of  acting  freely  with  all-sub- 
duing efficiency,  then  we  should  universally  find  a 
similar  conformity  to  law  without  any  transgression  ; 
and  sin — the  bitter  fruit  of  finite  freedom — would  be 
entirely  inconceivable. 

And  here  we  come  upon  a  point,  the  consideration 
of  which  w^as,  perhaps,  earlier  expected. — Evil  is  the 
12 


134 

stone  of  stumbling,  especially  for  those  with  whom  a 
uniform  agreement  with  law  passes  for  a  mark  of  good- 
ness and  perfection.  But  nevertheless  this  evil,  how- 
ever difficult  it  may  appear  to  incorporate  it  with  a 
system  of  the  world  and  of  science,  must  still,  as  some- 
thing spiritual  and  as  something  undeniably  existent, 
have  a  place  conceded  to  it  in  the  last,  as  it  has  long 
been  received  into  the  first. 

And  although  a  discord  for  the  mind  and  a  vexa- 
tion for  the  understanding,  still  its  existence  merits  the 
highest  attention,  because  that  man  alone  upon  the 
earth  is  capable  of  committing  it,  and  because  that  we 
are  thence  led  to  infer  a  certain  superiour  excellence  of 
the  powers  operative  in  him.  It  is  also  worthy  of  at- 
tention as  developing  itself  under  a  varied  diversity  of 
forms,  from  that  state,  where  with  inward  wickedness 
there  is  connected  a  cheerful  and  amiable  deportment, 
which  almost  challenges  our  esteem  and  affection — or 
where  evil  is  associated  with  wit  and  levity,  so  that  it 
becomes  a  derison  of  life  and  a  parody  upon  all  seri- 
ousness and  virtue— unto  that  condition  where  a  faith- 
less fury,  apostate  from  truth,  betrays  its  desperation  of 
all  good  by  a  wild  recklessness,  or,  more  revolting  still, 
by  cool  premeditated  crime.  Always,  as  it  would 
seem,  evil  is  to  be  considered  as  a  degradation  of  pow- 
ers, as  a  perversion  of  the  original  life ;  and  in  this 
state  of  perverseness,  it  now  manifests  itself  monkey- 
like exciting  laughter,— at  another  time  it  appears  as  a 
monstrous  birth,  creating  loathsomeness  and  disgust, — 
and  again  it  is  seen  as  an  object  of  horrour,  awaken- 
ing terrour  and  alarm. 


135 

However  difficult  now,  it  may  appear,  to  find  an 
appropriate  place  for  evil  in  a  scientific  system  pro- 
ceeding fi-om  Unity,  and  certain  as  it  is  that  sin  has 
ever  been  the  thorn  that  has  destroyed  the  peace  and 
quietude  of  life,  or  the  discordant  tone  which  has  ever 
with  jarring  dissonance  disturbed  the  harmony  of  the 
universe ;  yet  these  difficulties  do  not  immediately 
press  themselves  upon  him,  who,  only  in  a  scientific 
manner  maintains  the  freedom  of  the  human  will,  un-- 
disturbed  about  the  consequences  or  the  possible  abuse 
of  the  doctrine.  On  the  contrary,  not  only  the  possi- 
bility but  the  undeniable  actualness  of  sin,  as  has  already 
been  shown,  is  indeed  a  melancholy,  but  at  the  same 
time  a  most  convincing  proof  in  favour  of  the  alleged 
self-subsistence  of  the  human  will.  It  is  impossible 
to  derive  sin  immediately  from  God,  the  highest  Good. 
Were  He  the  only  free  Will,  then  it  would  follow  that 
every  thing  else  must  flow  from  him  in  a  peaceful  con- 
formity to  law ;  throughout  the  universe  there  would 
be  nothing  but  compulsion,  and  compulsion  too,  effec- 
ted by  a  most  perfect  Central  and  Universal  Will. 
Or  in  other  words,  every  efficiency  would  only  be  some 
form  of  God's  agency,  and  consequently,  since  it  is  im- 
possible for  God  to  act  in  opposition  to  himself,  it  would 
follow  that  every  where  there  would  be  nothing  but 
harmony,  and  that  in  reference  to  God  every  thing 
that  exists  would  be  good.  We  say  explicitly  in  res- 
pect to  God.  Because  considered  in  and  by  itself  the 
creature  could  be  neither  good  nor  bad ;  for  both,  (that 
is,  moral  good  and  moral  evil,)  can  only  originate  from  an 


136 

individuaPs  own  will.  But  instead  of  that  peaceful 
concentration  in  One  central  Will, — instead  of  that  har- 
mony of  all  the  powers  and  their  conformity  to  law — 
we  find  the  fact  to  be  directly  the  contrary.  Sin,  as 
a  self-active  striving  against  God,  compels  us  therefore 
to  adopt  the  position  that  the  pure  Godhead  is  not  the 
only  efficient  agent  in  the  creature,  but  that  it  also 
at  the  same  time  possesses  an  independence  of  God, 
(an  independence  bestowed  upon  the  creature  for  the 
behoof  of  personality  ;)  and  that  this  self-subsistence 
granted  to  man  is  moral  freedom,  the  fountain  of  his 
moral  good  and  moral  evil.  Should  any  one  wish  to 
seek  the  fountain  of  moral  evil  in  any  other  place,  it 
would  only  remain  for  him  either  to  place  in  God  some- 
thing which  is  not  himself,  which  is  not  actually  good, 
(on  which  point  we  have  already  expressed  our  opinion, 
and  from  which  evil  could  not  still  proceed  ;)  or  else 
he  must  assume  the  existence  of  another  uncreated  being 
co-eternal  with  God; — a  form  of  dualism  which  is 
scarcely  adapted  even  to  a  wild  and  heated  imagina- 
tion, in  as  much  as  it  is  repulsive  to  the  human  mind 
and  cannot  be  confirmed  to  any  scientific  proof.^ 

^  "  The  Origin  of  Evil,  meanwhile,  is  a  question  interest- 
ing only  to  the  Metaphyscian,  and  in  a  system  of  moral  and  re- 
ligions Philosophy.  The  man  of  sober  mind,  who  seeks  for 
truths  that  possess  a  moral  and  practical  interest,  is  content 
to  be  certain,  first,  that  Evil  must  have  had  a  beginning,  since 
otherwise  it  must  either  be  God,  or  a  co-eternal  and  co-equal 
Rival  of  God  ;  both  impious  notions,  and  the  latter  foolish  to 
boot.     Secondly,  That  it  could  not  originate  in  God ;  for  if 


137 

If  now,  as  we  have  endeavoured  to  show,  the  root 
of  evil  is  not  to  be  sought  for  in  God,  but  in  freedom 
alone ;  yet  freedom  itself,  as  such,  is  not  to  be  consid- 
ered as  something  already  actually  evil.  For  were 
this  the  case,  God  would  again  be  made  the  Author 
of  evil ;  since,  in  conformity  with  all  that  has  been  said, 
it  is  plain  that  freedom  can  be  derived  from  Him  alone. 
Considered  in  itself,  then,  this  freedom  is  to  be  regarded 
as  nothing  else  than  the  highest  good  of  man.  Yet  it 
is  not  at  all  contradictory  that  evil  should  spring  from 
this  good.  The  abuse  of  the  highest  good  can  only  be 
productive  of  the  highest  evil, — Sin. — It  may,  however, 
be  asked  how  such  an  abuse,  which  is  itself  already  sin, 
can  be  possible  ? — It  is  sufficiently  evident  that  every 
aberration  from  the  line  of  rectitude,  such  as  has  above 
been  spoken  of,  is  entirely  inconceivable  when  applied 
to   the   absolute    Divine   Freedom,  which  is  identical 

so,  it  would  be  at  once  Evil  and  not  Evil,  or  God  would  be 
at  once  God,  (that  is,  infinite  Goodness,)  and  not  God — both 
alike  impossible  positions." — "  A  moral  Evil  is  an  Evil  thai 
has  its  origin  in  a  Will.  An  Evil  common  to  all  must  have 
a  ground  common  to  all.  But  the  actual  existence  of  moral 
evil  we  are  bound  in  conscience  to  admit ;  and  that  there  i9 
an  evil  common  to  all  is  a  Fact ;  and  this  evil  must  there- 
fore have  a  common  ground.  Now  this  evil  ground  cannot 
originate  in  the  Divine  Will :  it  must  therefore  be  referred 
to  the  Will  of  man."  Aids  to  Reflection,  p.  158, 174.  See 
the  same  philosophic  view  expanded,  and  rhetorically  delin- 
eated by  Professor  Tholuck  in  his  Lehre  v.  d,  Sunde  s.  14 — 
26.     Tr. 

12* 


138 

with  holiness — the  higher  necessity  of  the  good.  In 
God  there  is  infininte  perfection  ;  but  the  perfection  of 
man  is  finite  ; — although  a  similarity  there  is  yet  a  dis- 
tinction. Human  freedom,  moreover,  is  not  absolute, 
and  consequently  involves  in  it  no  holy  necessity  of 
good. 

Bestow  upon  a  finite  being,  in  every  respect  imper- 
fect, freedom  of  will ;  or  impart  to  it,  (whilst  at  the  same 
time  you  exempt  it  from  an  infallible  but  neces- 
sitating guidance,)  the  power  of  self-determination,  and 
you  at  once  create  in  it  the  possibility  of  erring  and  of 
abusing  its  powers, — that  is,  the  possibility  of  sin.  It 
is  plain  that  the  only  way  of  excluding  this  possibility 
would  be  either  to  take  away  freedom  itself,  or  else  to 
elevate  man  to  the  condition  of  God.  It  is  not  here 
our  purpose  to  explain  how  sin  can  be  permitted 
by  God,  or,  according  to  the  much  used  phrase,  to 
justify  him  in  reference  to  the  existence  of  evil  in  the 
world ;  the  proposition  was,  and  still  continues  to  be 
only  this  ;  To  explain  the  possibility  of  sin  from  the 
spiritual  personality  of  an  imperfect  creature,  whom  the 
Creator  has  left  free  to  engage  in  the  hazardous  enter- 
prize  of  life. 

Were  freedom  a  things  somewhat  material^  like 
the  floating  atoms,  then,  indeed,  we  would  be  led  to 
seek  the  cause  of  its  departure  from  a  straight  line  or 
from  the  path  of  rectitude,  in  something  lying  out  of 
itself;  and  the  ground  of  this  cause  would  again  have 
to  be  sought  in  something  still  farther  back,  and  so  on 
in  infinitum,  and  at  the  end  we  should  still  find  our- 


139 

selves  linked  to  a  chain  of  endless  regression.  But 
all  this  results  from  an  entire  confusion  of  conceptions, 
for  nothing  whatever  can  be  conceived  of  freedom 
upon  the  stand-point  of  the  purely  Corporeal,  and  where 
impulsion  and  repulsion  are  literally  spoken  of.  If  an 
erroneous  point  of  view  be  once  chosen,  and  a  first  false 
position  be  assumed,  a  whole  series  of  conclusions  will 
follow,  which  although  entirely  consequent,  will  yet 
lead  only  to  a  compulsion  and  a  mechanism  of  nature ; 
and  from  such  materials  there  will  spring  up  sponta- 
neously a  whole  superstructure  of  errour.  The  same  is 
the  case  in  the  moral  life,  when  once  the  first  false  step 
has  been  taken,  when  the  understanding  and  the  con- 
science have  yielded  to  the  first  lie,  (the  ngoirov  xpev^og,) 
it  is  but  too  easy  for  a  chain  of  errour  to  follow,  nay  for 
a  whole  structure  of  sin  to  be  reared  upon  it.  But  the 
Idea  of  the  Will  is  that  it  is  no  thing,  and  least  of  all 
a  bodily  thing,  subject  to  physical  laws ;  but  that  it  is  a 
Productive  Energy,  a  Life  that  re-creates  itself  and  acts 
from  itself.  Nevertheless  it  may  be  said  in  a  certain 
sense,  only  somewhat  more  circumscribed,  that  freedom 
is  determined  by  something  else,  by  something  which 
lies  out  of  it ;  or  rather,  (in  which  that  more  limited 
sense  is  contained,)  that  it  can  permit  itself  to  be  deter- 
mined, [or,  that  it  can  take  occasion  to  determine  itself 
in  view  of  some  outward  object  or  some  end  proposed. 
The  difference  between  the  Will's  being  determined 
by  objective  motives,  and  determining  itself  in  view 
of  these  objects  as  occasions,  is  broad  and  radical,  and 
should  ever  be  kept  in  mind.]     For,  according  to  our 


140 

very  conception  of  an  action  there  precede  it  a  multi- 
tude of  contradictory  and  opposite  possibilities,  which 
operate  upon  the  acting  subject  by  more  than  one  soli- 
citation. But  which  solicitation  the  agent  will  permit  to 
gain  the  preponderance,  the  ground  of  that  lies  in  his 
will  alone ;  and  to  seek  for  another  ground  differ- 
ent from  it,  and  lying  without  it,  would  be  the  same  as 
to  maintain  that  the  will  never  can  be  a  ground,  that 
is,  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  Will. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  according  to  this  view 
man  acts  without  a  reason,  simply  in  order  to  will. 
The  will  is  itself  a  ground  as  well  as  the  solicitation 
through  which  a  person  determines  himself;  he  must  will, 
and  must  decide  in  view  of  the  continuous  inflowing  of 
various  excitations,  because  neither  the  inward  nor  the 
outward  hfe  can  remain  stationary.  The  act  of  willing 
is  therefore  necessary  to  his  continued  spiritual  exis- 
tence ;  but  what  direction  he  will  take,  or  what  act  he 
will  choose  to  make  his  own — these  are  matters  of  his 
free  election.  That  the  election  of  a  finite  and  imper- 
fect being,  left  to  act  upon  his  own  peril,  is  not  always 
righteous,  but  frequently  false  and  incorrect,  is  less  a 
matter  of  astonishment  than  if  the  case  were  otherwise. 
For  a  peaceful  course  of  human  life,  and  one  always 
conformed  to  the  Divine  law,  w^ould  be  in  the  highest 
degree  wonderful,  and  would  be  no  unimportant  objection 
against  the  actualness  of  freedom.  It  is  from  freedom 
alone,  moreover,  that  the  manifold  anomalies  and  irregu- 
larities of  character  found  among  men  can  be  explained. 
It  may  be  objected,  indeed,  that  the  aberration,  or 


141 

act  of  erring,  which  is  capable  of  being  explained  from 
the  freedom  of  an  imperfect  behig,  cannot  still  be  one 
and  the  same  with  actual  crime,  and  with  the  evil  do- 
ing of  an  intelligent  and  consistent  wickedness ;  and  it 
must  be  conceded  that  the  high  point  of  evil  spoken  of 
does  not  result  immediately  from  the  conception  of  one  act 
of  departure  from  the  line  of  right :  still,  however,  it 
may  be  explained  by  the  intermediate  conception  of  a 
gradual  deterioration.  This  deterioration,  as  the  contin- 
uance of  a  hfe  given  up  to  derangement,  becomes  more 
and  more  perverted,  and  gives  birth  to  products  increas- 
ingly loathsome  in  their  character ;  and  it  is,  also,  quite 
as  intelligible  as  moral  growth  in  virtue,  which  is  noth- 
ing else  than  a  progressive  cultivation  of  powers  con- 
formably to  the  original  law.  These  same  powers, 
however,  in  a  perverted  state  or  falsely  directed,  do  in- 
deed in  their  progressive  operation  and  growth,  always 
still  continue  to  manifest  the  character  of  a  Life  ;  but 
on  account  of  that  derangement  their  forming  principle, 
their  PROTOPLAST^,  exhibits  itself  in  mis-formations,  that 
is,  in  such  products  as  are  opposed  to  a  sound  and  healthy 
fife.  The  more  perfect  the  Original  of  a  Life,  the 
greater  the  multitude  of  possible  aberrations ;  and  the 
more  excellent  are  the  active  powers  of  a  being,  the 

^  So  our  medical  writers  commonly  translate  Professor 
Blumenbach's  Bildungstneb,  the  vis  plastica,  or  vis  vitae  for- 
matrix  of  the  eldest  physiologist,  and  the  life  or  livrjg  prin- 
ciple of  John  Hunter,  the  profoundest,  we  had  almost  said 
the  only,  physiological  philosopher  of  the  latter  half  of  thq 
preceding  century.     Friend,  p.  433,     Ti^, 


142 

more  energetic  and  destructive  is  their  agency  in  a  per- 
verted state. 

Hence  man's  departure  from  the  moral  Ideal  is  to 
be  lamented  as  a  deeper  fall ;  and  among  all  the  mon- 
strous forms  of  life,  moral  deformity  is  the  most  loath- 
some, and  excites  the  greatest  horrour.  It  would  be 
very  remarkable  if  sin  alone,  when  it  is  not  immediate- 
ly and  firmly  withstood,  were  incapable  of  increase  and 
progressive  growth,  inasmuch  as  it  belongs  to  the  pe- 
culiar character  of  man  that  neither  his  inward  nor  his 
outward  life,  as  has  already  been  observed,  can  ever 
endure  an  absolute  cessation.  No  where,  where  life 
exists,  is  there  found  a  fixed  and  motionless  state  of 
Being ;  on  the  contrary,  we  universally  meet  with  pro- 
gression, a  ceaseless  Becoming.  Even  in  sickness 
and  decay  there  is  only  exhibited  the  operation  of  a  con- 
tinuous activity ;  and  the  death  of  organized  things  is 
but  a  transition  from  one  state  of  existence  to  another, 
is  only  another  form  of  Becoming.  The  moral  life,  also, 
exhibits  similar  phenomena  in  good  and  evil ;  and  it  has 
already  been  shown  in  the  prehminary  part  of  this  essay, 
how  that  evil,  in  the  progress  of  a  continually  aug- 
menting and  guilty  derangement  of  the  moral  powers, 
may  attain  to  a  certain  state  of  self-subsistence.  This 
perverted  condition  of  the  moral  man  may  be  illustrated 
by  an  analogy  drawn  from  those  who  are  diseased  in 
body — an  analogy  which  others  have  frequently  obser- 
ved-—that  is,  from  the  so  called  after-organizations. 

From  all  that  has  now  been  said  it  seems  to  us  that 
we  can  be  at  no  loss  for  an  explanation  of  the  phe- 


143 

nomenon,  that  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  not  altogether 
annihilated  by  a  series  of  continued  acts  of  sinfulness, 
but  that  it  nevertheless  becomes  so  strongly  fettered  ; 
and    that   evil   may   be    raised    to  such   a  degree  of 
strength,    that   return  to  a  better  state    is    rendered 
exceedingly  difficult,  nay,  under  certain  circumstances, 
almost  impossible.     Besides,  we  can  now  be  at  no  loss 
to  discover  the  reason  why  a  constantly  progressive 
course  in  good  or  evil,  persevered  in  for  a  long  time, 
lessens  the  probability  of  an   entire  change  in  either 
case  ;  yet  this  fact  does  not  render  such  a  change  abso- 
lutely impossible,  nor  does  it  destroy  freedom,  but  only 
proves  that  it  is  a  human  freedom,  that  is,  such  a 
freedom,  in  the    possession  of  which   man   does  not 
cease  to  be  a  natural  being  and  to  develope  his  char- 
acter in  conformity  with  the  laws  of  nature. 

To  explain  the  Universality  of  sin  upon  the  earth, 
is  more  difficult  and  perplexing ;  and  we  may  well  be 
at  a  loss  to  show  how  it  is,  that  every  human  being  as 
soon  as  it  attains  to  a  state  of  consciousness,  at  the  same 
time  finds  within  itself  a  consciousness  of  evil.  Not 
that  we  would  be  understood  to  affirm  that  the  whole 
human  race  is  involved  in  one  and  the  same  state  of 
wickedness,  equal  in  degree  ;  but  as  men  now  are  no 
one  feels  that  fieedom  from  guilt  which  conscience  de- 
mands, and  all  moral  excellence  here  below  must  be 
attained  through  the  travails  of  a  new  birth.  And 
whenever  man  wishes  to  possess  any  thing  actually 
good,  and  to  have  it  grow  and  become  a  living  prin- 
ciple in  him,  he  must  first  root  out  and  deaden  the 


144 

weeds  of  evil  which  stand  in  the  way.  The  entire 
race  of  man,  as  it  presents  itself  to  the  eye  of  daily  ob- 
servation and  experience,  at  the  same  time  that  it  is 
endowed  with  invaluable  powers  and  talents,  is  yet 
infected  with  hankering  desires  after  that  which  is 
forbidden  ;  and  whosoever  has  remaining  a  sufficiency 
of  moral  energy  impartially  to  contemplate  his  inmost 
self,  will  there  find  not  indeed  a  necessity  of  sin,  but 
yet  somewhat  already  existent  without  his  agency  or 
concun-ence — somewhat  which  his  better  voice  cannot 
approve  but  commands  him  firmly  to  resist.  And  no 
matter  how  soon  the  contest  may  have  been  seriously 
commenced,  still  even  the  most  excellent  man  will  al- 
ways find  something  evil  to  have  been  anteriour  to  all 
his  efforts;  a  something  which  in  a  thousand  cases 
cannot  indeed  be  denominated  as  actual  guilt  or  wick- 
edness, but  must  still  be  considered  as  transgression. 
The  same  is  the  case  also  with  one  who  has  already 
commenced  the  work  of  reformation ;  he  will  not  pur- 
sue the  straight  path  of  life,  nor  attain  the  goal  placed 
before  him,  without  similar  aberrations. 

In  what  way  soever  we  may  otherwise  judge  of 
this  depraved  state  of  human  nature,  we  must  yet  al- 
ways attribute  to  the  individual  himself  every  act  of  er- 
ring or  departure  from  right  which  has  been  really 
perfected.  Even  the  best  among  men,  (as  it  is  not  ne- 
cessary here  to  speak  of  the  most  criminal  and  abandon- 
ed,) do  not  find  their  whole  life  to  be  free  from  guilt ; 
whilst  yet  every  moral  errour  can  only  arise  on  the  con- 
dition that  the  will  consents  to  the  transgression  of  an 


145 

always  existent  and  always  known  law.  This  univer- 
sality of  guilt  points  to  some  great,  deep-laid  cause  ; 
to  the  universal  prevalence  of  a  depraved  disposition. 
To  place  this  evil  disposition  directly  in  the  very  es- 
sence of  freedom,  were  contradictory  ;  because,  by  so 
doing,  freedom  itself,  that  is,  the  freedom  of  election, 
and  with  it  the  imputation  of  moral  character  which 
must  always  be  maintained,  WT)uld  all  be  swept  away. 
To  make  the  will  a  Principle  of  Evil  would  be  to 
make  every  true  moral  action  entirely  incomprehensi- 
ble. Nor  could  that  disposition  have  been  imparted 
by,the  Creator.  For  the  Great  First  of  all,  God,  is 
the  Good ;  and  our  better  nature  imposes  upon  us  an 
obligation  to  withstand  the  impulses  of  that  depraved 
disposition,  which  w^ould  be  utterly  inexplicable  were 
God  originally  the  Author  of  that  evil  state.  It  can 
therefore  only  have  arisen  through  guilt. 

But  here  it  may  be  asked.  How  could  a  universal 
and  permanent  evil  disposition  spring  from  any  single 
act  of  transgression  ?  And  how  could  that  which  is  al- 
ready born  with  us  have  come  into  existence  through 
guilt  ?  To  say  that  every  individual  in  his  Maxims 
commits,  through  the  elections  of  his  will,  occasional 
transgressions  of  the  law,  explains  nothing.  The  uni- 
versality of  sin,  which,  so  far  as  history  extends,  is 
without  exception,  cannot  be  accounted  for  on  on  the 
supposition  that  innumerable  individuals  differing  so 
widely  from  each  other^  all  possess  a  free  self-determi- 
nation. And  besides,  this  supposition  would  not  ex- 
plain the  circumstance  that  that  evil  disposition  is  bom 
13 


146 

with  us,  for  that  a  Maxim  should  be  connatural  13  in 
opposition  to  the  very  conception  of  a  maxim.  It  is 
by  no  means  to  be  assumed  that  such  a  universal  ac- 
cordance of  all  free  persons  in  a  perverted  maxim  can 
have  its  ground  in  freedom  alone ;  and  the  less  so, 
since,  independent  of  its  universality,  the  particular  fact 
that  it  is  born  with  us  points  to  an  entirely  different 
domain  than  that  of  arbitrary  election.  It  refers  us 
rather — (we  speak  it  at  the  hazard  of  being  misunder- 
stood,)— to  a  dark  law  of  nature. 

But   it  is  likewise    undeniable;    and,  as  it  might 
seem,  contradictory  to  what  has  just  been  said,  that 
moral   good  and   moral   evil  can  only   originate  from 
some  exercise  of  freedom,  so  that  the  inborn  imperfect 
condition  must  still  have  its   sole  ground  in  the  will  as 
the  moral  ability,  and  must  adhere  to  the  same.     This 
contradiction  can  only  be  explained  on  the  supposition 
that  the  ground  of  the  universal  state  of  sinfulness  lies 
in  something  which  is  both  free  and  necessitated ;  that 
is,  in  an  original  act  of  the  free  will,  the  consequences 
of  which  develope  themselves  according  to  the  laws  of 
nature.     For  the  solution  of  the  problem  it  is  express- 
ed more  definitely  by  saying  that   an  original  act  of 
guilt  must  be  presupposed,  through  which  there  is  im- 
planted in  human  nature  a   preponderating  inclination 
to  yield  to  sensuous  impulses,  and  by  means  of  it  obe- 
dience to  the  law  is  rendered  not  indeed  impossible  for 
the  will  but   exceedingly  difficult,  so  that  from  this 
cause  transgressions  are  to  be  met  with  in  the  course 
of  every  man's  life. 


147 

In  the  examination  of  this  assumption  the  point 
must  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  we  here  simply  inquire 
into  the  Universality  of  sin,  and  consider  more  par- 
ticularly that  inborn,  and  consequently  involuntary 
disposition  to  it.  To  place  this  involuntariness  imme- 
diately and  primarily  in  the  will  itself  were, — contradic-  - 
tory.  The  feeling  of  guilt  arises  when  the  will,  not 
originally  determined  to  evil,  but  finding  itself  called 
upon  to  obey  the  injunctions  of  the  better  voice,  does 
nevertheless  bring  no  determined  opposition  against 
those  powerful  impulses  which  exist  in  the  man  with- 
out his  agency  or  concurrence.  If  you  placed  in  man 
a  predetermination  of  the  will  as  the  source  of  evil — a 
predetermination  derived  either  immediately  from  the 
Creator,  or  resulting  from  one  intelligible  act, — then  nei- 
ther could  the  reaction  against  evil  be  explained,  not 
would  it  ever  be  possible  for  the  energy  of  a  good  will 
to  achieve  a  victory  over  sin.  Both,  however,  be- 
come intelligible  if  the  occasioning  cause  of  a  Univer- 
sal evil  disposition  be  sought  for  in  something  out  of 
the  will,  namely,  in  an  excited  and  strengthened  sen- 
suousness,  in  a  preponderance  of  the  irrational  princi- 
ple, which,  (in  its  present  state,)  is  interwoven  into  the 
very  being  of  human  nature.  Through  this  prepon- 
derating influence  of  the  Sensuous,  the  will  is  stunned 
and  can  be  easily  seduced  to  sin ;  this  consequence, 
however,  is  not  rendered  absolutely  necessary,  as  in 
very  many  individuals,  it  does  by  no  means  always 
continue  to  follow.  Since,  now,  according  to  what  has 
been  said,  the  cause  of  so  strong  a  solicitation  cannot 


148 

lie  in  the  will  of  each  individual,  nor  yet  in  the  original 
creation,  so  it  only  remains  to  assume  a  catastrophe 
subsequently  brought  in — a  catastrophe  which  could 
not  have  originated  from  natural  laws,  (for  if  so,  the 
Creator  would  have  been  its  direct  cause,)  but  which 
afterwards  operated  according  to  the  laws  of  nature, 
(because  on  any  other  supposition  the  involuntary  uni- 
versality of  the  solicitation  could  have  no  ground.) 
This  catastrophe  may  here  be  more  strictly  defined  as 
an  original  free  act,  anteriour  to  all  history  ;  to  this  act, 
however,  the  present  human  race  stands  related  in  the 
necessary  connexion  of  nature. 

Is  not  this  now  the  proper  place,  where  a  priori 
grounds  reach  no  farther,  to  present  the  testimony  in 
favour  of  this  view  derived  from  other  sources  ?  For 
there  is  a  tradition  among  the  nations,  which  has  exist- 
ed from  time  immemorial  and  is  still  current,  that 
goes  far  to  establish  the  theory  derived  from  the  oc- 
currence just  presupposed. 

History  itself  indeed,  taken  in  the  strict  sense  of 
the  word,  does  not  extend  back  to  the  time  of  the 
fact  after  which  we  are  inquiring;  but  this  fact  is 
rather  already  presupposed  in  all  history,  and  sinful- 
ness has  been  recognized  as  universally  prevalent 
through  all  past  centuries.  For  our  present  purpose 
it  is  not  necessary  to  appeal  to  the  more  flagrant 
crimes,  many  of  which  history  records ;  according  to 
her  testimony,  even  among  the  Noble  and  Virtuous 
of  all  times,  the  very  best  were  those  who  were  not 
entirely  without  failings,  but  those  who  were  charge- 


149 

able  with  the  fewest  faults.  And  that  man  has  always 
been  accounted  virtuous,  not  he  who  was  entirely  free 
from  sin,  (only  One  such,  as  a  Miracle,  shines  through 
the  world's  history,)  but  he  who  strove  most  constantly 
and  victoriously  against  that  evil  which  he  could  not 
yet  perfectly  eradicate. 

So  in  the  progress  of  history,  the  stream  of  life  is 
never  more  found  to  flow  perfectly  pure,  but  its  watei-s 
have  always  been  troubled  and  obscured  with  commin- 
gled evil.  From  the  very  earliest  antiquity,  however, 
this  evil  was  lamented,  not  as  something  originally 
created  by  God,  but  as  something  subsequently  in- 
troduced; and  it  was  the  common  belief  that  by  its 
violent  entrance  into  the  world,-  and  through  its  im- 
purity, the  pristine  immaculate  hfe  was  polluted.  Ac- 
cording to  all  the  traditions  of  the  earliest  times  which 
have  come  down  to  us,  the  human  race  did  not  com- 
mence in  a  state  of  depravity,  but  in  a  state  of  virtue  ; 
and  they  all  agree  that  a  time  of  happiness  and  in- 
nocence preceded  the  centuries  of  sin  and  guilt.  Par- 
adise, the  Golden  Age  of  peace  and  innocence,  is  so 
indelibly  impressed  upon  the  recollection  of  all  nations, 
and  its  loss  has  been,  (the  higher  up  the  more  defin- 
itely,) so  deeply  felt  and  so  universally  deplored,  that 
it  requires  no  small  degree  of  arrogance  to  give  the 
lie  directly  and  without  farther  examination,  to  the 
unanimous  testimony  of  the  oldest  generations  who 
were  placed  nearer  to  this  age  of  original  happiness. 
It  is  most  difficult  for  men  to  forget  that  which  is  irre- 
coverably lost ;  and  hence  with  the  knowledge  of  that 
13* 


150 

state  of  original  happiness  was,  fixedly  connected  the 
knowledge  of  its  loss.  Consequently  the  fact  by 
which  that  earliest  purity  was  first  and  forever  polluted , 
has  been  transmitted  in  a  more  or  less  inteUigible  form 
through  all  subsequent  traditions.^     In  the  oldest  say- 

^  The  tradition  of  a  Golden  Age  is  found  in  the  earliest 
records  of  history,  and  in  all  parts  of  the  world  ;  it  must, 
therefore,  have  been  antecedent  to  all  history.  Some  have 
supposed  that  far  back  in  the  depths  of  antiquity,  long  before 
the  Augustan  days  of  Rome,  or  before  civilization  and  sci- 
ence had  dawned  upon  Greece,  there  existed  an  age  of  re- 
finement and  learning,  no  traces  of  which  have  been  hand- 
ed down  to  us,  unless,  perhaps,  the  Orphic  Fragments  may 
be  referred  to  that  period.  Those  most  conversant  with  the 
early  history  of  the  world,  say  that  the  farther  history  is  tra- 
ced back  the  more  definitely  is  seen  the  influence  which 
religion  exerted  upon  politics.  It  is  also  known  that  the  In- 
dians, the  Chinese,  the  Chaldeans  and  Egyptians  were  early 
acquainted  with  Astronomy,  Geometry,  Natural  Philosophy 
and  Architecture.  Hence,  in  conformity  with  the  statements 
of  the  oldest  classic  writers,  and  contrary  to  those  who 
would  make  the  first  Parents  of  the  human  race  to  have  been 
semi-brutes,  many  of  the  best  German  Historians  and  Phi- 
losophers, such  as  Johannes  von  Miiller,  Heeren,  Herder, 
Schlegel  and  Tholuck  assume  that  man  was  originally  pla- 
ced by  God  in  a  high  state  of  cultivation,  and  was  endowed 
with  distinct  apprehensions  of  religious  truth  and  duty.  So 
also  the  celebrated  Antiquary  Ouverof :  L'^tat  naturel  de 
I'homme  n'est  ni  I'^tat  sauvage,  ni  I'etat  de  corruption,  c'est 
un  ^tat  simple^  meilleur,  plus  rapproch^  de  la  divinit^ ; 
I'homme  sauvage  et  I'homme  corrompu  en  sont  ^galement 


151 

ings  of  the  nations  this  fact  was  designated  as  the 
FALL,  or  the  ACT  OF  GUILT,  in  essentially  the  same 
manner  as  is  done  at  the  present  day.  Of  this  act  of 
transgression  the  original  parents  of  the  human  family, 
how  many  or  how  few  soever  they  may  have  been, 
were  all  equally  guilty. 

It  has  already  been  shown  that  a  departure  from, 
or  transgression  of  the  law,  may  be  understood  from 
the  existence  of  human  freedom  considered  in  itself, 
and  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  assume  any  other  dispo- 
sition in  order  to  account  for  it.  But  according  to 
tradition  this  transgression  of  the  first  parents  produced 
a  natural  disharmony  extending  to  all  their  posterity  ; — 
and  from  this  is  explained  the  universality  of  sin. 

It  is  plain  that  some  wonderful  change  must  have 
been  connected  with  the  ^rs^  step  to  evil ;  it  was  a 
transition  from  a  state  of  happy  innocence  to  one  of 
guilt  and  discord  ;  it  was  a  perversion  of  original  rela- 
tions, pregnant  with  evil  consequences,  and  taking 
deep  hold  upon  the  essential  character  of  human  na- 

eloign^s.  "The  natural  condition  of  man  is  neither  the  savage 
condition,  nor  the  state  of  corruption,  but  it  is  a  simple  and 
better  state,  approaching  nearer  to  the  divinity  ;  the  savage 
man  and  the  corrupt  man  are  both  equally  removed  from  it." 
It  is  not  necessary  to  mention  how  well  these  statements  ac- 
cord with  the  Biblical  representations.  For  further  informa- 
tion on  this  interesting  topic,  the  reader  is  referred  to  Nean- 
der's  Denkwurdigkeiteny  B.  I.  s.  15,  211 — 216  and  the  author- 
ities there  quoted,  or  to  Prof.  Robinson's  Bibl.  Repository 
Vol.  II.  p.  119—123.     Tr. 


152 

ture.  The  thorn  of  a  new  incitement,  never  before 
experienced,  must  have  goaded  on  the  hitherto  peace- 
ful life  to  a  sickly  and  inefficient  activity.  As  a 
strange  violence  for  the  first  time  came  like  a  shock — 
as  the  host  of  desires  and  lustful  passions  which  had 
before  reposed  in  their  dark  depth  were  suddenly 
awakened  from  their  light  slumbers — as  the  animal  na- 
ture which  had  previously  remained  in  peaceful  subjec- 
tion was  excited  and  broke  forth  in  hostility  from 
its  silent  ground — then  indeed  the  whole  internal  and 
external  organization  must  have  been  brought  into  wild 
confusion  by  the  sudden  interruption  of  the  previous 
harmony,  and  there  must  have  been  experienced  an 
alteration  difficult  to  be  described. 

Human  life  is  a  life  only  on  condition  tliat  in  it 
should  be  found  not  pure  freedom  alone,  but  necessity 
also ;  upon  which  necessity  it  rests  as  upon  a  dark 
ground  of  nature.  But  this  dark  ground  once  dis^ 
placed  from  its  benevolent  relation  operates  rude- 
ly and  destructively,  as  does  every  blind  power 
no  longer  held  by  the  bond  of  harmony ;  and  to 
allay  the  driving  storm,  to  banish  back  the  subterra- 
nean spirits  once  brought  up,  requires  an  energy  of  will 
entirely  different  from  that  which  first  called  them 
forth  from  their  places  of  repose.  Yet  this  conflict  be- 
tween the  spirit  and  blind  impulse,  arising  from  the 
double  nature  of  man,  is  not  fully  decided  :  and  we 
still  always  see  how  that  which  was  intended  as  the 
support  of  life,  when  brought  into  confusion,  becomes 
its  destroyer. 


153 

Even  in  the  peculiar  relations  of  the  human  body 
we  already  see  distinctly  shadowed  forth  that  co-exis- 
tence of  necessity  and  freedom,  which  is  in  itself  indis- 
pensable, and  in  the  highest  degree  salutary.  In  the 
royal  seat  of  the  head  the  free  spirit  manifests  itself, 
since  it  is  from  the  brain  as  the  support  and  instrument 
of  the  will,  that  voluntary  motion  proceeds ;  but  in  the 
lower  parts  of  the  body  a  nature  withdrawn  from  con- 
sciousness and  not  under  the  control  of  will,  performs 
its  mysterious  operations  in  a  manner  not  less  wonder- 
ful. This  arrangement  is  made  in  order  that  the 
silent  functions  of  life,  undisturbed  by  changeful 
caprice,  may  proceed  without  interruption.  And  to 
the  end  that  the  spirit  also  may  not  be  troubled  with 
the  continual  supervision  of  the  operations  of  the 
earthly  life,  immediate  insight  into  that  depressed 
depth  is  withheld  from  a  healthy  consciousness  by 
means  of  the  salutary  hmits,  (the  ganglia,)  imposed  up- 
on it.  Disorder  and  disease  are  connected  with  the 
overstepping  of  the  limits  here  prescribed  ;  and  how- 
ever remarkable  and  instructive  the  phenomenon  may 
appear,  it  is  still  true,  that  light  cannnot  fall  in  upon 
this  region  originally  consigned  to  peaceful  darkness, 
without  a  great  and  hostile  derangement  to  the  func- 
tions of  life.  For  which  reason  also  a  clear  magnetic 
insight,  whilst  on  the  one  hand  it  affords  the  most  im- 
portant solutions  in  regard  to  the  essential  character  of 
life,  and  leads  to  the  most  noble  views  respecting  it, 
yet  on  the  other  hand  cannot  but  prove  humiliating  to 
the  free  spirit. 


154 

We  need  not  here  be  required  to  furnish  any  circum- 
stantial analysis,  in  order  to  prove  what  is  sufficiently  ev- 
ident from  the  foregoing  remarks,  that  that  part  of  the  hu- 
man being  which  is  withdrawn  from  consciousness  and  not 
subject  to  the  determinations  of  will,  yet  contains  with- 
in itself  a  realm  of  great  and  wonderful  active  powers. 
Thus  the  free  and  conscious  man  stands  over  the 
waves  and  agitations  of  his  own  life,  as  over  a  conceal- 
ed and  slumbering  volcano,  which  whosoever  presump- 
tuously dares  to  lay  open  or  kindle  up,  it  bums  like 
a  consuming  fire.  Easily  excited,  these  concealed 
powers  rend  the  thin  veil  which  covers  them  ;  and 
those  otherwise  benevolent  quahties,  when  brought  in- 
to disorder,  turn  to  bitter  rage  and  demoniacal  fury. 
The  state  of  one  who  has  permitted  his  sensuousness 
to  gain  the  predominance  over  him — a  condition  which 
may  daily  be  observed — is  in  like  manner  only  to  be 
considerd  as  a  perversion  of  relations,  as  a  hostile  out- 
breaking of  that  which  properly  belongs  to  the  depth, 
and  which  in  its  subordinate  sphere  was  designed  to 
promote  the  operations  of  life. 

It  must  without  controversy  be  assumed  that  the 
first  rupture  caused  by  excited  impulse  was  to  the 
power  of  human  nature,  yet  fresh  and  undepraved,  like 
a  mighty  electrical  discharge,  and  took  place  with  ex- 
traordinary violence  ;  and  that  this  rupture  was  accom- 
panied with  particular  consequences  in  the  highest  de- 
gree remarkable  in  their  kind.  The  young  life,  still 
immediately  warmed  with  the  spirit  of  the  first  crea- 
tion, in  respect  to  good  and  evil  must  have  been  capa- 


155 

ble  of  an  energy  now  no  longer  felt ;  and  hence  also 
in  the  first  fall  a  greatness  of  excited  passions  may 
have  been  experienced  which  it  were  impossible  for 
the  sluggishness  of  a  later  race  to  comprehend.  It  is 
therefore  not  for  one  moment  to  be  doubted  but  that 
such  a  catastrophe  had  a  most  powerful  influence  upon 
the  entire  being  of  the  first  Parents,  and  that  it  left  be- 
hind deep  traces  upon  their  organization. 

Human  nature   after   the   fall    became    something 
very  different  from  that  first  and  original  nature ;    not 
differing  indeed  in  essence  and  substance,  but  in  regard 
to  the  reciprocal  relation  of  its  powers.      This  modifi- 
cation could  not  possibly  have   entered  into  the  first 
parents  of  the  human  family  without  leaving  a  physical 
influence  upon  their  posterity  ;  and   hence  we  have — 
not    an    hereditary  sin,  (for  the    conception  of  such 
sin  is  in  itself  contradictious,  and  the   Will  is  the  One 
thing  which  cannot  be  transmitted  as  an   inheritance,) 
— but  a  predominance  of  the  irrational  principle  propa- 
gated by  generation,— a  continual  solicitation   from  the 
natural  side  of  our  being,  which   is  always  striving  to 
raise  itself  from  the  depth  to  which  it  belongs,  and  to 
gain  over  man  that  dominion   which  it   was  never  de- 
signed to  exercise.     Since,  now,  this  side  of  our  being, 
as  that  which  stands  deepest,  is  always  in  the  order  of 
time  antecedent  to  the  intelligent  principle,  and  hence 
from  youth  up  the  Reason  being  as   yet  unadmonished 
and  the  Will  not  proportionally  strengthened,  they  do 
not  withstand  it  sufficiently  early  ;  so  in  the  progress  of 
life  this  dark  power  by  its  bewitching  arts  introduces  at 


156 

least  inefficiency  and  headlong  precipitance,  of  which 
even  the  best  have  found  cause  to  accuse  themselves. 

We  hope  that  the  objection  of  arbitrariness  will  not 
be  urged  against  this  attempt  to  explain  the  universal- 
ity of  sin.     Unless  we  are  totally  deceived,  throughout 
the  whole  representation  none  but  compulsory  grounds 
have  been  taken — not  seldom,  we  are  free  to  confess, 
with  the  strugghng  feelings  and  inward  aversion  of  the 
author.     Not  to  mention  the   painfulness   excited   by 
the  supposition  of  an  hereditary  sin,  nor  to  notice  the 
contradiction  involved  in  the  assertion  itself, — a  contra- 
diction with  which  the  author  feels  conscious  that  the 
present  essay  is   not  chargeable, — yet    even   the   as- 
sumption of  an  inherited  wicked  disposition  contains  in 
it    something   unkind    and    forbidding. — That    theory 
which  places  the  occasioning  cause  of  universal  sinful- 
ness, not  immediately  in  a  disposition  of  the  Will,  but 
in  that  excitation  of  the  irrational  principle  which  took 
place  already  in   the  first  Parents,  is  unquestionably 
more  tolerable  and  in  every  respect  more  conceivable  ; 
a  theory  which   on  the  one  side  is  conformable  to   ex- 
perience, and  on  the  other  still  leaves  open  the   hope 
of  victory  over  evil  and  always  guarantees  to  man  the 
freedom  of  election.     Both   these,  as  it  seems,   must 
fall  away,  if  a  principle  of  wickedness  be  placed  origi- 
nally in   the  human  will  itself,  and  if  it  be  maintained 
that  we  are   therefore  incapable  of  any  good,  but  are 
rather  wicked  by  nature  and  born   sinners.      No  one 
can  hesitate  to  consider  this   theory,  invented  for  the 
pretended  honour  of  religion,  as  a  calumny  upon  human 
nature — a  calumny  which  can  be  justified  on  no  ground 


157 

whatever.  Besides,  whosoever  from  a  religious  zeal 
would  defend  the  above  figment  also  renders  himself 
obnoxious  to  the  charge  of  slander  against  the  love  of 
God  towards  man,  which  must  likewise  be  maintained. 
For  even  a  fallen  spirit — in  reference  to  evil  constantly 
striving  against  it,  although  not  always  victorious  yet 
not  absolutely  wicked — may  be  an  object  of  love  and 
complacency  to  a  holy  Being.  That  an  inter-commu- 
nion of  love  and  of  faith  should  exist  between  beings 
diametrically  opposed  to  each  other  in  their  characters, 
is  not  possible  ;  but  can  this  relation  between  God  and 
man  be  misapprehended  ?  Is  it  not  plain  in  language 
and  in  word,  in  tradition,  in  revelation  and  religion, 
through  all  ages  of  the  world  down  to  the  present 
time  ? 

Correspondent  to  that  attractiveness  which  goes 
forth  from  the  eternal  Central  Point,  and  which,  not- 
withstanding that  sin  has  entered  into  the  soul,  still 
draws  it  with  the  living  bond  of  Divine  love,  there  is 
found  in  all  religion  a  reflex  effort  of  the  spirit  to  return 
to  God  ;  and  connected  with  it  there  is  universally 
found  an  amiableness  and  benevolence  more  or  less 
pure.  This  movement  of  the  soul  tending  towards 
and  seeking  the  One  and  the  Eternal  as  the  Centre, 
must  first  be  annihilated  before  it  can  be  said  that  the 
fall  of  man  was  an  entire  and  total  apostasy  ; — an  irre- 
concilable disseverance  between  himself  and  his  God. 
Nay  it  is  even  by  sin,  or  the  feeling  of  errour  and  of 
guilt,  through  which  an  entirely  peculiar  inwardness 
is  imparted  to  religion ;  and  from  this  cause  it  is  that 
14 


158 

in  Christianity  there  is  found  to  exist  that  deep  serious- 
ness, that  consciousness  of  the  need  of  salvation,  and 
that  lively,  spirited  commingling  of  sadness  and  of  joy. 
To  derive  the  origin  of  religion  and  of  revelation 
from  sin  itself  were  unsatisfactory,  and  woul3  give  rise 
to  unworthy  views.  Religion  is  natural  to  every  better 
unfallen  spirit ;  and  an  inter-communion  between  God 
and  man  is  appropriate  to  the  nature  of  both.  Yet 
through  the  introduction  of  sin  among  men  there  has 
arisen  a  new  and  peculiar  need  of  religion.  On  sin  too 
is  grounded  not  only  the  necessity  of  a  higher  Divine 
guidance,  but  also  the  indispensableness  of  a  scheme  of 
atonement  resting  upon  a  particular  revelation.  As 
every  particular  individual  of  the  present  race  of  men 
becomes  human  only  through  instruction  and  superinten- 
ding care,  and  as  he  stands  in  need  of  education  to  aid 
his  better  being,  and  to  develope  and  sustain  his  spiritual 
part  in  opposition  to  the  irrational  nature ;  so  also  (fal- 
len) humanity  in  the  aggregate,  (in  order  that  human 
education  may  thereby  have  a  ground  and  continuance,) 
cannot  surely  dispense  with  superhuman  guidance  and 
education.  As  in  organic  life  where  a  strongly  ex- 
cited activity  calls  forth  its  antagonist  principle,  and 
leads  to  opposition,  so  also  by  the  appearance  of  evil 
it  was  demanded  that  good  should  come  forth  as  an  an- 
tithesis to  this  phenomenon ;  or  it  became  necessary 
that  good  should  manifest  itself.  This  special  revela- 
tion can  never  cease  from  men  until  sin  has  not  only 
as  it  were  interrupted,  but  absolutely  destroyed  the  re- 
ciprocal relation  between  God  and  us ;  so  that  by  this 


159 

destruction  there  would  be  effected  an  entire  cessation 
of  communion  with  God,  an  absolute  irreconcilable  dis- 
severance. In  this  case,  however,  a  perfect  separation 
would  be  necessary,  and  with  the  withdrawal  of  God 
from  theTallen  creature,  the  necessary  result  would  be 
for  the  latter  a  state  of  entire  rejection,  or  rather  a 
proper  non-entity. 

The  religious  doctrines  of  the  oldest  nations  accord 
with  the  view  now  presented,  for  among  them  human 
nature  was  indeed  universally  considered  as  fallen,  but 
it  was  never  regarded  as  having  irrecoverably  aposta- 
tized. Hence  we  find  that  the  hope  of  re-union  and 
reconciliation,  (more  or  less  distinct  and  perfect,)  was 
universal ;  but  no  whefe  do  we  find  any  people  despair- 
ing of  a  possible  return.  And  this  distrust  was  the  less, 
since  among  the  most  remarkable  people  of  antiquity, 
(as  the  Indians  and  Egyptians,)  there  was  spread 
abroad  the  belief  in  a  means  of  deliverance  eflFected  by 
Divine  power,  and  a  new  relationship  of  man  with  God. 
They  believed  God  himself  to  be  manifested  in  a  finite 
form  of  being.^  It  is  very  instructive  and  affecting  to 
see  in  the  mysterious  doctrines  of  antiquity  how  the  con- 
solation of  redemption  always  goes  side  by  side  with 

^  Tholuck  has  shown  that  the  hope  and  expectation  of  a 
Divine  Restorer,  of  a  coming  age  of  virtue,  was  not  confined 
to  the  Indians  and  Egyptians,  but  vt^as  also  prevalent  among 
the  Persians,  the  Chinese,  the  Greeks  and  the  Romans,  in 
short,  that  it  was  universal.  Leh,  v.  d.  Siin.  merit  Beilage. 
6.229—237.     Tr. 


160 

evil,  and  how,  although  guilt  and  death  have  come  into 
the  world,  yet  no  religion  has  ever  recognized  their 
power  as  forever  binding ;  but  rather  from  this  wreck 
of  the  first  there  arises  another  creation,  and  through 
continual  reformation  and  renewal,  light  springs  from 
the  bosom  of  night,  and  out  of  the  midst  of  death  life 
is  born. 

Such  a  view  is  necessary  for  him  who  feels  that  his 
earthly  hfe,notw^ithstanding  sin,  is  still  interpenetrated  by 
that  which  is  above  earth ;  and  who  feels  that  man, 
with  all  his  deficiences,  is  yet  in  no  way  thrown  without 
the  circle  of  the  Divine  life  and  influence.  For  man 
generally  this  conviction  is  the  first  and  most  indispen- 
sable condition  of  reform  and  salvation ;  and  in  it 
science  finds  the  resolvent  word  which  unriddles  the 
difficulty  presented  by  the  existence  of  evil  in  the  world. 

It  is  only  from  a  religious  stand-point,  as  it  would 
seem,  that  we  are  able  to  gain  a  view  with  regard  to 
the  relation  of  sin  to  the  holiness  and  wisdom  of  God, 
which,  although  it  may  not  embrace  all  the  bearings  and 
connexions  of  the  subject,  may  yet  prove  satisfactory, 
and  may  serve  to  obviate  the  chief  difficulties  raised 
against  freedom  on  account  of  its  abuse.  From  the 
preceding  investigation,  indeed,  it  appears  that  the  ex- 
istence of  sin  does  not  render  doubtful  the  actual  and 
present  existence  of  the  free  will,  but  rather  confirms 
it.  It  is  true,  however,  that  doubts  with  respect  to  the 
derivation  of  freedom  from  God  may  be  raised  from  the 
fact  that  sin  is  the  offspring  of  the  misuse  of  freedom — 
a  freedom  not  always  infallible.     All  will  readily  con- 


161 

cede  that  if  there  had  been  no  freedom,  sin  or  moral 
evil,  never  could  have  had  any  existence.  Hence  the 
question  particularly  urges  itself  upon  our  consideration  ; 
How  could  the  Divine  Will,  which  is  and  only  can  be 
a  Will  of  Good,  have  willed  such  a  freedom  with  which 
is  evidently  connected  at  least  the  possibility  of  evil  ? 

In  the  course  of  the  preceding  essay  it  has  been 
shown  from  ultimate  grounds  that  such  a  freedom  of 
will  as  is  possessed  by  finite  creatures  must  not  only 
have  had  the  concurrence  of  the  Divine  Will  permit- 
ting its  existence,  but  that  it  must  have  been  express- 
ly willed  by  God,  nay,  that  it  must  be  regarded  as  the 
very  key  stone  of  that  creation  known  to  us.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  we  trust  it  has  been  satisfactorily 
shown,  that  although  no  immorality  were  possible  with- 
out moral  freedom,  that  yet  freedom  itself  in  its  essen- 
tial being  is  to  be  considered  as  a  good,  even  as  the 
highest  good  of  human  nature  ;  and  consequently,  is 
in  no  sense  to  be  regarded  as  something  actually  evil. 
But  it  is  the  characteristic  peculiarity  of  this  good  be- 
stowed upon  humanity,  that  the  possibility  of  its  abuse 
cannot  be  excluded  without  at  the  same  time  remov- 
ing with  it  the  good  itself.  He  who  willed  that  man 
should  exist,  must  also  have  willed  his  freedom  ;  but 
he  who  willed  human  freedom,  evidently  could  not  ex- 
clude from  it  the  possibility  of  false  election.  The 
Will  were  falsely  called  a  self-subsistent  Power  if  it 
could  determine  in  regard  to  one  course  of  conduct  on- 
ly, but  in  reference  to  the  other  was  determined  by  a 
superiour  destiny.  Besides,  we  should  have  to  call  the  , 
14* 


162 

election  of  good,  in  case  the  contrary  were  an  impossi- 
bility, unfree  and  worthless ;  or  rather  there  would  be 
no  election  at  all,  but  absolute  pre-determination.  To 
say  that  in  leaving  man  free,  God  did  by  that  act  de- 
cree the  existence  of  evil,  would  be  a  groundless  as- 
sumption resting  upon  an  ignorance  of  the  character  of 
freedom,  and  upon  entirely  false  representations  of 
God  and  his  Will.  Even  Omnipotence,  for  the  very 
reason  that  it  is  Divine  omnipotence,  stands  subject  to 
the  laws  of  universal  and  eternal  truths ;  and  whatsoever 
involves  in  itself  a  contradiction,  as  being  absolutely  im- 
possible, that  is  also  impossible  for  the  Divine  Will. 

To  will  the  dignity  of  spiritual  personality  and  of 
morality,  and  yet  not  at  the  same  time  to  will  freedom, 
were  contradictory,  and  hence  not  possible  even  for 
the  Creator.  To  will  the  freedom  of  a  human,  that 
is,  of  an  imperfect  being,  and  yet  by  any  kind  of 
constraint  to  exclude  from  that  freedom  the  possibility 
of  evil,  would  also  be  contradictory  in  itself,  and  there- 
fore in  no  way  possible  for  the  Divine  Will.  It  is 
only  from  the  fact  that  God  willed  the  actual  existence 
of  the  Good,  because  he  willed  that  the  morality  of  a 
personal  being  should  rest  upon  free  unbiassed  elec- 
tion, that  he  made  the  free  creature  the  reflected  im- 
age of  himself;  between  them,  however,  there  is  this 
difference,  that  with  the  former  co-exists  the  possi- 
bility of  evil,  which  can  never  be  an  object  of  the 
Divine  Will.  But  the  Divine  understanding  saw 
that  the  possibility  of  evil  was  something  inseparably 
connected  with  finite  freedom,  and  that  therefore  it 


163 

was  the  necessary  condition  of  true,  that  is,  of  free 
morahty.  After  all  this  it  may  correctly  be  said  that 
whosoever  claims  for  man  the  impossibility  of  sin,  at 
the  same  time  removes  from  him  the  possibility  of 
moral  good,  and  thereby  adjudges  to  evil  a  rank  and 
importance  which  by  no  means  belong  to  it. 

The  evil  actually  accasioned  by  sin  is  not  of  itself 
so  great,  that  in  order  to  prevent  it,  the  highest  good, 
spiritual  personality  and  self-determination,  should 
have  been  denied  to  man  ;  for  in  that  case  in  order 
to  obviate  the  possibility  of  a  relative  evil,  it  would 
have  been  necessary  to  impose  upon  him  something 
absolutely  evil,  viz.  a  mechanism  incapable  of  moral- 
ity. The  highest  end  after  which  creation  strives  is 
the  self-subsistent  developing  of  moral  natures.  Evil 
should  not  be  rendered  impossible  in  it,  but  should  be 
vanquished  in  manly  conflict.  Constrained  unifor- 
mity and  limitation  of  powers  cannot  in  the  least  be 
reconciled  with  the  highest  view  of  a  Divine  Gover- 
nour  ;  and  in  the  circumstance  that  God  imparts  to 
the  creature  a  freedom  which  can  manifest  itself  in 
opposition  lo  Him,  as  well  as  in  harmony  and  love, 
seems  to  lie  the  evidence  not  only  of  the  highest 
power,  but  also  of  the  Divine  love  and  self-denial. 
Yet  the  influence  and  importance  which  belong  to 
the  evil  actually  springing  from  this  striving  against 
God,  are  both  finite  and  circumscribed.  Good  only, 
as  participant  of  the  Divine  nature,  is  indestructible  and 
eternal.  But  evil  arising  as  a  kind  of  accompaniment 
in  the  formation  and  developement  of  finite  powers 


164 

endowed  with  self-subsistence,  is  on  this  very  account, 
so  far  as  its  actualness  is  concerned,  merely  a  tempo- 
ral phenomenon.  But  with  its  first  appearance  in  a 
finite  state  commenced  also  a  Divine  method  of  sal- 
vation, which  throughout  all  periods  of  the  w^orld  has 
been  gradually  developing  itself.  By  means  of  this 
redemptive  plan  the  character  of  a  Divine  scheme 
remains  perfectly  vindicated  for  nature  and  for  history ; 
and  in  a  manner,  too,  which  reconciles  all  apparent 
contradictions,  in  that  it  is  conformable  to  the  holiness 
and  the  goodness  of  the  Creator,  as  well  as  to  the  free- 
dom of  the  finite  though  not  guiltless  creature. 

It  is  true  in  a  very  limited  sense  only  that  God 
permits  sin  or  evil,  or  that  he  ever  did  permit  it.  In 
the  whole  circle  of  physical  powers — the  appropriate 
domain  of  might  and  natural  energy — no  one  is  able- 
to  point  out  any  thing  actually  evil.  Considered  ab- 
solutely and  in  itself  as  an  effect  upon  nature,  an  act 
could  be  regarded  as  evil,  not  simply  when  committed 
by  an  evil  will  striving  against  God,  but  when  suffi- 
ciently powerful  to  operate  destructively  upon  the 
system  of  the  universe,  to  suspend  the  operation  of 
the  divine  laws  imposed  upon  it,  and  thus  to  counter- 
act the  efficient  determinations  of  God  himself.  But 
no  one  has  yet  adduced  any  proof  too  show  that  an 
evil  act  has  this  power  ;  nor  has  the  position  been  con- 
troverted that  the  world  is  upon  the  whole  governed 
by  good  and  not  by  evil  powers.  Yet  the  Good  exer- 
cises one  dominion  in  the  circle  of  the  physical,  and 
another  in  that  of  the  spiritual  and  moral  powers.      In 


165 

the  latter  there  never  does  exist,  and,  according  to  our 
very  conception  of  it,  never  did  exist  on  the  part  of 
God,  any  physical  constraint,  and  consequently  no 
compulsory  prevention  of  moral  evil.  But  moral 
means  of  deliverance — by  revelation,  religion  and  effi- 
cient grace — as  the  only  conceivable  principles  which 
could  be  brought  to  bear  in  this  domain,  are  opposed 
to  moral  evil.  God  has  not  destroyed  the  essential 
character  of  the  creature  ;  and  the  latter  abusing  that 
freedom  which  was  bestowed  upon  it  no  longer  chooses 
the  right  alone,  but  is  in  a  continual  conflict  between 
good  and  evil.  But  inasmuch  as  each  individual's 
sphere  of  action  is  very  much  circumscribed,  so  also 
the  evil  which  he  may  effect  must  be  very  limited  ; 
whilst  on  the  other  hand  good,  as  participant  of  the 
Divine  nature,  on  that  account  carries  within  itself  the 
guarantee  of  final  victory.  On  account  of  this  peculi- 
arity of  good,  Divine  revelations,  as  illuminating  phe- 
nomena, shine  through  the  most  ancient  history — as 
phenomena,  in  which,  together  with  the  pervasion  of 
supersensuous  powers,  the  might  and  energy  of  good 
exhibited  themselves  as  victorious.  And  from  this 
very  circumstance  it  is  plain  that  with  God  there  is  no 
unconditional  toleration  of  evil.  Consequently  with 
the  outbreaking  of  sin  the  infant  race  of  man  was  by 
no  means  annihilated  in  its  birth,  but  on  the  contrary 
sin  itself  was  made  the  occasion  of  establishing  a  mode 
of  regeneration  which  no  one  will  find  to  be  inappro- 
priate, who  thinks  that  the  existence  and  continuance 
of  humanity  is  at  least  sufferable,  and  who  thinks  the 


166 

redemption  of  the  world  more  desirable  than  would 
have  been  its  destruction. 


Presumptuous  as  it  may  appear  to  wish  to  pene- 
trate into  the  secrets  of  the  Divine  counsels  ;  and  cer- 
tain as  it  is  that  at  this  precise  point  there  is  opened 
up  before  the  spirit  a  depth,  into  which  it  may  look  in- 
deed, (though  not  without  shuddering  and  terrour,) 
without  yet  being  able  to  fathom  it ;  still  with  him 
who  acknowledges  God  there  can  be  no  real  doubts  in 
reference  to  the  final  end  of  this  history,  for  he  feels 
assured  that  the  powers  that  enter  upon  a  finite  state 
of  being  do  all,  though  it  may  be  in  general,  tend  to 
one  grand  result.  Every  individual  or  particular  being 
has  actual  existence  conferred  upon  it  because  God 
must  manifest  himself.  And  from  the  fountain  of  eter- 
nal birth  once  opened  up  there  burst  forth  every  varied 
form  ;  and  in  the  progressive  formation  and  distinction 
of  powers,  upon  the  highest  point  of  creation,  where 
spiritual  personality  is  developed  and  free  powers  ope- 
rate, there  also  evil  makes  its  appearance  as  an  accom- 
paniment arising  from  that  formative  process.  Consid- 
ered as  evil,  it  is  not  that  which  the  active  powers  of 
the  world  seek  to  attain  as  their  end,  but  must  rather 
be  considered  as  that  which  is  to  be  entirely  separated 
through  various  clarifying  processes, — as  the  dross 
which  is  to  be  more  and  more  separated  from  the  pure 
metal.  Once  separated,  no  longer  in  conflict  or  com- 
mixture with  the  good,  evil  ceases  to  be  evil ;    as  after 


167 

a  thorough  separation  the  heterogeneous  masses  that 
remain  no  longer  stand  in  a  disturbing  relation  with  the 
gold  that  has  been  obtained  pure. 

Every  power  strives  after  an  end ;  every  course 
seeks  to  return  into  its  beginning.  The  creature 
also  seeks  its  beginning  again  ;  yet  without  being  at 
the  end  of  its  seeking  merely  the  same  that  it  was  at 
the  beginning.  The  conscious  and  personal  being  is 
only  as  it  were  raised  to  the  state  of  individuality,  in 
order  that  at  the  end  he  may,  by  the  free  self-subsis- 
tent  direction  of  his  own  spirit,  bring  himself  so  to  har- 
monize with  the  whole,  as  before  creation  in  the  peace- 
ful depth  of  eternity,  All  Powers  were  as  but  One  Pow- 
er. Then  will  God  be  All  and  in  All,  when  every 
creature  without  ceasing  to  have  an  individual  exist- 
ence shall  yet  find  itself  in  willing  accord  and  harmo- 
nious union  with  Him. 

That  now  which  here  appears  to  be  the  end  of  the 
world's  history,  is  at  the  same  time  the  problem  to  be 
solved  by  every  individual  human  life,  in  whom  the  laws 
of  the  Universal  are  Spiritually  repeated.  Correspon- 
dent to  the  voice  of  the  indwelling  conscience  and  of  each 
one's  reason  are  the  particular  Divine  revelations  made 
to  man  ;  and  these  revelations  are  but  so  many  eviden- 
ces of  a  continual  inter-communion  between  God  and 
us,  and  are  at  the  same  time  so  many  means  of  impart- 
ing light,  and  the  power  of  a  higher  world,  to  those  engag- 
ed in  a  free  conflict  with  darkness.  As  the  summit  of 
all  Divine  revelation,  but  also  as  the  Archetype  of  man 
and  the  Image  of  God,  Christ  stands  forth  in  the  midst 


168 

of  the  World's  History.  In  him  we  recognize  the 
sound  and  living  germ  around  which  a  new  spiritual 
creation  is  gradually  formed,  and  from  which  also  light 
and  energy  are  continually  streaming  forth  through  all 
the  arteries  and  veins  of  this  new  world,  and  whence 
they  will  forever  continue  to  stream.  This  temporal 
state  is  not  one  rejected  of  God,  but  was  rather  chosen 
by  Him  as  one  in  which  moral  natures  might  form 
themselves  into  harmony  with  the  whole. 

For  dark  matter  also  there  is  in  reserve  a  higher 
transmutation  and  clarification,  even  a  concord  with  the 
life  of  Spirits. 

On  the  great  circle  which  creation  describes,  this 
re-union  of  things  marks  the  point  where  the  end  rests 
again  upon  the  beginning  ;  and  here  God  becomes  All 
and  in  All.  Yet  even  here  things  cease  not  to  have 
their  own  separate  existence  ;  but  the  Original  Idea 
rather  shines  with  unsullied  lustre  in  Each  Individual 
One. 

But  here  we  meet  with  objects  of  consideration, 
which,  although  not  foreign  to  the  present  inquiry,  yet , 
seem  worthy  of  a  particular  and  not  merely  an  inci- 
dental examination.  Hence  the  author  of  the  present 
treatise  has  long  had  the  wnsh,  and  has  formed  the  deter- 
mination, if  his  situation  should  permit,  to  bestow  upon 
them  a  more  circumstantial  examination  at  another 
time.^ 

^  The  Author  did  not  live  to  accomplish  liis  purpose.  Tr, 


APPENDIX. 


A. 

As  the  word  Idea  is  of  such  constant  use  in  Philos- 
ophy, the  critical  reader  cannot  but  be  pleased  with  the 
following  extract.  It  is  taken  from  an  article  of  pro- 
found thought  and  learned  research  on  Brown's  Theo- 
ry of  Perception,  and  may  be  found  in  the  Edinburgh 
Review  for  1830.  We  could  not  conveniently  em- 
body it  in  the  work,  and  have  therefore  thrown  it  into 
the  appendix.  The  writer  is  commenting  upon  this 
passage  in  Brown's  lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of 
Mind  :  "  In  the  Philosophy  of  the  Peripatetics,  and  in 
all  the  dark  ages  of  the  scholastic  followers  of  that  sys- 
tem, ideas  were  truly  considered  as  little  images  de- 
rived from  objects  without;  and,  as  the  word  idea 
still  continued  to  be  used  after  this  original  meaning 
had  been  abandoned,  (as  it  continues  still,  in  all  the 
works  that  treat  of  perception,)  it  is  wonderful  that 
many  of  the  accustomed  forms  of  expression,  which 
were  retained  together  with  it  should  have  been  of  a 
kind  that,  in  their  strict  etymological  meaning,  m^ight 
have  seemed  to  harmonize  more  with  the  theory  of 
ideas  as  images,  which  prevailed  when  these  particular 
forms  of  expression  originally  became  habitual,  than 
with  that  of  ideas  as  m^e  states  of  the  mirid  itself; 
15 


170 

since  this  is  only  what  has  happened  with  respect  to 
innumerable  other  words,  in  the  transmutations  of 
meaning  which  they  have  received  during  the  long 
progress  of  scientific  inquiry.  The  idea,  in  the  old 
philosophy,  had  been  that,  of  which  the  presence  im- 
mediately preceded  the  mental  perception, — the  direct 
external  cause  of  perception  ;  and  accordingly,  it  may 
well  be  supposed,  that  when  the  direct  cause  of  per- 
ception was  believed  to  be,  not  a  foreign  phantasm, 
but  a  peculiar  affection  of  the  sensorial  organ,  that 
word,  which  had  formerly  been  appHed  to  the  suppo- 
sed object,  would  still  imply  some  reference  to  the  or- 
ganic state,  which  was  believed  to  supply  the  place  of 
the  shadowy  film,  or  phantasm,  in  being,  what  it  had 
been  supposed  to  be,  the  immediate  antecedent  of  per- 
ception."    Lect.  XXVI. 

"  It  is  always  unlucky  to  stumble  on  the  threshold. 
The  paragraph  [quoted  above]  in  which  Dr.  Brown 
opens  his  attack  on  Reid,  contains  more  mistakes  than 
sentences  ;  and  the  etymological  discussion  it  involves, 
supposes  as  true,  what  is  not  simply  false,  but  diamet- 
rically opposite  to  the  truth.  Among  other  errors — in 
the  first  place,  the  term  ^  idea '  was  never  employed 
in  any  system,  previous  to  the  age  of  Descartes,  to 
denote  '  little  images  derived  from  objects  without.^ 
In  the  second,  it  was  never  used  in  any  philosophy, 
prior  to  the  same  period,  to  signify  the  immediate  ob- 
ject of  perception.  In  the  third f  it  was  not  applied 
by  the  '  Peripatetics  or  Schoolmen,'  to  express  an  ob- 
ject of  human  thought  at  all,      In  the  fourth,  ideas 


171 

(taking  this  term  for  species)  were  not  ^  in  all  the  dark 
ages  of  the  scholastic  followers  of  Aristotle/  regarded 
as  *  little  images  derived  from  without ;'  for  a  numer- 
ous party  of  the  most  illustrious  schoolmen  rejected 
species,  not  only  in  the  intellect,  but  in  the  sense.  In 
the  Jijth  '  phantasm,'  in  ^  the  old  philosophy,'  was  not 
the  '  external  cause  of  perception  '  but  the  internal  ob- 
ject of  imagination.  In  the  sixth,  the  term  ^  shadowy 
film'  which  here  and  elsewhere  he  constantly  uses, 
shows  that  Dr.  Brown  confounds  the  matterless  species 
of  the  Peripatetics  with  the  substantial  effluxions  of 
Democritus  and  Epicurus 

duse,  quasi  memhrarKZ,  sunimo  de  cortice  rerum 
Dereptse,  volitant  ultro  citroque  per  auras. 

Dr.  Brown  in  short  only  fails,  in  illustrating  against 
Reid  the  various  meanings  in  which  '  the  old  writers  ' 
employed  the  term  idea,  by  the  little  fact,  that  the  old 
writers  never  employed  the  term  idea  at  all. 

The  history  of  the  word  idea  seems  completely 
unknown.  Previous  to  the  age  of  Descartes,  as  a  phi- 
losophical term,  it  was  employed  exclusively  by  the 
Platonists, — at  least  exclusively  in  a  Platonic  meaning ; 
and  this  meaning  was  precisely  the  reverse  of  that  at- 
tributed to  the  word  by  Dr.  Brown  ; — the  idea  was  not 
an  object  of  perception — the  idea  was  not  derived  from 
without, — In  the  schools,  so  far  from  being  a  current 
psychological  expression,  as  he  imagines,  it  had  no 
other  application  than  a  theological.  Neither,  after 
the  revival  of  letters,  was  the  term  extended  by  the 
Aristotelians  even  to  the  objects  of  intellect,     Melanc- 


178 

thon  indeed  (who  was  a  kind  of  semi-Platonist)  uses  it 
on  one  occasion  as  a  synonyme  for  notion,  or  intelligi- 
ble species  (De  Anima,  p.  187,  ed.  1555 ;)  but  it 
was  even  to  this  solitary  instance,  we  presume,  that 
Julius  Scaliger  alludes  (De  Subtilitaie,  VI,  4,)  when 
he  castigates  such  an  application  of  the  word  as  neo- 
teric and  abusive.  Q  Melanch.'  is  on  the  margin.) — 
We  should  have  distinctly  said  that  previous  to  its  em- 
plpyment  by  Descartes  himself,  the  expression  had 
n^ver  been  used  as  a  comprehensive  term  for  the  im- 
mediate objects  of  thought,  had  we  not  in  remem- 
brance the  Historia  Animce  Humance  of  our  country- 
man David  Buchanan.  This  work,  originally  written 
in  French,  had  for  some  years  been  privately  circula- 
ted previous  to  its  publication  at  Paris  in  1636.  Here 
we  find  the  word  idea  familiarly  employed,  to  express 
the  objects,  not  only  of  intellect  proper,  but  of  mem- 
ory, imagination,  sense ;  and  this  is  the  earliest  exam  - 
pie  of  such  an  employment.  For  the  Discourse  on 
Method  in  which  this  term  is  used  by  Descartes  in  an 
equal  latitude,  was  at  least  a  year  later  in  its  publica- 
tion— viz.,  in  June  1637.  Adopted  soon  after  also  by 
Gassendi,  the  word  under  such  imposing  patronage 
gradually  won  its  way  into  general  use.  In  England, 
however,  Locke  may  be  said  to  have  been  the  first 
who  naturalized  the  term  in  its  Cartesian  Universality. 
Hobbes  employs  it,  and  that  historically,  only  once  or 
twice ;  Henry  More  and  Cud  worth  are  very  chary  of 
it,  even  when  treating  of  the  Cartesian  philosophy ; 
[relatively  to  More  this  assertion  is  broadly  incorrect. 


173 

His  philosophic  pages  which  he  occupies  with  the 
higher  forms  of  metaphysical  discussion  are  literally 
sprinkled  with  the  word  idea,]  Willis  rarely  uses  it ; 
while  Lord  Herbert,  Reynolds,  and  the  English  philos- 
ophers in  general,  between  Descartes  and  Locke,  do 
not  apply  it  psychologically  at  all.  When  in  common 
language  employed  by  Milton  and  Dry  den,  after  Des- 
cartes, as  before  him,  by  Sidney,  Spenser,  Shak- 
speare.  Hooker,  &c.,  the  meaning  is  Platonic.  Our 
Lexicographers  are  ignorant  of  the  difference. 

The  fortune  of  this  word  is  curious.  Employed 
by  Plato  to  express  the  real  forms  of  the  intelHgible 
world,  in  lofty  contrast  to  the  unreal  images  of  the  sen- 
sible ;  it  was  lowered  only  when  Descartes  extended 
it  to  the  objects  of  our  consciousness  in  general. 
When,  after  Gassendi,  the  school  of  Condillac  had  an- 
alyzed our  highest  faculties  into  our  lowest,  the  idea 
was  still  farther  degraded  from  its  high  original.  Like 
a  fallen  angel,  it  was  relegated  from  the  sphere  of  Di- 
vine intelligence,  to  the  atmosphere  of  human  sense ; 
till  at  last  by  a  double  blunder  in  philosophy  atid 
Greek,  IdeOlogie  (for  Idealogie,)  a  word  which 
could  only  properly  suggest  an  a  j)riori  scheme,  dedu- 
cing our  knowledge  from  the  intellect,  has  in  France 
become  the  name  peculiarly  distinctive  of  that  philoso- 
phy of  mind  which  exclusively  derives  our  knowl- 
edge from  sensation. — Word  and  thing,  idea,  has  been 
the  crux  philosophorum,  since  Aristotle  cursed  it  to 
the  present  day  ; — tug  de  ideag  xcclQu&i '  tsgitiafimiit 
yug  Hoi:'  Vol.  LU.  p.  181-^. 
15* 


174 


B. 


The  remarks  in  the  text  to  which  this  note  refers 
are  evidently  levelled  against  the  theory  of  Kant,  who, 
it  is  well  known,  maintained  the  doctrine  of  two  reasons, 
or  Reason  under  the  twofold  form  of  the  Speculative 
and  the  Practical.  Speculative  reason  strives  to  give 
unity  and  comprehension  to  all  knowledge  by  classify- 
ing our  ideas,  and  ranging  them  under  particular  heads, 
such  as  absolute  substance,  absolute  cause,  and  the  like. 
Practical  reason  aims  to  give  unity  and  consistency  to 
all  our  desires  and  the  objects  to  which  they  are  direct- 
ed, by  holding  forth  to  our  view  ideas  and  principles 
which  it  generates  ;  or  it  is  the  province  of  practical 
reason  to  subordinate  our  desires  and  conform  them  to 
the  moral  law.  Reason,  therefore,  in  so  far  as  it  has 
power  to  regulate  our  desiring  faculty,  is  practical,  be- 
cause it  does  by  that  means  determine  our  practice. 
That  faculty  which  is  susceptible  of  being  directed  to 
action  through  the  determining  power  of  reason  is  the 
Will.  Practical  Reason  is  therefore  the  same  with 
Will. 

Kant  held  that  the  pure  reason  is  in  possession  of 
sciences,  a  priori,  as  mathematics  and  philosophy, 
which  are  grounded  in  the  unconditioned,  the  absolute 
and  the  eternal.  That  these  forms  of  cognition  may 
from  sense  through  the  understanding  be  traced  up  to 
their  fountain  analytically,  or  may  be  evolved  synthet- 
ically.     He  believed  in    the  actualness  of  an  outer 


175 

world,  but  declared  that  we  can  know  nothing  of  it  in 
itself;  and  of  matter  considered  in  itself  he  would  not 
ever  predicate  existence  in  time  and  space.  He  assert- 
ed that  all  we  can  know  of  it  are  the  phenomena  of 
which  we  are  conscious  ;  these  phenomena  are  in  the 
mind,  we  cannot  tell  any  thing  about  their  essential 
character,  and  they  succeed  each  other  according  to 
fixed  laws  of  necessity.  So  in  action,  all  that  we  know 
of  freedom  is  our  consciousness  of  it ;  we  can  tell  noth- 
ing about  it  considered  in  and  of  itself.  Freedom,  in 
his  system,  is  the  only  one  among  all  the  ideas  of  the 
speculative  reason,  which,  without  yet  having  an  insight 
into  it,  we  are  able  to  know  a  priori^  because  it  is  the 
condition  of  the  moral  law  with  which  we  are  acquaint- 
ed. (In  another  place,  however,  we  are  told  that  the 
moral  law  is  the  only  condition  under  which  we  can 
first  become  conscious  of  freedom.  In  order  to  recon- 
cile this  seeming  contradiction  we  must  bear  in  mind 
that  with  him  Freedom  is,  indeed,  the  ratio  essendi  of 
the  moral  law,  but  that  the  moral  law  itself  is  the  ratio 
cognoscendi  oii  freedoin.  For  if  the  moral  law  were 
not  distinctly  developed  in  our  reason  and  apprehend- 
ed by  it,  we  should  never  be  justified  in  assuming  the 
existence  of  freedom.  And  conversely,  were  there  no 
freedom,  we  should  never  meet  within  us  any  such 
thing  as  the  moral  law.)  The  ideas  of  God  and  im- 
mortality are  not  conditions  of  the  moral  law,  but  they 
are  only  the  conditions  of  a  will  determined  by  this 
law,  that  is,  conditions  merely  of  the  practical  employ- 
ment of  our  pure  reason.     It  is,  therefore  not  only  im- 


176 

possible  for  us  to  have  any  apprehension  or  insight  into 
the  actualness  of  these  ideas,  but  we  cannot  even  know 
any  thing  of  their  possibiUty.  Still,  however,  their 
real  existence  must  be  assumed  for  the  behoof  of  mor- 
al action  ;  and  it  is  sufficient  for  all  practical  purposes 
that  they  involve  no  impossibility  nor  inward  contradic- 
tion. He  therefore  assumes  freedom  as  a  postulate 
of  the  practical  reason,  without  clearly  showing  wheth- 
er, in  a  higher  and  transcendental  sense,  it  may  not  be 
under  the  law  of  a  rigorous  and  unchanging  necessity. 
It  would  seem,  th  en,  that  all  which  Kant  concedes  to  us 
physiologically  and  psychologically,  is  a  series  of  con- 
scious phenomena ;  in  the  wide  universe  of  being  he  has 
left  nothing  but  a  number  of  unknown  quantities — of 
things  in  themselves  nothing  can  be  predicated,  they 
are  without  form,  and  lie  far  beyond  the  circumference 
of  human  vision. 

Tennemann  in  noticing  Kant's  Practical  Reason  speaks 
thus  :  Reason,  however,  is  not  merely  theoretic,  but  is 
also  practical  in  the  determination  of  the  will,  by  the 
ideas  of  duty  and  right.  An  examination  of  the  concep- 
tion of  duty,  and  a  good  will  in  which  even  common 
reason  places  the  highest  worth  of  humanity,  leads  to 
a  recognition  of  practical  knowledge  a  priori,  in  which 
we  find  delineated  or  determined  not  that  which  is, 
but  that  which  should  be.  The  practical  reason  is  au- 
tonomic [self-law-giving,  ainog  v6f>togj]  it  determines 
only  the  form  of  the  will,  and  pre-supposes  freedom  as  a 
necessary  condition.  The  moral  law,  in  opposition  to  an 
empirically  determined  act  of  choice^  exhibits  itself  un- 


OF  TH«  \ 

der  the  character  of  a  categorical  imperative^  (aa  abso-  : 
lute  Ought  [unconditional  duty]),  and -places  itself  at 
the  very  summit  of  the  practical  philosophy.  As  the 
universal  rule  of  every  rational  will,  this  Imperative 
with  stern  necessity  precribes  a  universal  conformity 
to  the  law  [of  duty] ;  and  by  that  means  it  establishes 
the  highest  absolute  end  and  motive  of  acting,  which 
should  not  be  a  pathalogical  feeling  [mechanical  or 
blind  instinct,]  but  a  reverence  for  the  law,  as  virtue  is 
the  moral  strength  of  a  man's  will  in  the  pursuance  of 
his  duty,  (that  is,  of  moral  compulsion  by  his  law-giving 
reason,)  or  in  the  subordinating  of  his  propensities  and 
inclinations  to  reason.  The  ideas  of  God,  of  immortal- 
ity and  of  freedom,  obtain  through  the  moral  law  real- 
ity and  certainty.  Yet  this  conviction  of  their  certainr 
ty  is  no  theoretic  knowledge,  but  simply  a  practical 
belief  of  reason,  (Moraltheologie).  Grundriss  <§>  383. 
p.  469,  470. 

In  order  that  Kant  might  be  permitted  to  speak  for 
himself  on  this  point  we  have  ventured  to  undertake  the 
translation  of  a  passage  from  his  own  writings. 

Of  the  Idea  of  a  Critic  of  the  practical  Reason, 

The  theoretic  employment  of  reason  busies  itself 
merely  with  objects  of  the  cognitive  faculty,  and  a  Crit- 
ic of  Reason,  when  considered  in  reference  to  this  em- 
ployment, properly  treats,  only  of  the  pure  faculty  of 
cognition,  because  this  at  once  awakens  the  suspicion, 
which  is  also  subsequently  confirmed,  that  it  may  easi- 


178 

ly  lose  itself  in  striving  after  objects  unattainable  and 
beyond  its  own  boundaries,  or  amid  conceptions  al- 
together condictious  of  each  other.  The  case,  how- 
ever, is  entirely  otherwise  in  respect  of  the  practical 
use  of  reason.  In  this  latter  employment  the  reason 
is  occupied  with  the  grounds  of  determining  the  Will, 
which  is  a  faculty  that  in  outward  acts  is  able  to  em- 
body objects  corresponding  to  subjective  representa- 
tions, or  at  least  it  has  power  to  determine  itself  to- 
wards the  actualizing  of  these  representations,  (wheth- 
er the  physical  ability  may  be  sufficient  for  the  accom- 
plishment or  not,)  that  is,  it  can  establish  its  own  cau- 
sality. For  the  reason  can  at  least  attain  to  the  Will's 
determination,  and  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  concerned 
with  the  act  of  willing  does  it  possess  objective  reality. 
Here  then  rises  the  first  question  :  Is  the  pure  reason 
of  itself  alone  sufficient  for  the  determination  of  the 
will,  [does  it  determine  the  will],  or  is  it  a  ground  of 
determination  only  as  an  empirically  conditioned  rea- 
son ? 

But  here  now  there  enters  into  the  account  a 
conception  of  causality  justified  by  a  Critic  of  the  pure 
Reason,  but  susceptible  of  no  empirical  delineation^ 
namely,  the  conception  of  Freedom ;  and  could  we 
here  discover  reasons  to  prove  that  this  attribute  does 
in  fact  belong  to  the  human  will,  (and  therefore  also  to 
the  will  of  every  rational  being,)  it  would  thereby  be 
shown  not  only  that  the  pure  reason  may  be  practical, 
but  that  it  alone,  and  not  the  empirically  circumscribed 
reason,  is  practical  in  an  unconditional  manner.      Con- 


179 

sequently  we  would  have  no  occasion  to  elaborate  a 
Critic  of  the  pure  practical  Reason,  but  simply  of  the 
practical  Reason  in  general.  For  pure  Reason,  when 
it  is  in  the  first  place  proved  that  there  is  such,  stands 
in  no  need  of  a  Critic.  It  is  that  which  contains  with- 
in itself  the  standard,  (measuring-line,  Richtschnur,)  of 
a  Critic  in  respect  to  all  its  different  employments.  It 
therefore  becomes  obligatory  upon  a  Critic  of  the  prac- 
tical reason  generally,  to  keep  back  the  empirically 
conditioned  reason  from  abrogating  to  itself  the  claim 
that  it  alone  in  an  exclusive  way  is  to  furnish  the 
ground  of  the  will's  determination.  The  use  of  the 
pure  reason,  if  it  is  once  made  out  that  there  is  such, 
is  simply  immanent ;  but  the  empirically  conditioned 
employment,  which  arrogates  to  itself  the  sole  execu- 
tive dominion,  is  on  the  contrary  transcendent,  and 
manifests  itself  in  requisitions  and  commands  which  as- 
cend up  above  its  sphere.  This  relation  is  directly 
the  opposite  of  that  which  can  be  predicated  of  the  pure 
reason  in  its  speculative  employment. 

Meanwhile,  since  it  is  still  always  pure  reason, 
the  cognition  of  which  here  lies  as  the  basis  of  the 
practical  use,  so,  in  its  general  features,  the  division  or 
distribution  of  a  Critic  of  the  practical  reason  must  be 
graduated  conformably  to  that  of  the  speculative.  We 
must,  therefore,  have  in  it  a  Doctrine  of  Elements  and 
a  Doctrine  of  Method,  as  in  that  of  the  speculative 
Reason.  In  the  first  part  is  required  an  Analytic,  as  a 
rule  of  truth,  and  a  Dialectic  as  an  exhibition  and  a  so- 
lution of  the  phenomena  exhibited  in  judgments  of  the 


180 

practical  reason.  But  in  the  subdivisions  of  the  Analytic 
the  order  must  be  the  reverse  of  that  which  it  is  in  the 
Critic  of  the  pure  Speculative  Reason.  In  the  present 
case,  (practical  reason,)  beginning  with  fundamental 
principles  we  proceed  first  to  conceptions,  and  then 
where  it  is  possible,  to  the  senses  ;  but  in  the  speculative 
reason,  on  the  contrary,  we  must  commence  with  the 
senses,  and  end  with  fundamental  principles.  The 
ground  of  this  again  lies  herein  :  that  at  present  we 
have  to  do  with  a  will,  and  have  to  consider  the  reason 
not  in  relation  to  objects,  but  in  relation  to  this  will 
and  its  causality  ;  since  the  fundamental  principles  of  the 
empirically  unconditioned  causality  necessarily  consti- 
tute the  beginning,  after  which  the  attempt  can  first  be 
made  to  fix  firmly  our  conceptions  of  ihe  determining 
ground  of  such  a  will  in  its  application  to  objective  ends, 
and  finally  in  its  application  to  the  subject,  and  the  sub- 
ject's sensitive  faculty.  The  law  of  causality  proceeding 
from  freedom,  that  is,  from  some  pure  practical  funda- 
mental principle,  here  inevitably  constitutes  the  begin- 
ning, and  establishes  the  objective  ends  to  which  alone  it 
can  be  directed.      Critikder  pract,  Veniunft,  Einleit. 


Concerning  knowledge  ;  Behold,  saith  Moses,  I 
have  set  before  you  this  day  good  and  evil,  life  and 
death.  Concerning  Will,  he  addeth  immediately, 
Choose  life ;  that  is  to  say,  the  things  that  tend  unto 
life,  them  choose.     But  of  one  thing  we  must  have 


181 

special  care,  as  being  a  'matter  of  no  small  moment, 
and  that  is,  how  the  Will,  properly  and  strictly  taken, 
as  it  is  of  things  which  are  referred  unto  the  end  that 
man  desireth,  differeth  greatly  from  that  inferior  nat- 
ural desire  which  we  call  Appetite.  The  object  of 
Appetite  is  whatsoever  sensible  good  may  be  wished 
for;  the  object  of  Will  is  that  good  which  Reason 
doth  lead  us  to  seek.  Affections,  as  joy,  and  grief, 
and  fear,  and  anger,  and  such  like,  being  as  it  were 
the  sundry  forms  and  fashions  of  Appetite,  can  neither 
arise  at  the  conceit  of  a  thing  indifferent,  nor  yet  choose 
but  rise  at  the  sight  of  some  things.  Wherefore  it  is 
not  altogether  in  our  power,  whether  we  will  be  stirred 
with  affections  or  no.  Whereas  actions  which  issue 
from  a  disposition  of  the  Will,  are  in  the  power  there- 
"of  to  be  performed  or  stayed.  Finally,  Appetite  is 
the  Will's  Solicitor,  and  the  Will  is  Appetite's  ►con- 
troller ;  what  we  covet  according  to  the  one,  by  the 
other  we  often  reject.  Neither  is  any  other  desire 
termed  properly  Will,  but  that  where  Reason  and 
Understanding,  or  the  ghew  of  Reason,  prescribeth 
the  thing  desired.  It  may  be  therefore  a  question 
whether  those  operations  of  men  are  to  be  counted 
voluntary,  wherein  that  good  which  is  sensible  provo- 
kelh  Appetite,  and  Appetite  causeth  action,  Reason 
being  never  called  to  counsel ;  as  when  we  eat  or 
drink,  and  betake  ourselves  unto  rest,  and  such  like. 
The  truth  is,  that  such  actions  in  men,  having  attain- 
ed to  the  use  of  Reason,  are  voluntary  :  for  as  the 
authority  of  higher  powers  hath  force  even  in  tbos^ 
16 


182 

things  which  are  done  without  their  privity,  and  are 
of  so  mean  reckoning,  that  to  acquaint  them  there- 
with it  needeth  not :  in  hke  sort,  voluntarily  we  are 
said  to  do  that  also,  which  the  Will,  if  it  hsted,  might 
hinder  from  being  done,  although  about  the  doing 
thereof  we  do  not  expressly  use  our  Reason  or  Un- 
derstanding, and  so  immediately  apply  our  Wills  there- 
unto. In  cases  therefore  of  such  facility,  the  Will  doth 
yield  her  assent,  as  it  were,  with  a  kind  of  silence,  by 
not  dissenting ;  in  which  respect  her  force  is  not  so 
apparent  as  in  express-  mandates  or  prohibition,  espe- 
cially upon  advice  and  consultation  going  before. 
Where  Understanding  therefore  needeth,  in  those 
things  Reason  is  the  director  of  Man's  Will,  by  dis- 
covering in  action  what  is  good.  For  Laws  of  well- 
doing are  the  dictates  of  right  Reason.  Hooker 
Eccles.  Pol  B.  I. 


D. 

As  the  Ideas  of  the  Deity,  and  of  the  Perfect, 
constitute  the  first  and  the  last  truths  of  Philosophy 
as  well  as  of  Religion,  and  as  the  views  advanced  by 
our  author  are  oftentimes  controverted,  it  will  be  in- 
teresting to  hear  what  two  of  England's  greatest  scbol-^ 
ars  and  thinkers  have  said  on  the  point. 

^^  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the  Deity  is  more  incom- 
prehensible to  us  than  any  thing  else  whatsoever, 
which  proceeds  from  the  fullness  of  its  being  and  per- 
fection, and  from  the  transcendency  of  its  brightness  ; 


183 

but  for  the  very  same  reason  it  may  be  said  also,  in 
some  sense,  that  it  is  more  knowable  and  conceivable 
than  any  thing.  As  the  sun,  though  by  reason  of  its 
excessive  splendour,  it  dazzle  our  weak  sight,  yet  it  is 
notwithstanding  far  more  visible  also  than  any  of  the 
nebuloece  stellce,  the  small  misty  stars.  Where  there 
is  more  of  light  there  is  more  of  visibility  ;  so  where 
there  is  more  of  entity,  reality,  and  perfection,  there 
is  more  of  conceptibility  and  cognoscibility  ;  such  an 
object  filling  up  the  mind  more,  and  acting  more  strong- 
ly upon  it.  Nevertheless,  because  our  weak  and  im- 
perfect minds  are  lost  in  the  vast  immensity  and  redun- 
dancy of  the  Deity,  and  overcome  with  its  transcend- 
ant  light  and  dazzling  brightness,  therefore  hath  it  to 
us  an  appearance  of  darkness  and  incomprehensibility  ; 
as  the  unbounded  expansion  of  light,  in  the  clear  trans- 
parent ether,  hath  to  us  the  apparition  of  an  azure 
obscurity  ;  which  yet  is  not  an  absolute  thing  in  itself, 
but  only  relative  to  our  sense,  and  a  mere  fancy  in  us. 
The  incomprehensibility  of  the  Deity  is  so  far 
from  being  an  argument  against  the  reality  of  its  exist- 
ence, as  that  it  is  rhost  certain,  on  the  contrary,  that 
were  there  nothing  incomprehensible  to  us,  who  are 
but  contemptible  pieces,  and  small  atoms  of  the  uni- 
verse; were  there  no  other  being  in  the  world,  but 
what  our  finite  understandings  could  span  or  fathom, 
and  encompass  round  about,  look  through  and  through, 
have  a  commanding  view  of,  and  perfectly  conquer 
and  subdue  under  them  ;.  then  could  there  be  nothing 
absolutely  and  infinitely  perfect,  that  is,  no  God.     For 


184 

though  that  of  Empedocles  be  not  true  in  a  literal 
sense,  as  it  seems  to  have  been  taken  by  Aristotle 
yaia  fiip  ydg  ycuav  &;c.  that  by  earth  we  see  earth,  by 
water,  water,  and  by  fire,  fire  ;  and  understand  every 
thing  by  something  of  the  same  within  ourselves  :  yet 
is  it  certain,  that  every  thing  is  apprehended  by  some 
internal  congruity  in  that  which  apprehends,  which 
perhaps  was  the  sense  intended  by  that  noble  philo- 
sophic poet.  Wherefore  it  cannot  possibly  otherwise 
be,  but  that  the  finiteness,  scantness,  and  imperfection 
of  our  narrow  understandings  must  make  them  as- 
symetral,  or  incommensurate,  to  that  which  is  abso- 
lutely and  infinitely  perfect."  Cudworth's  Intellect. 
Syst.ofthe  Universe.  Lond.  1820  Vol.  III.  p.  221-3. 
'^  1.  Those  who  deny  Infinity  in  God,  must  ne- 
cessarily attribute  it  to  something]  else,  as  to  infinite 
Space,  infinity  of  succession  ol  ages  and  persons,  if  tliS 
world  were  eternal ;  and  therefore  it  is  most  unreasona- 
ble to  reject  any  notion  for  that  which  it  is  impossible, 
but  if  I  deny  that,  I  must  attribute  it  to  something  else, 
to  whose  Idea  it  is  far  less  proper  than  it  is  to  God's. 
2.  Lest  I  should  rather  seek  to  avoid  the  argument 
than  to  satisfy  it,  I  say,  that  though  infinite  as  in- 
finite cannot  be  comprehended,  yet  may  we  clearly 
and  distinctly  apprehend  a  Being  to  be  of  that  nature 
that  no  limits  can  be  assigned  to  it,  as  to  its  Power  or 
Presence  :  which  is  as  much  as  to  understand  it  to  be 
infinite.  The  ratio  formalis  of  Infinity  may  not  be 
understood  clearly  and  distinctly,  but  yet  the  Being 
which  is  infinite  may  be.     Infinity  itself  cannot  be  on 


185 

this  account,  because  however  positive  we  apprehend 
itj  yet  we  always  apprehend  it  in  a  negative  way,  be- 
cause we  conceive  it  by  denying  all  limitations  and 
bounds  to  it ;  but  the  Being  which  is  infinite  we  appre- 
hend in  a  Positive  Manner,  although  not  adequately, 
because  we  cannot  comprehend  all  which  is  in  it.  As 
we  may  clearly  and  distinctly  see  the  sea,  though  we 
cannot  discover  the  bounds  of  it ;  so  may  we  clearly  and 
distinctly  apprehend  some  Perfections  of  God  when 
we  fix  our  minds  on  them,  although  we  are  not  able  to 
grasp  them  altogether  in  our  narrow  and  confined  in- 
tellects, because  they  are  infinite.  Thus  we  see  that 
God's  Infinity  doth  not  at  all  abate  the  clearness  and 
distinctness  of  the  notion  which  we  have  of  God  ;  so 
that  though  the  perfections  of  God  are  without  bounds 
or  limits,  yet  it  bears  no  repugnance  at  all  to  men's  nat- 
ural faculties,  to  have  a  settled  Idea  of  a  Being  infinitely 
Perfect  in  their  minds. 

It  seems  highly  probable  and  far  more  consonant 
to  Reason  than  the  contrary,  that  this  Idea  of  God 
upon  the  mind  of  man,  is  no  merely  fictitious  Idea, 
but  that  it  is  really  imprinted  therq  by  that  God  whose 
Idea  it  is,  and  therefore  doth  suppose  a  reality  in  the 
thing  correspondent  to  that  objective  reality  which  is  in 
the  understanding.  For  although  I  am  not  so  well  satis- 
fied that  the  mere  objective  reality  of  the  Idea  of  God 
doth  exceed  the  efficiency  of  the  mind,  as  that  Idea 
is  nakedly  considered  in  itself,  because  of  the  unlimit- 
ed power  of  the  understanding  in  conception  :  yet  I 
say  considering  that  Idea  in  all  the  circumstances  of  it, 
16* 


186 

it  seems  highly  probable  that  it  is  no  mere  ens  rationis, 
or  figment  of  the  understanding :  and  that  will  appear 
on  these  considerations  :  1 .  This  Idea  is  of  such  a 
nature  as  could  not  be  framed  from  the  understanding's 
consideration  of  any  corporeal  phantasms.  Because 
whatever  hath  any  thing  of  matter  in  it,  involves  of 
necessity  many  imperfections  along  with  it ;  for  every 
part  of  matter  is  divisible  into  more  parts.  Now  it  is 
a  thing  evident  to  natural  light  that  it  is  a  greater  per- 
fection not  to  be  divisible  than  to  be  so.  Besides,  cor- 
poreal phantasms  are  so  far  from  helping  us  in  forming 
this  Idea,  that  they  alone  hinder  us  from  a  distinct 
conception  of  it,  while  we  attend  to  them  ;  because 
these  bear  no  proportion  at  all  to  such  a  Being.  So 
that  this  Idea  however  must  be  a  pure  act  of  Intellec- 
tion, and  therefore  supposing  there  were  no  other 
Faculty  in  man  but  imagination,  it  would  bear  the 
greatest  repugnancy  to  our  conceptions,  and  it  would 
be  according  to  the  principles  of  Epicurus  and  some 
modern  philosophers,  a  thing  wholly  impossible  to 
form  an  Idea  of  God,  unless  with  Epicurus  we  imagine 
him  to  be  corporeal,  which  is  to  say  he  is  no  God. 
'  Which  was  the  reason  that  TuUy  said  Epicurus  did  on- 
ly, nomine  ponere,  re  tollere  deos,  because  such  a 
notion  of  God  is  repugnant  to  natural  light.  So  that 
if  this  Idea  doth  wholly  abstract  from  corporeal  phan- 
tasms, it  thereby  appears  that  there  is  a  higher  Faculty 
in  man's  soul  than  mere  imagination,  and  it  is  hardly 
conceivable  whence  a  faculty  which  thus  extends  to 
an  infinite  object  should  come,  but  from  an  Infinite 


187 

Being:  especially  if  we  consider  ;  Secondly,  That  the 
understanding  in  forming  this  Idea  of  God,  doth  not 
by  distinct  acts  first  collect  one  perfection,  and  then 
another,  and  at  last  unite  these  together,  but  the  sim- 
plicity and  unity  of  all  these  perfections  is  as  necessarily 
conceived  as  any  of  them.     Granting  then  that  the 
understanding  by  the  observing  of  several  perfections 
in  the  world,  might  be  able  to  abstract  these  severally 
from    each    being  wherein  they  were,    yet    whence 
should  the  Idea  of  the  Unity  and  the  Inseparability 
of  all  these    Perfections    come  ?      The    mind  may, 
it  is  true,  knit  some  things  together  in  fictitious  ideas, 
but  then  those  are  so  far  from  unity  with  each  other, 
that  in  themselves  they  speak  mutual  repugnancy  to 
one  another,  which  makes  them  proper  entia  ratio- 
nis,  but  these  several  perfections  are  so  far  from  speak- 
ing repugnancy  to  each  other  that  the  Unity  and  In- 
separability of  them  is  as  necessary  to  the  forming  of 
this  Idea,  as  any  other    perfection  whatsoever.      So 
that  hence  it  appears  that  the  consideration  of  the  per- 
fections which  are  in  the  creatures,  is  only  an  occasion 
given  to  the  mind  to  help  it   in  its  Idea  of  God,  and 
not  that  the   Idea  itself  depends  upon  those  perfec- 
tions as  the  causes  of  it :    as  in  the  clearest  math- 
ematical  truths   the  manner   of    demonstratioa    may 
be  necessary   to  help   the   understanding  to  its  clear 
assent,  though  the  things  in  themselves  be  undoubtedly 
true.     3.  It  appears  that  this  is  no  merely  fictitious 
Idea  from  the  uniformity  of  it  in  all  persons  who  have 
freed  themselves  from  the  entanglements  of  corporeal 
phantasms.     Those  we  call  entia  rationis,  we  find  by 


188 

experience  in  our  minds  that  they  are  formed  ad  pla- 
citum,  we  may  imagine  them  as  many  ways  as  we 
please ;  but  we  see  it  is  quite  otherwise  in  this  Idea  of 
God  ;  for  in  those  attributes  or  perfections  which  by 
the  light  of  nature  we  attribute  to  God,  there  is  an  uni- 
form consent  in  all  those  who  have  divested  their  minds 
of  corporeal  phantasms  in  their  conceptions  of  God. 
For  while  men  have  agreed  that  the  object  of  their 
Idea  is  a  Being  absolutely  Perfect,  there  hath  been  no 
dissent  in  the  perfections  which  have  been  attributed  to 
it ;  none  have  questioned  but  that  infinite  Wisdom, 
Goodness  and  Power,  joined  with  necessity  of  exist- 
ence, have  been  all  implied  in  this  idea.  It  is  hardly 
conceivable  there  should  be  so  universal  a  consent  of 
minds  in  this  Idea,  were  it  not  a  natural  result  from 
the  free  use  of  our  Reason  and  Faculties."  Bishop 
Siillingfleefs  Origines  Sacrce^  B.III.  ch.  I.  V.  VI.  p. 
234—6. 


E. 

Even  now  there  are  not  a  few,  on  whose  convic- 
tions it  will  not  be  uninfluencive  to  know,  that  the 
power  by  which  men  are  led  to  the  truth  of  things,  in- 
stead of  the  appearances,  was  deemed  and  entitled  the 
living  and  subtantial  Word  of  God  by  the  soundest  of 
the  Hebrew  Doctors  ;  that  the  eldest  and  most  pro- 
found of  the  Greek  philosophers  demanded  assent  to 
their  doctrine,  mainly  as  Ooocfla  eonaQadoiog^  i.  e.  a 
traditionary  wisdom  that  had  its  origin  in  inspiration  : 


189 

that  those  men  referred  the  same  power  to  the  nvQ  kw 
CcDOP  V710  diovyiovvTog  AOFOT;  and  that  they  were 
scarcely  less  express  than  their  scholar  Philo  Judaeus, 
in  their  affirmations  of  the  Logos,  as  no  mere  attribute 
or  quality,  no  mode  of  abstraction,  no  personification, 
but  literally  and  mysteriously  Deus  alter  et  idem. 

The  very  same  truth  [that  the  Life  is  the  Light  of 
men]  is  found  in  a  fragment  of  the  Ephesian  Heracli- 
tus,  preserved  by  Stobaeus,  and  in  somewhat  different  _ 
words  by  Diogenes  Laertius.  Avv  v6(a  Xiyoviag  /a/u- 
QiCeod'ai  yQTi  tm  :'^vvco  navzcov'  zQeqovTac  yag  navii? 
ol  av&QOjnlvov  voov  vno  ivog  xov  '&atov  (Aoyov  *)  ^QaTel 
yoLQ  ToaovTOv  okogov  id^skei,  kuI  e^ccgael  7iaat>  aat  nsQL" 
yiveiui.  Translation  : — To  discourse  rationally  (=if 
we  would  render  the  discursive  understanding  "  dis- 
course of  Reason^ ^)  it  behoves  us  to  derive  strength 
from  that  which  is  common  to  all  men  :  (=the  light 
that  lighteth  every  man.)  For  all  human  understand^ 
ings  are  nourished  by  the  one  Divine  Word,  whose 
power  is  commensurate  with  his  will,  and  is  sufficient 
for  all  and  overfloweth  (=shineth  in  darkness,  and  is 
not  contained  therein,  or  comprehended  by  darkness.) 
Aids  to  Reflection,  p.  387,  8. 

The  learned  Cudworth  in  the  preface  to  his  great 
work  speaks  thus  :  '^  Moreover  we  have  in  the  fourth 
chapter,  largely  insisted  also  upon  the  Trinity.  The 
reason  whereof  was,  because  it  came  in  our  way,  and 
our  contents  engaged  us  thereunto,  in  order  to  the  giv- 
ing a  full  account  of  the  Pagan  theology,  it  being  cer- 
tain that  the  Platonics  and  Pythagoreans,  at  least,  if 


190 

not  other  Pagans  also,  bad  their  Trinity  as  well  as 
Christians.  And  we  could  not  well  avoid  the  compar- 
ing of  these  two  together :  upon  which  occasion  we 
take  notice  of  a  double  Platonic  Trinity ;  the  one  spu- 
rious and  adulterated  of  some  later  Platonists  :  the  oth- 
er true  and  genuine,  of  Plato  himself,  Parmenides,  and 
the  ancients.  The  former  of  which,  though  it  be  op- 
posed by  us  to  the  Christian  Trinity  and  confuted,  yet 
betwixt  the  latter  and  that,  do  we  find  a  wonderful  cor- 
respondence :  which  is  largely  pursued  in  the  Platonic 
Christian  apology.  Wherein,  notwithstanding,  nothing 
must  be  looked  upon  as  dogmatically  asserted  by  us, 
but  only  offered  and  submitted  to  the  judgment  of  the 
learned  in  these  matters  ;  we  confining  ourselves  in 
this  mysterious  point  of  the  Holy  Trinity,  within  the 
compass  of  these  its  three  essentials  declared  : — First, 
that  it  is  not  a  trinity  of  mere  names  or  words,  or  of 
logical  notions  only  ;  but  of  persons  or  hypostases. — 
Secondly,  that  none  of  those  persons  or  hypostases  are 
creatures,  but  all  uncreated. — And,  lastly,  that  they 
are  all  three,  truly  and  really  One  God.  Nevertheless 
we  acknowledge,  that  we  did  therefore  the  more  copi- 
ously insist  upon  this  argument,  because  of  our  then 
designed  defence  of  Christianity;  we  conceiving  that 
this  parallelism,  betwixt  the  ancient  or  genuine  Pla- 
tonic and  the  Christian  Trinity,  might  bd  of  some  use 
to  satisfy  those  amongst  us,  who  boggle  so  much  at  the 
trinity,  and  look  upon  it  as  the  choke-pear  of  Chris- 
tianity ;  when  they  shall  find  that  the  freest  wits 
amongst  the  Pagans,  and  the  best  philosophers,  who 


191 

had  nothing  of  superstition  to  determine  them  that 
way,  were  so  far  from  being  shy  of  such  an  hypothesis, 
as  that  they  were  even  fond  thereof. — *  *  *  True, 
indeed,  our  beHef  of  the  Holy  Trinity  is  founded  up- 
on no  Pagan  Cabala,  but  only  Scripture  revelation  ;  it 
being  that,  which  Christians  are,  or  should  be,  all  bap- 
tized into.  Nevertheless  these  things  are  reasonably 
noted  by  us  to  this  end,  that  that  should  not  be  made 
a  prejudice  against  Christianity  and  revealed  religion, 
nor  looked  upon  as  such  an  afFrightful  bugbear  or  mor- 
mo  in  it,  which  even  Pagan  philosophers  themselves,  and 
those  of  the  most  accomplished  intellectuals,  and  un- 
captivated  minds,  though  having  neither  councils,  nor 
creeds,  nor  scriptures,  had  so  great  a  propensity 
and  readiness  to  entertain,  and  such  a  veneration  for." 
Vol.  I,  p.  60-2. 

It  should  perhaps  be  mentioned  here,  that  some 
recent  German  writers  have  endeavoured  to  show 
that  the  Idea  of  a  Trinity  is  not  to  be  found  in  the 
writings  of  Plato.  Yet  even  if  this  were  true  it 
would  not  disprove  the  -principle  involved  in  the 
preceding  remarks.  For  in  addition  to  the  traces  of  a 
trinity  in  a  Divine  Being  current  among  the  Jews  of 
Alexandria  and  the  Platonists,  there  are  many  other 
indications  of  the  same  in  all  the  East,  particularly 
among  the  Indians  and  Egyptians  ;  which  is  proof  suf- 
ficient that  this  doctrine,  whencesoever  it  may  have 
been  first  derived,  whether  from  outward  or  inward 
revelation,  or  from  tradition,  is  not  so  repugnant  to  the 
principles  and  the  belief  of  the  human  mind.      Indeed 


192 

Neander  says  that  "  The  Idea  of  a  God  not  wrapt  up 
in  himself,  but  manifesting  himself — without  which 
there  could  be  found  no  perfect  revelation  of  God, — 
nay,  of  a  God  imparting  even  his  own  essence,  is  the 
fundamental  Idea  of  Christianity,  and  also  the  basis  of 
ALL  LIVING  Theism."  Alg.  Kircheng.  B.  II.  abt.  II. 
p.  789. 

If,  as  some  maintain,  the  Idea  of  the  Trinity  so 
far  transcends  the  apprehension  of  all  finite  faculties, 
and  if  yet  this  doctrine  be  found  in  the  Bible,  we  might 
ask  whether  the  Prophets  and  Apostles  who  were  the 
instruments  of  communicating  this  revelation  had  any 
distinct  apprehension  of  it  ?  And  if  so,  were  they  still 
men  ?  If  it  be  necessary  that  a  super-human  agency 
be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  mind  in  order  to  en- 
able it  to  apprehend  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  do  all 
enjoy  that  Divine  aid,  or  do  they  not  ?  If  not,  is  that 
doctrine  a  truth  for  them  ?  Or,  if  the  mind  in  itself 
or  in  conjunction  with  those  supernatural  influences 
vouchsafed  to  all,  had  not  a  capacity  or  adaptedness  to 
the  apprehension  of  the  highest  spiritual  truths,  could 
those  truths  be  communicated  to  it  by  writing  or  ver- 
bal address  ?  Can  an  ape  be  brought  to  apprehend  the 
principles  of  mathematics  ?     And  why? 

Plotinus,  as  quoted  by  Coleridge,  says :  "  To  those  to 
whose  imagiation  it  has  never  been  presented,  how  beau- 
tiful is  the  countenance  of  justice  and  wisdom  ;  and  that 
neither  the  morning  nor  the  evening  star  is  so  fair.  For, 
in  order  to  direct  the  view  aright,  it  behoves  that  the  be- 
holder should  have  made  himself  congenerous  and  simi- 


193 

lar  to  the  object  beheld.  Never  could  the  eye  have 
beheld  the  sun,  had  not  its  own  essence  been  soliform," 
(that  is,  pre-configured  to  light  by  a  similarity  of  es- 
sence with  that  of  light,)  "  neither  can  a  soul  not  beau- 
tiful attain  to  an  intuition  of  beauty."  Nor,  we  may 
add,  can  a  mind  in  its  nature  not  adapted  to  form  an 
Idea  of  the  Trinity,  ever  attain  to  an  afpprehension  of 
the  Trinity.  On  the  use  of  Reason  in  Religion 
Quenstedt  aptly  remarks  :  "  Sine  usu  rationis  nemo  in 
theologia  versari  potest ;  neque  enim  brutis  aut  animal" 
ibus,  rationis  expertibus,  proponenda  est  theologia. 
Uti  itaque  homo  sine  oculis  non  potest  videre,  sine 
auribus  non  potest  audire,  ita  sine  ratione,  sine  qua  ne 
quidem  homo  est,  non  potest  percipere,  quae  fides  com- 
plectitur.  With  Saurin,  Bayle  believed  that  the  chris- 
tian doctrines  accord  with  reason,  but  that  human  rea- 
son cannot  perceive  this  accordance.  He  did  not  doubt 
but  that  the  mysteries  of  Christianity  were  conformable 
to  the  high  absolute  reason  of  God,  but  he  believed  that 
the  small  imperfect  part  of  reason  communicated  to 
man  is  not  sufficient  to  afford  him  an  insight  into  that 
agreement.  Leibnitz  held  that  the  mysteries  of  the 
christian  faith  are  not  opposed  to  reason  but  above  it. 
He  made  two  classes  of  truths,  the  one  eternal  and 
necessary,  the  opposite  of  which  would  be  a  contradic- 
tion ;  and  the  other  positive  truths,  or  those  laws  which 
God,  according  to  his  own  wisdom  and  goodness,  im- 
posed upon  creation.  Nothing  can  contradict  the  for- 
mer, and  therefore  nothing  can  be  absolutely  opposed 
to  reason ;  the  latter  may  be  subordinated  to  higher 
17 


194 

grounds,  and  consequently  some  things  may  be  above 
our  reason.  He  thought  also  that  much  confusion  arose 
from  confounding  the  words  to  comprehend  and  to  ex- 
plain.  Les  mysteres  surpassent  notre  raison,  car  ils 
contiennent  des  verites  qui  ne  sont  comprises  dans  cet 
enchainment ;  mais  ils  ne  sont  point  contraires  a  notre 
raison,  et  ne  contredisent  a  ancune  des  verites  ou  cet 
enchainment  nous  pent  mener. 

II  y  a  souvent  un  peu  de  confusion  dans  les  expres- 
sions de  ceux  qui  commettent  ensemble  la  philosophic 
et  la  theologie,  ou  la  foi  et  la  raison  ;  ils  confondent  ex- 
pliquer,  comprendre,  yrouvevy  soutenir.     Les  mysteres 
se  peuvent  expliquer,  autant  qu'il  faut  pour  les  croire  ; 
mais  on  ne  les  sauroit  comprendre,  ni  faire   entendre 
comment  ils  arrivent.     On  this  subject  generally,  many 
remarks  rich  in  thought  and  profound  may   be  seen  in 
Tvvesten's  Dogmatik,  B.  I.   ss.  463-496.      Without 
an  outward  revelation  correspondent  to  the  law  written 
upon  the  heart,  in  order  that  the  former  might  serve  to 
elicit  the  latter  and  awaken  it  to  life,  and  without  su- 
pernatural or  Divine  influences  to  enable  him  to  rise 
above  himself  and  to  withstand  the  promptings  of  an 
inward  depravity  as  well  as  to  attain  to  clear  intuitions 
of  objects  spiritual  and  unseen,  forlorn  indeed   were 
man.      And  although,  compared  with  the  full-orbed 
day  of  Christianity,  Paganism  was  but  the  dark  night 
of  religion,  still  on  examination  we  shall  find  that  night 
to  have  been  studded  with  twinkling  and  heavenly  stars, 


195 


The  prominence  which  our  author  concedes  to  Schel- 
ling,  and  the  little  that  is  known  of  him  in  this  coun- 
try, will  be  a  sufficient  justification  for  our  dwelling 
with  the  more  particularity  upon  him.  He  is  univer- 
sally allowed  to  have  been  a  thinker  of  great  depth 
and  originality.  But  at  the  same  that  this  acknowl- 
edgement is  made,  and  whilst  some  of  the  most  judi- 
cious writers  in  Germany  admit  their  indebtedness  to 
him,  they  yet  charge  his  philosophy  with  being  essen- 
tially pantheistic,  and  accuse  him  of  radical  errour  in  ma- 
ny of  his  fundamental  principles.  The  annexed  de- 
scription of  himself  and  his  system  by  one  of  his  own 
countrymen,  although  partaking  somewhat  of  the  char- 
acter of  the  humourous,  will  be  read  with  interest.  Af- 
ter speaking  of  Fichte  and  various  other  of  Schelling's 
predecessors,  the  writer  proceeds  : 

Now  came  Schelling.  He  sought  not  so  much  to 
balance  accurately  the  opposition  between  the  Sub- 
jective and  the  Objective,  as  to  deduce  from  their  ori- 
ginal union,  (identity,)  the  Philosophy  of  Identity,  of 
which  the  two  poles  are  the  philosophy  of  Being,  (phi- 
losophy of  nature,)  and  the  philosophy  of  Knowing, 
(transcendental  Idealism.)  He  was  a  bright  phe- 
nomenon, perhaps  the  most  distinguished  that  has 
ever  appeared  in  the  domain  of  philosophy.  Who  has 
not  at  least  a  general  knowledge  of  the  views  of  Schel- 
ling ?     In  the  mean  time,  however,  it  must  not  be  con- 


196 

cealed,  that  in  antiquity  as  well  as  in  the  middle  ages, 
kindred  spirits  announced  kindred  theories,  yet  not 
with  the  same  fulness  or  systematic  completion  as  has 
beeii  done  by  him.  Even  in  the  antiquity  of  Greece 
we  find  already  the  doctrine  of  One  in  All,  (or  all  in 
one,)  and  the  same  doctrine  existed  still  earlier  in  the 
East.  Then  in  the  middle  ages,  what  a  kindredness  of 
views  do  we  find  to  have  been  held  by  Scotus  Erigena, 
by  Gerson,  by  Giordano  Bruno,  whom  Schelling  him- 
self has  recently  called  forth  from  his  darkness,  and  fi- 
nally, by  that  mystic  of  all  mystics,  Jacob  Boehman  ! 
And  besides,  without  Fichte,  or  even  without  Kant, 
what  would  Schelling  have  been  ?  Still,  however,  al- 
though outward  stimuli  were  brought  to  bear  upon  him, 
and  his  growing  mind  was  nourished  by  nutrition  re- 
ceived from  others,  yet  he  possessed  an  individual  and 
inward  power,  a  living  activity  ;  he  was  endowed  with 
an  energy  and  a  union  of  intuitive  thought  or  think- 
ing intuition,  (eine  Verbindungdesschauenden  Denkens, 
oder  denkenden  Schauens,)  in  a  manner  and  to  a 
degree  that  was  imparted  to  no  other  thinker  of  that 
period  so  rich  in  men  of  thought.  Nevertheless,  has 
this  man  of  Genius  conducted  any  farther  than  to  pan- 
theism ?  It  would  be  difficult  to  show  that  he  has, 
and  therefore  he  has  only  reached  that  goal  which  in 
the  East  is  the  starting-point  of  philosophical  specula- 
tions. Now  these  oriental  speculations  in  destroying 
the  conception  of  a  creation,  annihilate  also  the  concep- 
tion of  a  holy  Creator  and  Lord  of  the  world ;  or  in  other 
words,  if  the  Divine  revelation  contained  in  the  sacred 


197 

history  be  true,  they  put  falsehood  in  the  place  of  truth. 
But  this  Oriental  pantheism  being  once  received,  how 
does  the  pantheism  of  Schelling  differ  from  it  ?  And 
wherein  consists  the  distinction  between  the  former, 
and  the  doctrine  of  All  in  One,  or  the  doctrine  of  Iden- 
tity ?  But  grant  that  they  are  true,  and  what  advan- 
tage accrues  to  our  knowledge  from  the  genial  specu- 
lations of  Schelling,  or  what  farther  insight  do  we  re- 
ceive from  the  no  less  genial  speculations  of  the  old 
East  ?  They  teach  us  to  know  neither  the  All  nor 
the  One,  but  we  must  rest  satisfied  with  empty  postu- 
lates and  hollow  formulas,  of  which  the  highest  and  the 
ultimate  is  that  A=A.  [Absolute  Identity  alone  is, 
and  besides  it  there  is  in  fact  nothing  else  ;  conse- 
quently also  there  is  nothing  which  is  in  itself  really 
finite.  All  things  that  are,  are  but  the  Absolute  Iden- 
tity and  its  developed  being  ;  for  the  opposites,  as  the 
Impression,  the  Sides,  the  Poles  of  the  Absolute,  do 
yet  derive  their  existence  from  it,  and  are  only  distin- 
guished now  by  the  preponderance  of  the  Ideal  and 
now  of  the  Real,  (duplicity,  polarity,)  and  these  again 
become  unified,  (indifFerenced,)  through  Totality. 
Identity  in  Triplicity  is  the  law  of  developement. 
This  derivation  of  existence,  or  these  developed  forms 
of  being,  is  at  one  time  called  a  Dualizing,  (a  distin- 
guishing, a  differencing,)  of  the  Absolute,  and  again  it 
is  called  Self-revelation,  Through  this  self-revelation 
absolute  cognition  is  also  rendered  possible  ;  and  Rea- 
son itself,  in  so  far  as  it  is  absolute,  constitutes  the 
identity  of  the  ideal  and  the  real.     The  Form  of  the 


198 

essence  of  the  Absolute,  is  the  absolute  act  of  knowing, 
in  which  identity,  unity,  passes  over  into  duplicity, 
A=A.] 

Notwithstanding  all  the  intellectual  intuition  [The 
absolute  identity  of  the  Subjective  and  the  Objec- 
tive constitutes  the  essence  of  the  Absolute=God. 
Through  an  absolute  act  of  cognition,  in  which  the  sub- 
jective and  the  objective  become  identical,  is  the  Ab- 
solute known.  This  cognitive  act  is  termed  intellec- 
tual intuition,  intellectuelle  Anschauung.]  of  Schelling, 
from  the  Starry  Heavens  on  high  down  to  the  small 
blade  of  grass  upon  the  earth,  the  energy  and  Creative 
power  of  the  All-Seeing  One  is  entirely  concealed  from 
our  view.  And  the  All-Seeing  himself,  does  he  ex- 
hibit his  countenance  in  this  Philosophy  of  Identity  ? 
He  before  whom  hosts  of  angels — if  revelation  does 
not  deceive  us — continually  cry  aloud,  Holy,  Holy, 
Holy,  does  He  obey  the  magic  call  of  the  Philosopher 
and  stand  before  us  in  his  grandeur  and  in  his  glory, 
and  at  the  same  time  in  his  mercy  and  compassion 
towards  the  weak  race  of  man  ?  The  Philosopher  does 
not  think  on  poverty  of  spirit,  nor  on  the  feebleness  of 
man ;  but  as  a  young  Lion  rather  he  bounds  forward 
exulting  in  his  might.  And  well  might  he  do  so,  since 
a  God  and  a  Universe  simultaneously,  or  rather  a  God 
and  a  Universe  one  and  the  same.  One  in  Two,  spring 
forth  from  the  thinker's  head ; — an  act  which  may  be 
compared  with  that  of  Jupiter's  in  giving  birth  to  the 
Goddess  of  Wisdom,  when  Minerva  leapt  forth  from 
his  head  armed  and  mailed  against  every  opposing  foe. 


199 

It  is  well  known  how  warmly  the  Philosophy  of  the 
Absolute  went  forth  armed  with  Sword  and  Lance  to 
withstand  its  opposers  to  the  face. 

We  may  calmly  acknowledge,  however,  that  no 
one  of  these  opposers  ever  attained  to  the  height  of 
Schelling  ;  for  it  is  much  easier  to  find  fault  with  that 
which  has  been  created  than  to  call  it  into  being. 
Does  not  the  nasal-twanged  Jurist  whom  Goethe  men- 
tions in  his  biography,  say  "  I  have  detected  imperfec- 
tions even  in  God  himself?''  Why  then  should  Schel- 
ling have  remained  unattacked  ?  Who  is  not  open  to 
attack  in  some  part  ?  [Even  Achilles,  though  plung- 
ed into  the  Styx  by  the  Goddess  Thetis,  was  still  not 
invulnerable  in  the  heel.]  But  notwithstanding  the 
opposition  which  Schelling  had  to  encounter,  on  the 
other  hand  he  found  more  disciples,  followers  and  im- 
itators, than  any  of  his  cotemporaries  or  predecessors 
in  the  New  Philosophy  ;  and  those  who  with  views 
either  apparently  or  actually  of  a  contrary  tenour  op- 
posed themselves  to  him,  even  they,  as  if  involuntarily, 
did  still  imbibe  his  spirit.  Heinroth's  Pisteodicee,  s, 
312-314. 


ERRATA . 

Page  16  line  14  from    top    for    "  principle  '*    read     principal. 

in  being         "  inheing. 

insert     the  before  "  understanding." 

"effect"         read  effort 

"  remain "  "         remains. 

"  end  "  "  ^  and. 

'^?;AovTat"       "    iccclovpTcti. 

receives  "  receive. 

condictious  "  contradictious. 


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